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The human subject is profoundly interdependent, in relation to other people and to the 
surrounding environment, both “natural” and technological. Western dualistic thinking creates 
bounded and oppositional categories and generates a conception of human subjects as 
autonomous, self-sufficient beings that are transparent to themselves and in control of self, other, 
and world. This contributes to the ongoing inequalities in society and supports normative 
hegemony. This dissertation argues that it is imperative to insist on the intersubjective, 
permeable, and contingent qualities of existence. While this project is preceded by a great deal of 
theoretical criticism of Western metaphysical dualism, we must still continually work to break 
down the binaries of mind and body, self and other, rational and emotional, culture and nature. 
We need not just to critique the binaries but to generate new ways of thinking. I propose that art 
can act as a catalyst for thinking the new. Art can queer the boundaries. It is impossible to 
  
vi 
separate out the mind from the sensual body in the production or reception of art. Art 
demonstrates how the sensual and affected/affecting body is integral to the thinking subject, not 
an impurity or distraction that needs to be controlled.  
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Introduction 
 
In the philosophical tradition that begins with Plato and continues through Descartes, 
Husserl, and Sartre, the ontological distinction between soul (consciousness, mind) and 
body invariably supports relations of political and psychic subordination and hierarchy. 
The mind not only subjugates the body, but occasionally entertains the fantasy of fleeing 
its embodiment altogether. The cultural associations of mind with masculinity and body 
with femininity are well documented within the field of philosophy and feminism. As a 
result, any uncritical reproduction of the mind/body distinction ought to be rethought for 
the implicit gender hierarchy that the distinction has conventionally produced, 
maintained, and rationalized. 
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble  
 
 At its most basic, this project is aimed at exploring tactics for the incitement of 
nondualistic thinking-acting in the world. It is a project driven by the sense that the present is 
unacceptable and that one of the things that perpetuates this unacceptable present is a perverse 
insistence on oppositional dualism: self/other, mind/body, rational/emotional, culture/nature, 
man/woman, heterosexual/homosexual, and more. Habits of thinking are hard to break perhaps, 
and they provide the comfort of the familiar, but for some, the results of these bad habits are 
anything but comfortable. Dualistic thinking does not just separate the world into arbitrary 
categories but it ranks those categories. When some people in the world are perpetually 
associated with the lesser half of a dualism their lives become less livable. The question then 
becomes how best to break the habits of thought and think the new. It is not my intention to 
provide a singular and unique answer. I posit that a part of imagining a future that is different 
than, better than, the present requires giving up notions of a single individual working alone 
creating something completely unique. This project will extol notions of connectivity and 
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interdependence. My hope is to contribute to a multiplicitous and ongoing dialog. This 
dissertation works from a history within feminist and queer theory of critiquing Western dualism 
and the primacy of the rational, individualist subject. Feminists have worked to establish the 
links between different forms of oppression that hinge on the restrictive understanding of the 
body and its subordinate relation to the mind. They pointed to the way that some bodies are 
marked as irrational, natural, sensational, and emotional in order to draw an exclusionary 
boundary around the all important objective, rational subject. Through a consideration of 
embodiment and affect I will argue for a new conception, a new image of thought, one that 
stresses the interconnected and dependent nature of the subject. 
In this introduction I first lay out, in brief, the specific provocations that lead me to the 
assertion that the present is unacceptable. Then I articulate the elements of theory and action I 
wish to explore for their potential effect. I am informed throughout by feminist theory, queer 
theory, affect theory, with perhaps a perverse interest in scientific inquiry. Perversion is of 
course not necessarily bad. Perversion can stand with the non-normative and anti-hegemonic. 
Understanding the risks of positivist scientificity, I will still pepper my project with questions, if 
not conclusions, from contemporary scientific study. We must think differently to make a 
different world. We must open ourselves up to being affected and acknowledge and cultivate our 
affect on others. We must give up control and see our dependence not as weakness but as 
potential. 
 This dissertation will use art as a theoretical object to explore theories of embodiment and 
affect and work toward a different future. Along the way it will engage with feminist and queer 
theory and Deleuzian aesthetics. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept that art, science, and philosophy 
are all propelled by a similar impulse has great appeal. They imagine that each deals with chaos, 
  3 
intercepting it to a degree to keep it from overwhelming. They also conceive of the world as 
multiplicitous and interconnected. One way of thinking the interconnectedness of the world is 
through the image of the rhizome. The research for this dissertation will form a network of 
connections, or rhizomes, between disciplines, addressing cultural criticism, feminism, queer 
theory, all at the intersection of contemporary time-based and installation art. I will look to the 
artwork of several contemporary artists, and I will end with a consideration of my own artistic 
practice. In conjunction with this dissertation, I have created a body of work that, while it does 
not attempt to be strictly exemplary of the theories addressed in the text-based research, will be 
inspired by the theory and hopefully productive of new thought.  
Art practice will work in concert with theoretical research. The written component of the 
dissertation project will be broken into five sections: Embodied Orientation, Sensational Bodies, 
Queer Emotions, Affected Minds, and Art in Practice. The last section will reflect on the 
installation produced as the creative component of the project, titled Suitable for Wet Locations. 
This project will appeal to art to imagine how to manifest concepts as affects, to imagine an 
approach in which the mind and body are extended into the world and all are integral 
components of a process of becoming. I appeal to art because it already contains so many 
confusions of borders, because it works best when it is an embodied cognition, and because it is 
a doing and a thinking. Art is in no way free from the problematic structures of dominant society, 
but it still holds promise of being an entry point into a new way to be in the world. Art can be 
connective, between body and mind, but art is also connective with the political. As theorist 
Mieke Bal observes, “Neither art nor the political are defined by subject matter. They are 
domains of agency, where acting becomes possible and can have effects.”1 All of the artists 
                                                      
1 Bal, Doris Salcedo's Political Art, 2. 
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selected for this project deal with the political in a way that is not simply didactic but is complex 
and compels the viewer to think and also to feel. They all work with a diversity of media but 
consistently occupy the space of the viewer and implicate the body as the locus of a thinking, 
moving, feeling, embodied subject. 
 I turn to affect and embodiment not as a turning away from other theoretical work but 
more in the senses of a rhizome extending out, hopefully to reconnect and branch out again, or as 
a new coupling within an assemblage. As mentioned, part of this project takes inspiration from 
the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. And of course at the same time I am reading 
Bergson, bits of Nietzsche, flashes of Foucault, and my own work here is heavily indebted to 
these authors and more. Some of the key texts that influence this project are: Halberstam’s, 
Queer Art of Failure and In a Queer Time and Place, Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology and 
The Promise of Happiness, Massumi’s Parables for the Virtual, Goodman’s Sonic Warfare, 
Muñoz’s Cruising Utopia and Disidentifications, Jean Gebser’s The Ever-present Origin, and 
Elizabeth Grosz’s Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze And The Framing Of The Earth. I connect to 
these works and extended them further. 
The project is informed throughout, in some sections more explicitly than others, by 
queer theory. I look to queer theory for its capacity to deviate from the normative, the dominant, 
the common sense opinion. Art, at its best, questions these things as well. “Queer” resists an easy 
definition and promotes a comfort with a certain level of ambiguity, remaining open to 
renegotiation. That said, I will provide some sense of how I will be using the concept in this 
dissertation. Queer theory reclaims the once wholly derogatory term and makes claims for a 
human subject that is complex and fluid. Sara Ahmed in Queer Phenomenology uses queer to 
refer to “what is ‘oblique’ or offline,” while she also uses the word to refer to “specific sexual 
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practices.”2 I do not view queer theory as something narrowly applying to the realm of those who 
identify as queer or as lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex, or asexual; however, I do not want 
this connotation of the word to be erased.  In this project I am more concerned with how queer 
theory might be used to further the dismantling of structures that generate and oppress a 
minoritarian community. I use the word minoritarian, following Jose´ Esteban Muñoz, as a term 
to “index citizen-subjects who, due to antagonisms within the social such as race, class, and sex, 
are debased within the majoritarian public sphere.”3 It is not strictly speaking about numbers or 
ratios within populations. Queer theory questions the legitimacy of dominant social structures 
and the ‘objective’ knowledge used to maintain dominance. While queer theory offers resistance 
it is not simply oppositional. It does not set itself up as the binary extension of the dominant. It 
may follow lines that deviate or pervert or expose the assumptions of majoritarian culture and 
understanding, but instead of strict opposition it offers instead “a commitment not to presume 
that lives have to follow certain lines in order to count as lives.”4 I will also use the term 
queering; to queer something is to challenge the normative assumptions embedded within. Lisa 
Duggan, referring to queer theory, claims that it is more than a new terminology; it brings with it 
“the promise of new meanings, new ways of thinking and acting politically.”5 I aim to queer 
Western dualism, to confuse the boundary distinction of fixed notions of identify, and to enact a 
new image of thinking and a new future. 
Provocation to Embodiment 
The separation and superiority of mind over body is a significant problem in that the 
                                                      
2 Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology, 161. 
3 Muñoz, Cruising Utopia, 56. 
4 Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology. 187. 
5 Duggan, “Making it Perfectly Queer,” 51. 
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underlying assumptions of Cartesian dualism have been used to justify the subjugation of a large 
percentage of the population, not to mention the degradation of the environment.6 This dualism is 
emblematic of a conception of the humanist subject that has fueled a will to control: body, 
nature, other. Scholars have critiqued the dualistic humanist subject of Western thought, yet the 
model persists. N. Kathryn Hayles, among others, even argues that there are forces that are 
strengthening the practice. She theorizes that our current age is a pivotal moment. Having 
survived the classical humanist subject, we are still faced with an imminent threat that the 
disembodied subject will be reinstalled in the move to embrace a utopian vision of escape into a 
technologically driven, virtual world. She sees too many fantasies of a world in which 
consciousness can be coded as information and downloaded into all powerful and immortal 
machines.7 In this moment, when those assigned the position of other are still subjugated by the 
effects of dualistic thinking, this schema is being rejuvenated.  
 Poststructuralist theorists examine the assumptions of rationality and universality 
embedded in the liberal, individualist conception of humanity as well as the coincident dualistic 
structures. The primacy placed on rationality serves to eliminate the voices of those deemed less 
rational, and the assumption of universality is made possible through the exclusion of difference. 
The “man of reason” is elevated at the expense of a host of “others.” The removal of thought 
from the body, and its restriction to the rational mind, creates a disembodied subject that assumes 
greater authority because it is believed to be unaffected by concerns for individual bodies or 
                                                      
6 See Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007). Susan Bordo, The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on 
Cartesianism and Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). Elizabeth Grosz, Time Travels: 
Feminism, Nature, Power (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: 
The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991). Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature 
(London: Routledge, 1993). 
 
7 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman,. 4-5. 
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different bodies. Despite facing various radical critiques, vestiges of the classic humanist subject 
remain ingrained in the thought patterns of many present-day theorists, including oddly enough, 
some working within the area termed post-humanism. To the extent that people still try to image 
a rational subject with a dualistic division between body and mind, there is the danger of 
reinforcing a disembodiment that does not need to take note of the specificities of skin color, sex, 
or any other marker of difference. Braidotti warns, “In spite of the sustained efforts of many 
radical critics, the mental habits of linearity and objectivity persist in their hegemonic hold over 
our thinking.”8 In response to this persistent power of the concept of the rational objective 
subject, I will look to theories that allow us to reconceive the mind and body as one, and 
understand the way this mind-body interacts with and is sustained by the world. 
I begin the first chapter by demonstrating the problem of the mind/body duality and 
explore the benefits of an embodied and embedded conception of the subject. I argue that art has 
the potential to enact this embodiment and challenge destructive oppositional constructs that still 
dominate conventional thinking. I will take the work of Janine Antoni as a case study to explore 
the implications of theories of embodiment. Antoni’s work involves the body without 
representing the body and employs a process-focused practice that highlights the fluid and 
interconnected becoming subject. Turning to the work of Mona Hatoum, I will extend the notion 
of the embedded subject into a consideration of phenomenology; however, inspired by Sara 
Amhed’s Queer Phenomenology, this will be a queer approach. Here I will consider how 
subjects come to be oriented in the world and how certain orientations are favored over others. 
Hatoum’s work helps us to queer the object world and denaturalize normative hegemony. 
 In the second chapter, I argue that sensation is integral in art and equally integral to 
                                                      
8 Braidotti, Metamorphoses, 1. 
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confusing the boundaries of binary oppositions. In a way this chapter is an extension of the work 
on embodiment; a key component of the embodied experience is bodily sensation. The body’s 
experience of sensation implicates the profundity of embodiment to the experience of the subject 
but also the degree to which the body is not independent from the sensation-engendering world. 
In short, I will argue for the power and force of sensation and the sensational essence of art. 
Dualism is still a present concern in that sensation is associated with the body and separated from 
the rational mind. An added complication to this critique of dualism, ocularcentrism, creates 
ranked differences between the senses. Sight is preferred to the other senses for its imagined 
capacity to distance the subject from the objective world. Here I will again insist on the 
interconnected nature of the subject and also stress the interconnected nature of sensory 
perception. Within this chapter I will consider sound art as my primary source material, but I also 
look at sound in relation to works that are multimodal, creating a synesthetic experience. I will 
turn to sound and polysensorial work and to Deleuze’s notion of art as intensity and affect for a 
non-hierarchical understanding of sensation. I will address the work of Christina Kubisch, 
Laetitia Sonami, and Pipilotti Rist. Sound plays a prominent role in the work of all three artists, 
though they do not employ sound in isolation. These multi-sensory works that cross the 
boundaries of the separate faculties can disrupt fixed categories and articulate the relational. 
 The third chapter turns to a consideration of emotion. Emotion is devalued and suspect; it 
is the irrational to the rational mind. It is also another powerful tool to analyze and debunk 
dualistic thinking. Affect permeates the thinking subject and defies Western rationalism. 
Emotion is also thought of as private and interior and relegated to spheres apart from the public 
and politic. I will argue for a new consideration of affect. I will first establish the parameters of 
the many theories regarding affect and then narrow in on the emotional state of happiness. Here I 
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will again turn to the work of Sara Ahmed, drawing inspiration from her book, The Promise of 
Happiness. I will consider this work in relation to Judith Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure. 
Happiness can move us, direct our path through life, and drive us to achieve success. But the 
normative understanding of the good life may direct us down too narrow a path that leaves no 
room for deviation. I will contemplate emotion as a political force and do so primarily in 
association with the artwork of Félix González-Torres but also look to the work of Wafaa Bilal 
and Shirin Neshat. They each create work that is highly affecting.  
 Chapter Four again addresses theories of affect, but now in a Deleuzian sense: affect in 
the sense of a body capable of acting on and being acted upon. This affect will implicate the 
sensitivity of the human subject to interior and exterior forces. Things in the world, in nature, in 
our own bodies, affect us. I will show the conception of the mind as logical is illusionary and 
destructive. Affect is a force that can help reveal the illusion. I will also insist the ‘natural’ world 
is a dynamic force, far from the passive ground for an active culture, that can thwart the will to 
control and dismantle misconceptions of human self-sufficiency and self transparency. Through 
affect I will queer the image of thinking. New ways of thinking are required for new ways of 
being in the world. And thinking is not the isolated work of the mind, but is in the coupling of 
the mind and body, the body and world. Thought, and affect may be linked in all operations of 
the mind, but perhaps they are easier to recognize in art 
 The final chapter will address my own artistic production: what drives it, what form it 
takes, my hopes for it. But much like the previous chapters I will also be addressing an 
assemblage of concepts. In conjunction with this dissertation I have created and installation titled 
Suitable for Wet Locations. My own art is directed at the divide between culture and nature and 
by extension many other binary constructions. I bring living plants into the work to introduce the 
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real time dynamism of the living world. I place the plants in a built environment that sustains 
them. The specific type of plant I am using is grass. Grass has many uses and associations; I will 
play off these to suggest a problematic in the instrumentalized approach to nature. But the work 
is not ideally experienced from an intellectual position alone. I think of it in terms of blocs of 
sensation. While I anticipate and welcome attempts to interpret or read the content, for me the 
cognitive is not separate from the sensational and is enhanced when the connections to sensation 
are strengthened. 
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Chapter One: Embodied Orientation 
 
The body is the vehicle of being in the world. 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception  
 
Embodiment is a prominent theme in phenomenology. Embodiment concerns the body 
not as objective physiological object, but as a phenomenal, experiential body of lived 
subjectivity.  In this sense the body is the location of the subjective and intersubjective 
experience of being-in-the world.  My interest in embodiment is for its potential to complicate 
the boundaries of mind and body, subject and object, and self and world. The subject comes into 
being with the world, and the body extends into the world. Cognition, associated with the mind, 
is embodied and situated and according to theorists Price and Shildrick takes “account not simply 
of sexual difference but of racial difference, class difference and differences due to disability; in 
short the specific contextual materiality of the body.”1 In this chapter I will articulate the 
problem of the continued practice of thinking dualistically and placing the mind apart from, and 
opposed to, the body. I will argue for the necessity of an embodied and embedded conception of 
the subject and argue that art has the potential to enact an embodied and situated approach to 
experience and knowledge. As part of this consideration of embodiment, I will incorporate the 
insights of Sarah Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology and examine the importance of how subjects 
are oriented in the world. After establishing an art historical context for the work of embodiment, 
I will then think through the implications of these ideas by describing specific works of art by 
                                                      
1 Price and Shildrick, Feminist Theory and The Body, 5. 
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Janine Antoni and Mona Hatoum.  
The body is a site of crucial negotiations, in part, because of the long history of 
separating the mind from the body and placing the mind in the privileged position, a position not 
coincidently associated with man–the Western, white, man of means. The splitting character of 
the classical humanist subject places mind as spirit above body as earthbound. This hierarchy is 
often associated with Descartes, but we can also see traces of it leading back to Plato. For Plato 
the body was a threat to the higher order of reason, an unfortunate and limiting receptacle for the 
soul.2 Descartes further separates the soul, or consciousness, from nature and the bodies 
contained therein. Descartes famous pronouncement, “I think therefore I am” negates the bodily 
influences derived from the senses. For Descartes, “the soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely 
distinct from the body.”3 While more contemporary instantiations of the binary equate the mind 
with the processes of the brain, Descartes elevated the mind to equate with the soul and left the 
body as lowly animal, a mere vessel that can serve only to befoul the mind it contains. 
 Shifting the orientation toward the body is part of the larger project of moving away from 
a system that installs boundaries: boundaries between mind and body, man and woman, culture 
and nature, human and technology, human and animal, organism and world, and even self and 
other. The mind is celebrated as rational, cultural, and a key component of the universal, 
objective subject. The humanist subject possesses these qualities but by the nature of the 
dualistic operation, or what Dianne Currier calls the “logic of identity,” these qualities are denied 
to the “other.” According to this logic, “difference is conceptualized only in terms of degree of 
difference from the privileged term.”4 Thus, woman is defined as not-man, and is consequently 
                                                      
2 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 5. 
3 Jones, Critical Terms, 251. 
4 Currier, “Assembling Bodies,” 520. 
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not afforded an independent identity of her own. The body is denied any influence, other than a 
negative one. The body is of nature, of animal, and is uncontrollable. This reveals the mistaken 
belief that we posses a unified stable subjectivity that is in control of the mind. Rather than try to 
gain equal access to the privileges of mind, I want to join with those who argue that we instead 
reject the duality all together. In breaking down the dynamic of the mind/body and the 
identity/other dualisms, no term is privileged and no one is privileged. The body is not placed 
above the mind but the interconnectedness between them is galvanized. In turning to the body we 
must guard against the danger of elevating the body to an essentialist destiny without 
consideration of context. Bodies exist in relation; they are historically and culturally situated. 
Our understanding of the body is always mediated by culture, even constituted by culture. 
Grosz expresses the issue succinctly: “There is no natural body to return to, no pure sexual 
difference one could gain access to if only the distortions and deformations of patriarchy could 
be removed or transformed.”5 How women are defined by culture, how bodies are depicted is 
central to the very construction of what bodies are. Here again Grosz effectively describes the 
problem. Bodies “are not only inscribed, marked, engraved, by social pressures external to them 
but are the products; the direct effects, of the very social constitution of nature itself. It is not 
simply that the body is represented in a variety of ways according to historical, social, and 
cultural exigencies while it remains basically the same; these factors actively produce the body 
as a body of a determinate type.”6  
 The problem of privileging the mind and denying positive significance to difference has 
led many to challenge the negation of the body. Many women artists have tried to represent their 
bodies differently and their bodily difference. Women artists have focused on the body as a way 
                                                      
5 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 58. 
6 Ibid., x. 
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to insist on their existence, their positive presence, and to redefine the significance of their own 
bodies. However, much of this early feminist art worked primarily within the realm of 
representational issues, and was readily co-opted by conceptions of woman as image or object of 
contemplation, rather than asserting an embodied existence that did not constitute the object to 
man’s subject. 
Embodiment in Art 
Art has never strayed very far from the body. The body has arguably always enjoyed a 
dominant role in art, at least with regard to representations of the body. Art has been about 
bodies for thousands of years. Not exclusively so, perhaps, but images of people and their bodies 
in art are ubiquitous throughout the history of art. But art can be more than representation. Art 
can involve the body. In fact, “the work of art is the work of embodiment, of bringing us to our 
senses and cognition.”7 Ultimately I will argue that theories of embodiment are a way around 
many of the limitations of a representationalist emphasis in art. 
 Art’s strength is not only in how it functions like a language transmitting ideas but also 
how it functions directly on embodied, situated, subjects. Creating new images of women was 
only so effective in achieving the desired changes in women’s social standing and perhaps even 
less effective in generating a genuine positive shift in the female subject. One avenue for 
exploring alternative approaches is to look at art that creates direct bodily sensation and 
downplays the importance of representation. On artist of interest then is Janine Antoni. Later, I 
consider her work and the manner in which she approaches the process of art making, the way 
that she treats the body, not as subject to be looked at, but as a process of discovery and 
revelation about her embodied experience of the world. 
                                                      
7 Meskimmon, Women Making Art, 5. 
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I now take a closer look at possible strategies for performing the work of dismantling the 
dualistic opposition between mind and body in the realm of art production and reception. To this 
end I will consider the relationship between art and embodiment. I will clarify that I make a 
distinction between work that is about the body and works of embodiment. In an effort to 
critique and contest normalizing cultural constructs, many feminist theorists and artists have 
worked with images of women and women’s bodies, and there has been a proliferation of 
feminist work on ‘the body,’ but while almost exclusively focusing on “discourses about the 
body.”8 While these strategies have been very productive, I want to question the viability of 
alternative strategies, ones that might also address the danger of an over reliance on the body as 
sign. It may now be more productive to move away from images of women and discourses about 
women’s bodies, toward processes that generate from an embodied and embedded position. It is 
in this spirit that I intend to examine the work of material and corporeal feminists and theories of 
embodiment for ways to think about art practice beyond images and language. 
Embodiment involves a positioned thinking subject inseparable from sensory perception. 
Art is particularly compelling in this project because it is not of the mind or the body but is 
produced and understood through the intertwined body-mind-world. Art can work in the spaces 
in-between. Art is of both mind and body. To the extent that it even makes sense to speak of the 
mind and body as two separate categories, art production and reception involves both. It 
necessitates the interaction of mind and body, bodies and other bodies, bodies and worlds. 
Arguably all activities necessitate these complex relations, but perhaps art can make this 
complexity inescapable and palpable. There has been a growing interest across many fields in 
embodiment. The body is not just a physiological object but is a locus of lived experience. 
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Embodiment also implicates the influences of the body on mind and subjectivity. In a sense, 
embodiment is a way of dealing with the body not as the other side to the mind but including 
aspects of conscious experience associated with the mind. With the rejection of the separation of 
mind and body, we effectively let the body back into the conversation as more than the mere 
housing of the mind, more than the unfortunate vessel, the obstacle to reason.  
Women’s relationship to the body and to art makes a consideration of embodiment 
imperative. Marsha Meskimmon, in Women Making Art: History, Subjectivity, Aesthetics, argues 
for an embodied knowledge to counter the long history of associating knowledge “with pure 
rationality, freed from the deceit of the senses, corporeality and by extension, ‘woman.’”9  
Meskimmon claims not only that art has a prime position to compel an understanding of 
embodied knowledge, but that women artists specifically are in the unique position given that  
“women have been placed on the negative side of the mind-body duality as ‘all body.’”10 
Strategically she maintains yet complicates, the duality, or at least difference, between man and 
woman. Her critical outlook relies on the notion of sexual difference. Arguably in keeping these 
distinct categories she is also maintaining the dualist structure of gender/sex differentiation. A 
potential weakness of her work is that she does not stress enough the constructed nature of these 
categories or acknowledge the ways that many people do not fit neatly into this either or 
conception. However, in that she is looking critically at the ranked binary nature of difference, 
she is complicating the oppositional dualism, and she tactically maintains the categories to 
perform the critical analysis of how difference has relegated women to the negated half of the 
dualism. A key impetus in Meskimmon’s project is to actualize a female subjectivity, a 
subjectivity that is not the ‘other’ to the masculine. Rather than trying to assert women’s 
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equivalent access to the mind, she, as so many others,11 argues that we reject the duality 
alltogether. An insistence on embodiment and situated corporeality can help to renegotiate a 
positive subjectivity for women. Certainly this move to embodiment is not the project of women 
alone, but this is one notable position from which to queer the unified subject, privileged at the 
“expense of its ‘other.’” Meskimmon points to how “the authoritative ‘I’ who authored texts, the 
intellectual subject capable of rational thought and the genius who created high art, was not a 
neutral subject, but masculine, heterosexual, white, euro–ethnic, middle-class and able-bodied–
the normative subject of Western epistemology and ontology.”12 The normative subject excluded 
women, among others, and excluded the feminized body. And thus a move to reincorporate the 
none-normative is potentially productive in an effort to dethrone the hegemonic unified, rational 
man.  
Embodiment allows us to think about the significance of the body without relying on an 
essentialist notion of the body. Embodiment moves us away from a consideration of the body as 
image or sign. Scholars like Stacy Alaimo and Elizabeth Grosz claim that poststructuralism 
fostered a “linguistic turn” in feminist theory. They claim that, while very productive on a 
number of fronts, the turn has gone too far, such that it leaves out the possibility of theorizing an 
embodied material existence. Alaimo takes particular aim at social constructionist arguments that 
leave no room for material influences because they assert that even the material body is formed 
in discourse. The most salient aspect of this argument that I take is the idea that even if we have 
no access to the body outside of the discourse about the body, this does not negate the necessity 
of consideration for the body. Following Foucault, we cannot step outside discourse to critique it. 
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Yet certainly this did not stop Foucault from taking discourse as an object of criticism.  We 
cannot know the body any more than we can know anything at all. Alaimo concludes from this 
that this turning too far effectively creates another dualism, the dualism of “language/reality.”13 
She explains that social constructionist models have taken pains to avoid any taint of 
essentialism. Any explanation that is contingent on a material body is accused of being an 
essentialist reduction creating yet another dichotomy, discursive/material, setting up what seems 
too close to the modernist dualism of culture/nature. This may be too narrow a reading of the 
linguistic turn presumably associated with much of poststructuralism, and elsewhere Alaimo 
herself calls for theorist to “build on rather than abandon the lessons learned in the linguistic 
turn.”14 
Within feminist art practice there was also a conflict around the charge of essentialism. 
Some artists promoted the idea that one could discover an authentic and true woman, a natural 
woman. Once all the layers of cultural constructions were scraped away this ‘real’ woman would 
be revealed. Artist like Judy Chicago, putting an aesthetized version of female genitalia on 
display, attempted to reclaim the woman’s body as positive and beautiful. In her famous work, 
The Dinner Party, first exhibited in 1979, she worked with a number of other artists to create an 
elaborate table setting in which all the plates were rendered as vaginal and flowering. Each place 
setting dedicated, with an embroidered tablecloth, to a prominent woman from history, such as 
Virginia Woolf and Susan B. Anthony, and others draw from ancient goddesses, such as Ishtar 
and Kali. Many saw these works as drawing from, and celebrating, some sense of an essential 
nature that all women possessed. They were seen as reinscribing a natural, ahistorical and 
universal woman and still ultimately reinforcing hierarchies of sexual difference. This may be an 
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overly simplified reading of the work. There were also aspects of the work that dealt with the 
history of how women’s creative work was relegated to craft, and Chicago’s work designated 
ceramic plates and embroidered cloth as viable media for works of ‘high art.’ Still, the extent to 
which the work seems to rely on a simple equation between women’s biological, material bodies 
and the essence of woman was problematic.  
The Emergent Body in Action 
 If we look to the history of feminist treatment of the body in art, perhaps a better model 
for an embodied approach to art might be the “body art” of the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than a 
celebration of qualities of the female sex, this work presents us with a living body acting in the 
world. The performance and body artists returned to the body, not through images and depictions 
of the body, but though enacted bodies. The body took on new significance in the postmodern 
era and this shift still influences current contemporary art. Much postmodern art in general 
returned to representation that had been evacuated, with a few exceptions, from the non-
objective works of abstract expressionism. But the body artists, rather than depicting images of 
bodies, explored their own bodies through action and performance. Amelia Jones points out that 
at the same time that post-structuralism was critiquing the “coherent Cartesian subject of artistic 
Modernism,” the coherence of the body was being tested in body art.15 Jones elaborates on the 
disembodiment of the artist, and the art connoisseur, during Modernism. Influenced by the 
‘disinterested’ stance of Kantian aesthetics and the Modernist insistence on the autonomous and 
transcendent work of art; the body of the artist was hidden. “The repression of the body marks a 
refusal of Modernism to acknowledge that all cultural practices and objects are embedded in 
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society, since, it is the body that inexorably links the subject to her or his social environment.”16 
Body art took steps toward demonstrating a body enacted in context but often maintain the body 
as a sign for essentialist notions of woman. 
Jones goes on to explain this shift toward art engaged with the body as stemming from a 
number of possible influences, in addition to the emerging interest in phenomenology. The 
political and counter-cultural spirit of the times led artists, like Ana Mendieta among others, to 
create works that dealt with the fragility of the body and its embeddedness in the world. But the 
body still often reads as symbol rather than implicating an embodied subject. Writing about the 
history of feminist art Miwon Kwon, while recognizing the great variety of artists and theories, 
reticently still identifies two major ‘camps.’ The distinction between the two comes down to “the 
status of the body in representation and as representation. That is, the body as a transparent 
signifier of identity and self versus the body as a nexus of arbitrary conventions of meaning, the 
body as signature or sign.”17 Kwon questions if a reading of Ana Mendieta’s work might 
“complicate the terms of the current feminist debate.”18 Ana Mendieta is often included under 
the heading of body art. Her work is complicated in its various approaches; all however implicate 
the body. Mendieta’s own words sometime seem to place her in the essentialist and goddess art 
camp: “My art…is a return to the maternal source. Through my earth/body sculptures I become 
one with the earth…I become an extension of nature and nature becomes an extension of my 
body. This obsessive act of reasserting my ties with the earth is really the reactivation of 
primeval beliefs [in] an omnipresent female force, the after-image of being encompassed within 
the womb, in a manifestation of my thirst for being.” And still more so in the words of some of 
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her admirers, Nancy Spero writes: “If one of her sculptures were sent to a distant planet, or were 
kept sealed for thousands of years on earth, it would still convey the imagery, strength, mystery, 
and sexuality of the female human form—woman’s body and spirit inscribed.”19 But her work is 
complicated by a number of factors. The works in her Silueta series were made over a seven-year 
period and performed in Iowa and Mexico. Born in Cuba and living in exile, her crossing over 
this border of nationality was a meaningful aspect of the work that cannot be simplified to a 
reading of any essentialist understanding of woman. She also performed other border crossings 
that did not seem to exalt an essential feminine. In the performance piece from 1972, Untitled 
(Facial Hair Transplants), Mendieta collaborated with Morty Sklar. Over the span of the 
performance his beard is transferred to her face. As Sklar cut off his beard, Mendieta glued the 
hair to her jaw line fashioning a beard for herself. This piece plays with gender rather than 
accepting the delineated oppositions. Gender reads as transmutable not essential. It asks us to 
contemplate what is passing between the two artists alone with the bits of hair. Does Sklar 
become feminized as Mendieta become masculinized? Can gender be affixed with glue and a 
little patience? The process involved in this work help to maintain a sense of contingency and 
fluidity of the subject. In what follows, I will approach the work of Janine Antoni by examining 
how it might articulate an embodied subject through accentuating process. 
Janine Antoni: Embodied Processes 
Body art works of the 1960s and 1970s have had a great influence on many contemporary 
artists, Janine Antoni among them. In the documentary film, !Women Art Revolution, Antoni 
describes the experience of her professor showing her the work of Hannah Wilke, Carolee 
Schneeman, and Ana Mendieta. “I looked at this work, and I thought, ‘I’m making the work of 
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the seventies.’”20 In the performance, Loving Care, Antoni enacted a performance piece in which 
she mopped the floor of the gallery space with her hair. Instead of mopping it clean, however, 
she dipped her hair in black hair dye and systematically covered the floor with black brush 
strokes. Hair dye is, of course, associated with beauty rituals of feminine gender norms, as 
moping the floor is associated with gendered labor. And like so many of Antoni’s works the 
process is labor intensive, challenging the physicality of the body. In Loving Care, Antoni’s 
efforts are present in the work, as is her body. The viewer witnesses her labor. This work is 
process driven but still has to deal with the issues of how Antoni herself becomes representation. 
I am particularly intrigued by the works in which her actions are evident, but her body is absent. 
I want to look more closely at this work for its potential to resist the function of the body in 
representation or as representation. 
While Antoni’s work speaks to a highly gendered culture both within and outside the art 
world, almost all of her work approaches an understanding of this culture with a practice oriented 
around performative process. Many scholars are looking at the body in process as a way to 
acknowledge the body without essentialism. From Julia Martin’s ‘body practices,’ to Rosi 
Braidotti’s ‘monster in process,’ scholars present us with theories of the emergent body in 
process.21 Marsha Meskimmon calls for a process based paradigm as well. She promotes a focus 
on process for how it emphasizes “becoming, as opposed to meaning, stresses mobility and 
change as fundamental to subjectivity and this fact necessitates finding ways to think and 
demonstrate process. Art provides unique opportunities in this respect since its materiality bears 
the trace of its production and can be mobilized as part of its meaning.”22 The work of Antoni 
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involves the body in a way that definitely leaves a trace of the production. Antoni negotiates a 
practice that manages to imply her direct bodily involvement even when she is nowhere to be 
seen, and when seen, manages to avoid the position of the to-be-look-at. Gnaw is a work that 
exemplifies this. A multifaceted work created in stages, it occupies space but in some sense also 
take place in time because the process is implicit. Janine Antoni’s work decidedly “bears the 
trace of its production.” 
In Gnaw, Antoni cast a large cube from 600 pounds of chocolate measuring two-foot 
square and weighing six hundred pounds. She then proceeded to gnaw away at the block. We do 
not see her perform this act; we see the trace left over. The cube is what is exhibited, with its 
irregular corners bearing the gouge marks from her teeth. The quantity of marks on the cube 
conveys the enormity of the activity. She gnawed at the chocolate over a period of a month and a 
half, repeating the action over and over. She then went though the whole process again, this time 
with 600 pounds of lard or fat, cast into a cubic form. The blocks are exhibited as a pair. Antoni 
is keenly aware that just as the viewer images biting the chocolate they will also feel disgust at 
the thought of biting into a block of lard. This work was clearly enacted by an embodied mind, 
and it speaks to Meskimmon hopeful appeal to the process of art to negotiate a new kind of 
subjectivity.  
The pairing of the material blocks makes immediate associations to bodies even with out 
the trace of her carving. They are reminiscent of minimalist cubes and occupy the space of the 
viewer in that “theatrical” way as noted by Michael Fried.23 They create a roughly figural 
presence in the room. However, the material of the work parts from minimalist sculpture, as does 
the process. One cannot help but recognize the chocolate immediately. The color, the patina, and 
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the smell, all trigger the viewer’s awareness of the nature of the material. The body knows before 
the mind makes sense of material it confronts. The viewer experiences the work in an embodied 
way. The senses desire the chocolate even as the mind tries to make sense of the form. The block 
of fat may be less immediately recognized, but once the viewer discovers the truth of the second 
block, they are repelled by the fat even more powerfully than drawn to the chocolate. The 
oscillation between the experiences only serves to intensify the participant’s fully embodied 
awareness. 
As the experience of the materiality of the piece unfolds, thought processes are engaged 
with sense making. What is the relationship between the pair? Chocolate and fat have some 
obvious relations. The body desires chocolate, consumes it and produces fat, but the work does 
not stop there. What are the marks on the surface? A cognizance of the action of biting into 
blocks brings the viewer into their bodies in yet another way. One cannot help but think/feel the 
process of obsessively gnawing away at both chocolate and lard.  The viewer senses the material, 
feels the process of the artist in the micro repetitions of the gnawing action and the larger scale of 
the time involved in the full production, from casting raw block to casting cultural signifiers.  
In the process of gnawing, Antoni did not actually ingest the chocolate or the fat but 
saved up the material she removed from the cubes to cast another pairing of a sort. From the 
chocolate, she cast the heart shaped container one would typically find containing chocolates, a 
staple of a romantic Valentine’s Day gesture. The lard she combined with pigment and cast it 
into the form of lipsticks; red of course. This pairing also has powerful connotations of desire 
and consumption and production; the desire for the compulsory heteronormative romantic love 
and the consumption of the culturally produced ideals of feminine beauty and sexuality. 
Lick and Lather similarly sets up a pairing of different substances, but here there are no 
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minimalist references. This work, in fact, references a much older tradition in art, the portrait 
bust. Antoni was thinking of neoclassical portrait bust of the nineteenth century.24 These are not 
cast in raw blocks but cast in the likeness of the artist. Antoni took a mold of her own head and 
face and then cast the busts in chocolate and soap. Not just a pairing of two, this time, the work 
has seven of each. The busts face each other in two rows. The repetition of the forms allows 
Antoni to show the process in another way. Each of the busts has been eroded, the chocolate by 
licking and the soap by lathering. The likeness becomes more and more obscure as one walks 
down the aisle between the two rows. Here again the work is process driven, and the work of the 
body is performed prior to its exhibition, outside the purview of the gallery audience. 
Nevertheless, the viewer becomes engaged bodily as they are aware of the artist’s bodily 
manipulations of each form. One is aware not just of the body but also of the time. Erosion is not 
a speedy process. Erosion is associated with geological time. Chocolate is not stone, but 
somehow the link between the portrait bust form and the typical sculptural materials of stone are 
present in the mind. Typically inert matter is displayed in the process of change through 
sequential repletion of the forms. The work speaks to how the human form is acted on by its 
surroundings and human action is capable of transforming what it comes in contact with. 
Something of this affect is active in this work.  
What is eroded in Lick and Lather is the face, the locus of how we identify other 
individuals. The busts are placed on pedestals bringing them up to the height of the artist and 
bringing them into the scale of the spectator. The viewer stands face to face with the artist’s 
surrogate. The artist did not just gnaw away at a crude block but licked and washed away 
markers of her own identity. Here, Antoni, a conventionally attractive woman, is not 
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manipulating her likeness to look more beautiful but to disappear. She displays her image to be 
looked at but, at the same time, denies the expectations of looking. A depiction of an individual 
subject is shown as both multiple and malleable.  
Antoni initially creates the forms in conventional sculptural process but manipulates them 
in decidedly unconventional processes. She shapes, or reshapes, the work with her mouth and her 
body. She licked the chocolate. She bathed with the busts of soap, usually a very private activity. 
In fact, in an artist lecture, Antoni describes this as an intimate, almost loving, process.25 Both 
activities required a direct and prolonged encounter with the artist’s body. In an interview in 
Bomb magazine, Antoni states, “When you are with my objects you are with something I have, 
literally, been intimate with. The work doesn’t necessarily reveal anything personal. You come 
to understand the work through your own body.”26 This focus on the experiential body might be 
productively examined in relation to feminist and queer interpretations of phenomenology. In the 
next section I will consider a queered version of phenomenology and apply the concepts gleaned 
from this approach to the work of Mona Hatoum. 
Phenomenological Orientations 
The outline of my body is a frontier which ordinary spatial relations do not cross. This is 
because parts are inter-related in a peculiar way: they are not spread out side by side, but 
enveloped in each other. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
 
Many scholars interested in embodiment reach out to phenomenology for what it has to 
offer in the way of understanding how bodies are embedded in the world and how subjects come 
to be in relationship to this world and to others. However, authors like Susan Kozal, Elizabeth 
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Grosz, and Sara Ahmed do not turn to phenomenology in a manner that is categorically faithful 
to, or uncritical of, the tradition. Whether through Kozal’s “creative disrespect”27 or Ahmed’s 
queering of phenomenology, they read the classic texts through an oblique frame for what they 
have to offer their project. I follow this path toward phenomenology to see what it has to offer in 
thinking through embodiment and art practices for, “beginning to view our bodies and the spaces 
between bodies differently is the condition for reworking…our understanding of thought, the 
communication of ideas between people and the relation between physicality and ideas, between 
self and world.”28  
Phenomenology is concerned with the lived body. This insistence on the lived body has 
compelled the interest of a number of feminist theorists. One can even trace Judith Butler’s early 
work back to phenomenology by way of Simone de Beauvoir. Beauvoir translated this interest in 
the lived body to the experiences of living as a woman.29 And one can see a certain 
phenomenological influence on Butler’s ”stylized repetition of acts” in gender performativity.30 
The body is not an autonomous, natural object but has a history and is manifested in contexts. 
Amelia Jones points to an emerging interest in phenomenology as another explanation or 
precursor to the turn toward the body and the accompanying concern for the social and the 
inevitably interested position of the artist and viewer alike. Body art insists on the importance of 
“intersubjectivity” and the “embodied subject,” and many found phenomenology to resonate 
with these concerns.  
 Sara Ahmed, in Queer Phenomenology, takes up some of the concepts of 
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phenomenology. Phenomenology engages with the full body-mind as it is enacted in and with 
the world. Ahmed also speaks to the importance of establishing positions and the feminist history 
of “calling for a politics of location as a form of situated dwelling.”31 Ahmed uses 
phenomenology largely to investigate the notion of orientation, in the sense of sexual orientation, 
but also how we are directed in the world in a myriad of ways. “Phenomenology can offer a 
resource for queer studies insofar as it emphasizes the importance of lived experience, the 
intentionality of consciousness, the significance of nearness or what is ready-to-hand, and the 
role of repeated and habitual actions in shaping bodies and worlds.”32 Ahmed is both interested 
in how phenomenology might engage productively with queer theory and also how her project 
might queer phenomenology along the way. Ahmed does not take an unproblematic stance 
toward phenomenology. She recognizes the limitations of the enterprise and does not attempt to 
read phenomenology in a faithful or “proper” way. Instead, Ahmed attempts to exploit that 
which is queer within phenomenology and, in fact, “enjoy the failure to be proper.”33  
Ahmed’s failure to be proper allows her to make use of aspects of phenomenology but 
remain critical of some its assumptions. Phenomenology is often critiqued as being too reliant on 
naïve subjectivism, or “for failing to specify the kinds of bodies and sexualities behind the lived 
experience in question, or for an inability to deal with power relations embedded in 
perception.”34 As if the “zero point” of orientation, as Husserl describes “the point from which 
the world unfolds,” is the position of a privileged subject somehow not sullied by cultural 
mediations, as if this point of view could stand outside of discourse and look from a distance. 
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Ahmed acknowledges the danger of Husserl and others universalizing from a specific bodily 
location. Still, the body is what establishes this zero point and thus the lived, sensuous body 
cannot be dismissed.  
The body establishes a point of view on the world, but it is also the point of contact with 
the world and is affected by and has affect on the world. Some instances of phenomenology 
actually stress the body as constituted through its actions in the world, not so much as a pre-
established agency but as an object in a world of objects. “Bodies may become orientated in this 
responsiveness to the world around them, given this capacity to be affected. In turn, given the 
history of such responses, which accumulate as impressions on the skin, bodies do not dwell in 
spaces that are exterior but rather are shaped by their dwelling and take shape by dwelling.”35  
This is an emergent process and it takes account of the actions of bodies in conjunction with 
spaces and other bodies, including culturally mediated spaces and bodies. “The social also has its 
skin, as a border that feels and that is shaped by the ‘impressions’ left by others.”36 This zero 
point does not need to imply the “subject as originary.” It does not “make all space relative to 
‘my position.’”37 The body is within space but is also part of an assemblage of other bodies and 
spaces. It is not the center but an intersection within a multiplicity. 
 One of the classic tenants of phenomenology is that consciousness is directed toward 
objects, or it is directed toward things in the world. This gives consciousness the quality of being 
embodied and embedded in the world, and it also provides the opportunity to take a critical look 
at how subjects attend to some things and not others. What forces are at play in directing the 
orientation of the subject? How do subjects come to be in certain locations and not others? 
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Ahmed relates an aspect of her own position, “I think fondly of Virginia Woolf’s A Room of 
One’s Own. How important it is, especially for women, to claim that space, to take up that space 
through what one does with one’s body. And so when I am at my table, I am also claiming that 
space, I am becoming a writer by taking up that space.”38 Claiming a space of action, a space of 
becoming, has to do with how we are oriented in the world. The orientation toward writing is 
perhaps a more significant direction for some whose bodies do not line up with the expected 
form of what it means to be a writer. In Queer Phenomenology Ahmed directs us to Husserl’s 
writing table. This table is in a room that is understood to be the place for the work of philosophy 
to take place. It is also understood that this room is the solitary domain of the philosopher. 
Husserl takes the writing table as the object of his attention, to test his perception, in a mode that 
oversteps the familiarity of ordinary perception. Ahmed points out what Husserl must “bracket” 
out in order to direct this special kind of attention at this object. In describing the background, 
and what gets set aside, one of the things he brings up are children, his children presumably. 
What is not present in the room with him is all the domestic labor that has taken place to clear 
this room for him to work. It is understood that this is the room for his labor. It is given that he is 
not occupied with caring for children. Ahmed contrasts Husserl’s experience with that of 
Adrienne Rich’s attempts at taking up the space at the writing table. For Rich the children will 
not be bracketed out.39 They tug at her attention and become an obstacle to the object of writing. 
One of the points of Husserl attending to his writing table was to experiment with perception. He 
wanted to step outside ordinary, natural perception and look at the object as if it were unfamiliar. 
In describing his experience of the table, Husserl walks around the table and views it from many 
points of view, observing how his perceptions shift with his shifting relationship to the table. He 
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claims that the table remains the same but only through a “synthetic consciousness, which 
connects the new experience with the recollection.”40 Husserl recollects what the behind of the 
table looks like even as he sits in front of it. But what is behind the table that Husserl does not 
see? The children, yes, but the table also has a history. What objects come to be before us 
depends on the history, the behind, of the object, as well as the history of our own actions that 
led us to be in this space. Husserl’s table could not stand still for him to walk around it if the 
floor not supporting it, if he was not supported by the floor. What else supports the experience of 
this table–the labor that went into making the table, the labor that built the room, the labor that 
went on to provide Husserl with the time and space to perform this exercise in perception. What 
is “given” disappears from view. It is taken for granted. Ahmed meticulously and eloquently 
elucidates what is “given,” and asks if a queer phenomenology might bring what is in the 
background forward. The space of the writing table extends the body of the philosopher and 
makes it possible for him to do his work. There is a history to this space, to the objects in it, to 
the body that occupies it. Ahmed takes up the idea of orientation as a complex indicator of 
special location but also an indicator of directions taken. The familial is in place to support this 
work. The table is in place to support this work. But the work of producing this family structure, 
this material object, this constructed space is taken as given.  
 Being oriented is to know where you are, which also implies a comfort in one’s 
surroundings. To lack this comfort is to be disoriented. Orientations require that we think of 
bodies in space as well as the objects that share that space. Orientation is the direction we face 
but also the understanding of where we are in space. The comfort of belonging in one’s 
surroundings can extend to the idea that one is surrounded by certain behaviors. A location is 
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never just about space; locations are intertwined with the things in the space as well as the things 
that go on in those spaces. Our surroundings are intelligible because we know what to expect. 
Some people come to belong in certain spaces while others are excluded. If we are correctly 
oriented in these spaces we are read as belonging; we are intelligible.  
Normalization also has the capacity to obscure how we came to be oriented in certain 
space. The ways spaces are designated are not neutral. Space and direction are systematized and 
hierarchized. Some points of view are taken as given. The gift of this point of view is concealed 
in the moment of being received as given. As Ahmed makes clear, “What comes into view is not 
just what “happens to be ‘in front’ of us.”41 Following a given path takes us in a particular 
direction that takes us out of reach of other paths, makes some objects unattainable and even 
unthinkable. Following a given path makes the decision, the action, the investment disappear. 
They do not call for our attention, and we “arrive, as if by magic.”42 And in following the given 
path we make the path that is reproduced become even more definite, like each performance of a 
normative gender reconfirms its naturalness. Similarly, sexual orientation is a designation used to 
point to the homosexual while heterosexuality disappears as an orientation one comes to acquire. 
What winds up in the background when we face a certain direction? One strategy of queering 
phenomenology, then, is to bring the background forward. It is a strategy in keeping with 
phenomenology in that phenomenology often attends to the familiar but with an attitude of the 
unfamiliar. In some sense the unconsidered background might be unfamiliar, even uncanny. 
We might compare Ahmed’s well-worn paths to Judith Butler’s conception of 
performativity. Butler theorizes identity formation and subjectification as a kind of 
performativity. She suggests that something like gender is produced through a “stylized 
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repetition of acts.” Gender does not precede its performance but is constituted by each successive 
iteration of these performative acts. Discourses around regulatory, normalizing understandings of 
gender produce the effect that they name. Performativity does not, however, imply conscious 
choice; it does not mean that each day we may choose the path that suits us and perform 
whatever gender expression we wish. Writing about her relationship to the identity as a lesbian, 
Butler clarifies that the performative is how the identity is “established, instituted, circulated, and 
confirmed. This is not a performance from which I can take radical distance, for this is deep-
seated play, psychically entrenched play, and this ‘I’ does not play its lesbianism as a role”43 
Like Ahmed’s point that some paths are in reach and some paths become so omnipresent as to 
disappear, gender performance is restricted to what is intelligible. Regulatory ideals form 
intelligible bodies, but they also produce a domain of the unthinkable and unlivable bodies. 
Normalizing constraints also work through erasure and violent exclusion. 
Another line that Ahmed explores is that of disorientation. She again relates this to a 
queer phenomenology and a queering of phenomenology. “Moments of disorientation are vital. 
They are bodily experiences that throw the world up, or throw the body from its ground.”44 
Ahmed turns to disorientation to explore the possibility of new paths and new orientations that 
might support the lives of more people. She is careful to clarify that she is not calling for 
disorientation as an obligation for queer bodies, not as a goal meaning that all actions in the 
world must strive to be disorienting. Nor does she suggest that disorientation is always a good 
thing. Certainly this can be a painful experience, and it is an experience that some are more 
likely to encounter than others. Queer bodies and bodies of color are prone to experiences of 
disorientation. But even if moments of disorientation can be experienced as pain or loss or 
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deprivation, “then such a deprivation would not be livable simply as loss but as the potential for 
new lines, or for new lines to gather as expressions that we do not yet know how to read.”45 It 
would seem Ahmed is asking us to attend to moments of disorientation for the potential shifting 
of ground; 
The point is not whether we experience disorientation (for we will, and we do), but how 
such experiences can impact on the orientation of bodies and spaces, which is after all 
about how the things are “directed” and how they are shaped by the lines they follow. 
The point is what we do with such moments of disorientation, as well as what such 
moments can do—whether they can offer us the hope of new directions, and whether new 
directions are reason enough for hope.46  
 Life is full of queer moments, but it is also full of “straightening devices.” Ahmed relates 
an experience in which her neighbor asks her a question about the woman she lives with: “Is that 
you sister or your husband?”47 Her neighbor was compelled to understand the relationship from 
one or another straight perspective. The neighbor’s orientation in the world tries to put a straight 
frame around this queer relationship; the queer relationship is unintelligible from this frame. Two 
adult women living together in a home suggests a family, and the neighbor can only conceive of 
two ways that this familial relation can exist. Ahmed’s partner is either her husband and thus fits, 
albeit obliquely, into the frame as husband to wife. Her partner steps into one side of the binary 
couple form. If not husband then sister, not housemate, not close friend. Again if the relationship 
is to be read as familial the other woman must be a sanctioned element of a family bond. Lauren 
Berlant and Michael Warner writing in “Sex in Public” envision “the radical aspirations of queer 
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culture building: not just a safe zone for queer sex but the changed possibilities of identity, 
intelligibility, publics, culture, and sex that appear when the heterosexual couple is not longer the 
referent or the privileged example of sexual culture.”48 To Ahmed’s neighbor, two women living 
together is unintelligible because she privileges heterosexual hegemony; but a part of this 
heteronormativity is also to structure any private intimate relationship as familial, so if not 
husband then sister. Berlant and Warner link structures of heteronormativity with public 
mediations of private intimacies. They write of the “mirage” of the private as the “home base of 
the prepolitical humanity from which citizens are thought to come into political discourse and to 
which they are expected to return.”49 Heteronormativity constructs this notion of sisters as 
normal. Heterosexuality reproduces itself generationally, and the family structure ensures the 
continuation of the line, the straight line. For two women of roughly the same age to exist in the 
heteronormative constructions of family, one must be sister. If they cannot be mother and 
daughter, then they occupy horizontal position in the family line, but the family form stays intact 
and the home base a place of proper intimacies, a sanctuary from politically challenging ideas. 
Perhaps Ahmed’s neighbor found this queer presence disorienting. Disorientation can become a 
familiar feeling for some. As Ahmed so eloquently phrases it: 
By implication, we learn that disorientation is unevenly distributed: some bodies 
more than others have their involvement in the world called into crisis. This 
shows us how the world itself is more “involved” in some bodies than in others, 
as it takes such bodies as the contours of ordinary experience. It is not just that 
bodies are directed in specific ways, but that the world is shaped by the directions 
taken by some bodies more than others. It is thus possible to talk about the white 
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world, the straight world, as a world that takes the shape of the motility of certain 
skins.50 
Oriented Toward Art 
I propose that art can help us to attend to the unseen, the unfamiliar, the disorienting. It 
can bring the background forward, and “to move the ‘behind’ to the ‘front’ can have a queer 
effect.”51 Disorientation can lead one off the given path. Art itself often exists on the periphery or 
even behind the everyday and the familiar. It maintains a closer contact with the unseen forces 
and the unattended. What does it mean to be oriented toward making art? What objects in the 
world are in reach because of this orientation? When we do not follow, or cannot follow, the path 
given we can become disoriented. Ahmed questions the possible productivity of disorientation. 
Perhaps art can be productively disorienting. 
 Returning to the work of Janine Antoni, what does this work point to? What objects come 
into reach in her process? Antoni does not use traditional tools of art making. Instead she uses 
her body. Sometimes her body serves as model; sometimes it serves as tool. Antoni does not 
reach for a hammer and chisel to carve away at the block of chocolate or a rasp to shape the 
soap. What is in reach is her body as tool, in its capacity to act in the world on objects. She 
brings forward the process of making. She brings the background of bodily interaction, the way 
bodies affect but also the way bodies are affected. When she uses her teeth to carve she affects 
her orientation toward the object. She must be close, even intimate, with the material. Our 
understanding that these gouge marks are, in fact, teeth marks, affects our orientation toward the 
object. It can make the form abject and repel the viewer. It can, perhaps, disorient the viewer, 
making a space for them to experience the world from a different point of view. 
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 Antoni’s teeth are the tools she finds ready at hand. She does not reach outside the body 
but find the forces within and makes these capacities evident. One can imagine the power and 
muscularity it takes to wield the hammer and control a chisel. What body do we imagine 
possessing this power? It takes strength and stamina of another sort to obsessively gnaw away at 
an immense block of chocolate. In Gnaw, Antoni is dealing with food as her material and her 
body as the tool. The body is the site for the exercise of control for many people who feel 
otherwise powerless. Many exercise power by controlling what they eat, or do not eat. This 
exertion of control can often lead to dissolution of the body. Antoni shapes the block of 
chocolate with her mouth but she spits it back out. Through repeating this simple act of gnawing 
she shapes the block. She controls the consumption of the desired object and the repulsive object. 
She is oriented toward, and calls our attention to, objects that manage the body: food, chocolate, 
fat, lipstick, decorative packaging. She created the heart shape container for the chocolate treats 
and lipsticks to decorate the packaging of the body. One can also imagine that this repetition 
must have shaped Antoni's body through the strain of this repeated action. Does viewing this 
work change our orientation toward the control we may wish to exert over our bodies? 
In Conduit, Antoni created a female urination device. Its form was inspired by the 
gargoyle like sculpture on old buildings that function to redirect rainwater. The rainwater runoff 
flows through the mouth of the creature. Antoni exhibits the object in tandem with a photograph 
of herself using the object to urinate while standing near the top of the Chrysler Building. She 
makes an uncanny association between her body and the skyscraper as well as the forces of 
nature. Instead of rain funneled through the drainage system of the architecture, we are presented 
with Antoni’s bodily waste pouring through the sculpted object. She redirects our attention to an 
abject bodily process but with a sense of awe and wonder in the grandeur of this setting. But we 
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are also looking at a female body urinating while standing. What does this say about bodily 
orientations?  While Gnaw may direct our attention to how the body controls what is allowed 
inside, Conduit calls us to attend to how we control what it illuminates. It provides us with a 
queer perspective, one because of the audaciousness of peeing from the Chrysler building, but 
also by shifting a boundary of the gendered body. We become familiar with a gendered notion of 
the body’s capacities. In Conduit, the given path of the gendered body is slightly shifted. In the 
next section, I address the work of an artist whose work is less overtly about process and more 
about playing at the boundaries of the ordinary and the extraordinary. 
Mona Hatoum: Crossing Boundaries  
If we notice only some arrivals (the arrival of those who are out of place), then it is also 
true that we only notice some forms of proximity, some forms of sexual and social 
contact that create new lines in the very moment they cross others. What happens when 
we follow such lines?  
 
     Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology 
 
In a way, it might be queer encounter with existential phenomenology that helps us 
rethink how disorientation might begin with the strangeness of familiar objects.  
 
      Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology 
 
Mona Hatoum has a talent for making the familiar strange, for queering the ordinary. 
Whether it is taking the simple form of a cheese grater and making it into a functional room 
divider (Grater Divide, 2002), or making the form of a hand grenade (Nature morte aux grenade, 
2006-2007) out of beautiful and delicate colored glass, or tethering two suitcases together with 
human hair (Traffic, 2002), the commonplace becomes decidedly uncommon, even uncanny. 
Objects, no matter how familiar they seem, do not simply appear before us. With the familiarity 
of the object we forget the history of their arrival and the significant of their use. “Seeing such 
objects as if for the first time...involves wonder, it allows the object to breathe not through a 
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forgetting of its history but by allowing this history to come alive.”52  
Hatoum can make strange even objects of ordinary domestic use. In works like Grater 
Divide (2002), the strangeness is produced through a translation of scale but also through a shift 
in the function. What was once used in food preparation now stands in the room. Over six feet 
tall and made into three panels, the sculpture functions to partition space, to separate bodies. In 
this new scale our bodies are the equivalent size to a wedge of cheese, and our skin, that point of 
division of self from world, feels decidedly vulnerable.  As a room divider it is still a domestic 
item, but the impressive sharp steel implicates divisions beyond simple décor. One cannot help 
but think about how spaces are divided by the gendering of domestic labor; kitchen utensils call 
up a world designated as the realm of feminine or reproductive labor. Hatoum speaks about 
growing up with the expectation that she would inhabit this realm, an expectations that she 
actively resisted.53 A room divider might function as a privacy screen for dressing, but it also 
implicates geographical and national divisions, divisions at both a micro and macro scale. A 
simple room divider can function physically (and can be read metaphorically) to separate space, 
but the boundary it creates brings to mind how divisions separate people. A room divider is a 
boundary that moves; it can even be folded up and set aside. No boundary is immutable, and 
there is power in how they are located.  
 The histories of objects and the histories of spaces are not neutral, and bodies inhabit 
space and utilize objects differently. Some bodies are out of place in relation to familiar objects 
and spaces. Ahmed illustrates how the familiar world extends the reach and capacities of certain 
bodies giving them privileged orientation in the world. Queer bodies, disabled bodies and bodies 
of color may actually have their reach limited by the familiar. 
                                                      
52 Amhed, Queer Phenomenology, 163-164. 
53 Glencross, “Mona Hatoum Interview,” 65. 
  40 
In a way, Merleau-Ponty describes the body as “successful,” as being “able “ to extend 
itself (through objects) in order to act on and in the world. Fanon helps us to expose this 
“success” not as a measure of competence but as the bodily form of privilege” the ability 
to move through the world without losing one’s way. To be black or not white in “the 
white world” is to turn back toward oneself, to become an object, which means not only 
not being extended by the contours of the world, but being diminished as an effect of the 
bodily extensions of others. For bodies that are not extended by the skin of the social, 
bodily movement is not so easy. Such bodies are stopped, where the stopping is an action 
that creates its own impressions.54  
The way some bodies move easily in the world while others are stopped tends to be one of those 
things that disappear into the familiar. Perhaps we can recognize the phenomenon in some 
instances more than others. The able bodied individual moves easily in the world and many tend 
to assume that the disabled body is stopped or encumbered by the body’s impairment alone. But 
clearly impairment is not the only thing that orients the disabled body differently. Hatoum 
created as sculpture that calls attention to our assumptions about how bodies move. Untitled 
(Wheelchair) 1998, is reminiscent of a conventional wheelchair, but this chair has a number of 
differences that dramatically change the relationship to the object. The material seems very 
sterile and appears almost more like a medical cart. There is no padding in the seat, just an 
unforgiving clean metal surface. The object is very familiar and yet strange. If you look further 
you notice that the handles, that one might hold to push the chair from behind, are shaped like 
knifes. This coupled with the fact that the rear wheels are as small as those in the front, leaving 
the occupant with no means to propel the chair themselves, presents one with a very disturbing 
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sensation. This chair would not function to extend the body in space but would stop the body in 
its tracks. Who moves freely in the world is no casual matter.  
 Why did Hatoum make the handles into knifes; to call attention to the impulse to control 
or direct the movements of others, perhaps, or perhaps to call attention to the pain of 
interdependence in a world so focused on individual autonomy. Perhaps Hatoum intended a 
disorienting effect, and affect. This disorientation might call attention to what has come to seem 
a casual relationship of the able body to control and the movement of the self but also the ability 
to compel others to move in the same direction. In the documentary Examined Life, Judith Butler 
goes for a walk with Sunaura Taylor, an artist and disability and animal rights activist. Taylor 
was born with arthrogryposis, or as she puts it, “what the medical community has labeled 
arthrogryposis.”55 This is a condition in which the joints of the body are fused and there is a 
shortening of some of the muscles. This makes it difficult for her to use her limbs in a normative 
fashion making tasks like picking a coffee cup challenging. Taylor describes how she can go into 
a coffee shop and pick up the cup of coffee with her mouth. “But that becomes almost more 
difficult because of…the normalizing standard of our movements. The discomfort that that 
causes, when I do things with body parts that aren’t necessarily what we assume they are for, that 
seem to be even more hard for people to deal with.”56 It is not ability that stops Taylor from 
using her mouth to pick up the cup of coffee but how the able-bodied have become oriented 
toward objects, including mouths. Confronted with the deviation from the typical orientation 
toward the object, the able-bodied individual becomes disoriented by an ability that does not 
follow the norm. During their conversation Butler muses that “maybe we have a false idea that 
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the able-bodied person is somehow radically self-sufficient.”57 Everyone can see how creating a 
ramp provides access to those bodies that use wheelchairs, but what falls into the background is 
how stairs have been built to provide access for the able-bodied. The able-body is supported in 
the world, and we fail to see the labor that goes into this support. The stairs appear as if by magic 
and the ramp somehow implies going out of one’s way to make the building accessible. In order 
to see the work that goes into supporting normative bodies and value the ways that we help one 
another, perhaps we need to rethink, to queer, what it means to be human; in Butler’s words, we 
must begin the process of “rethinking the human as a site of interdependency.”58  
The human is a site of interdependence, interdependent with other humans but also with 
the non-human, objects, and environments. Certain objects cluster together in certain 
environments, and, as Ahmed suggests, we come to feel at home in our shared orientations. This 
homeliness works more readily for some bodies over others. The home itself, the familiar and 
familial home, is perhaps the site where bodies are supposed to be most at ease. Hatoum 
manages to create a tension even around this relationship. In Homebound (2000), Hatoum 
assembled a group of domestic objects. The centerpiece was a 1950s style Formica kitchen table 
with kitchen chairs of the same era placed around it. On the table’s surface are a host of objects 
most associated with kitchen use: colander, cheese grater, garlic press, sifter, eggbeater, and the 
like. The colander is turned upside down and a light bulb is placed beneath and other objects in 
the space are similarly treated. A bare copper wire runs through the space connecting all the 
objects. The wire is live. Electricity flows through the wire and the current powers the light 
bulbs. The bulbs turn on and off seemingly at random. The sound of the electrical current is 
amplified and loudspeakers play an ominous buzz. Visitors to the gallery cannot approach any of 
                                                      
57 Taylor, Examined Life. 
58 Ibid. 
  43 
the objects as there are a series of tautly stretched cables creating a barrier between the viewing 
space and the space of the assembled objects. The other objects in the installation all relate to the 
home as well; they are domestic objects though they all have a somewhat institutional quality 
about them. For example, there is a metal bed frame but no mattress. There is nothing soft in the 
installation. This mundane, yet bizarre and threatening, arrangement shifts our orientation toward 
these objects and the familiar in general. The electrical wire ties the objects together, but these 
objects are already tied together in their association to the home, especially the kitchen, the realm 
of domestic labor. These domestic objects, and the ground of the home, become unfamiliar. As 
Said describes it, “Familiarity and strangeness are locked together in the oddest way, adjacent 
and irreconcilable at the same time.”59 Domestic spaces are associated with comfort and security. 
This space contains the same objects one might find in a typical home, but they do not disappear 
into the background, forming the forgotten support of a comfortable existence. These objects 
come forward and we are confronted with the question of what connects them together. The 
home which is thought to function as the ground for all other social spaces of interaction, 
becomes unsteady, unfamiliar, powerful and threatening. Does this shift in the ground open up a 
space for different kinds of interaction? What are the implications of these objects not only 
becoming unfamiliar but threatening? They are alive with an energy that surrounds us everyday 
but one which remains hidden.  As Ahmed explains, “when the doorknob is felt as something 
other than what it is supposed to do, then it comes to have a tangible quality as a “cold object,” 
even one with a “personality.” A cold object is one that gives us a sensation of being cold. When 
objects come to life, they leave their impressions. These homely objects become cold bare metal 
but crackle with the heat of electrical current. Hatoum hopes to shift our understanding of the 
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familiar, as she describes, “I called it Homeboud because I see it as a work that shatters notions 
of wholesomeness.  The home, the domain where the feminine resides is supposed to be about 
nurturing, giving, loving or whatever therefore I often like to introduce a physical or a 
psychological disturbance to contradict those notions.”60  
Hatoum does not attempt to reinscribe the object in a way to straighten our orientation. 
The objects remain unsettled and unsettling. This disorientation might fit well with Ahmed’s call 
for a queer orientation. “We can consider the ‘affect’ of disorientation. As I have suggested, for 
bodies that are out of place, in the spaces in which they gather, the experience can be 
disorientating. You can feel oblique, after all. You can feel odd, even disturbed. Experiences of 
migration, or of becoming estranged from the contours of life at home, can take this form.”61 
Hatoum perhaps creates a space for a resistance to the “straightening devices” of the straight 
world or the “white world.” As Edward Said describes Hatoum’s work: “In Mona Hatoum’s 
relentless catalogue of disaffected, dislocated, oddly deformed objects, there is a similar sense of 
focusing on what is there without expressing much interest in the ambition to rescue the object 
from its strangeness or, more importantly, trying to forget or shake off the memory of how nice it 
once was.”62 Ahmed asks if there might be something productive in paying attention to 
movements of disorientation.  
  Hatoum’s work crosses the boundaries of geographic and national distance, the distance 
of emotional separation that “haunt the borders of identity.”63 It exposes the inside of the body 
and electrical currents running through mundane and domestic artifacts. We cannot separate the 
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mind from the body; alternately we cannot focus on the body as object without producing 
vestiges of the object-subject relationship. Hatoum’s works make these boundaries ambiguous. 
Perhaps this work answers Grosz’s question of how to live the future differently from the 
present. For Grosz this requires a feminist theory more complex than the “models of language 
and representation” that have been dominant throughout the twentieth century. We must not 
discard nature, matter or anything falling outside of structured systems. “Subjectivity, sexuality, 
intimate social relations are in part structured not only by institutions and social networks but 
also by impersonal or pre-personal, subhuman, or in human forces.64  
Hatoum said in an interview about her career, “In the early performance work I was in a 
sense demonstrating or delivering a message to the viewer. With the installation work, I wanted 
to implicate the viewer in a phenomenological situation where the experience is more physical 
and direct. I wanted the visual aspect of the work to engage the viewer in a physical, sensual, 
maybe even emotional way.”65 Measures of Distance (1988), is a video work and is arguably the 
most autobiographical work that she has produced. “There isn't a conscious effort on my part to 
speak directly about my background and history,” Hatoum has been at pains to point out. “But 
the fact that I grew up in a war-torn country; the fact that my family was displaced, a Palestinian 
family that ended up living in exile in Lebanon, has obviously shaped the way I perceive the 
world. It comes into my work as a feeling of unsettledness. The feeling of not being able to take 
anything for granted, even doubting the solidity of the ground you walk on.”66 The work features 
the images Hatoum took of her mother’s naked body while she was showering. The images are 
never whole, never include the full body. They are fragments and close ups, and the image is 
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partially obscured with text forming a kind of translucent patterned screen, like a “veil” or 
“barbed wire.” The words almost appear to be written on the body at first glance. The text is 
Arabic, and it is taken from letters written to Hatoum by her mother during an extended, and 
forced separation. Mona Hatoum was stranded in London when war broke out in Lebanon. The 
video also has layers of sound. We hear the voices of Hatoum and her mother speaking in casual 
conversation. Layered with those voices we hear Hatoum reading the letters aloud in English. 
Her voice is slow and measured and contrasts with the voices in conversation. One cannot help 
but think about the spaces between, the distance and duration, the geographical distance between 
mother and daughter, but also the generational distance. The letters speak of displacement, exile, 
war and isolation. But the voices and the tender quality of the images bring a sense of intimacy. 
It is remarkable to think about Hatoum’s concern about using the photographs of her 
mother. She is not concerned about decorum but the status of representation of women within the 
art world of the time. Are the images problematic from a feminist viewpoint? We are looking at 
an obscured image of an unremarkable middle-aged woman. Is she presenting her mother for the 
“male gaze?” The images are more likely to instill a feeling of intimacy than desire, combined as 
they are with the sounds of the voices and the context of the words. They do not read like a flat 
image in a magazine. Instead they create an impression that, in Deleuze’s words, “directly 
impacts the nervous system and intensifies sensation.”67 In the letters, Hatoum’s mother 
expresses some concern about the images as well, but she is pondering the reaction of her 
husband walking in on the two of them naked, with the daughter taking pictures of her mother. 
She writes, “He still nags me about it, as if I had given you something that only belongs to him,” 
and later, “Anyway whatever you do with the pictures, for god’s sake don’t tell him about it.” 
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Each letter begins with a touching salutation, but no one greeting is the same as the other, and 
they seem to grow more florid as the time of separation grows longer. “Dear Mona, I long to see 
you my little one. You are so close to my heart yet so far away from me. It is not fair that this 
bloody war should take all my daughters away from me.”68 The work inspires empathy, a shared 
sensation.  
Hatoum has another video piece that deals with images of the body but this time they are 
images taken of her own body from the inside as well as the outside. In Corps Étranger (1994), 
or foreign body, Hatoum created a tall cylindrical chamber with a video projected onto the floor. 
The projected image is round like the room and takes up much of the floor space leaving just a 
small amount of space around the image. The viewer entering the space must stand as if on the 
edge of an opening or walk on the image. The tightness of the space compels attention to the 
image and the proximity and the close up view of the imagery creates an intimacy if not a bit of 
claustrophobia. The footage is of Hatoum's body. The camera runs along the surface of her body 
but so close to the surface as to make the body into a kind of landscape filled with hyper detailed 
textures of skin. As the camera reaches the orifice of the mouth it goes inside the body. The 
footage is shot with the aid of medical equipment, both endoscopic and colonoscopic. The 
camera moves between the surface and the interior of the human body. This work is at once 
confrontational and inviting. One is drawn into the image and enveloped by the intimate space of 
the installation. 
This work seems far more objectifying than Measures of Distance. It is in fact, part of the 
point of the work, in the senses of the close examination of a scientific instrument. Hatoum 
intends for the “foreign body” to reference at once the camera intruding into her body, the 
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foreign body that conjures the idea of illness invading the body, and as the body of someone 
displaced from their native country. Hatoum presents us with images of her body, but they do not 
function in conventional terms. They do not produce a representation of Hatoum’s identity but 
play with the boundaries of inside and outside. And this is done not just with images but with 
space and with sound. As the endoscope or the colonoscope explores the interior channels of her 
body the viewer hears an ultrasound recording of her heartbeat. When the camera emerges and 
crosses over the surfaces of her body the viewer hears the sound of Hatoum breathing. What the 
camera reveals of the exterior of the body is made strange by the close up view of skin and eyes 
and ears. There is no abrupt distinction between inside and out. In this small chamber the 
audience is immersed in her visceral body and made keenly aware of their own bodily limits.  
Antoni and Hatoum’s work resist the separations of mind and body of Western 
metaphysical dualism. Hatoum views this dualism from an oblique angle, from a queer 
perspective, and in her work she makes this oblique angle visible to others: 
I come from a culture where there isn’t that tremendous split between body and 
mind. When I first went to England 'it became immediately apparent to me that 
people were quite divorced from their bodies and very caught up in their heads 
like disembodied intellects. So I was always insisting on the physical in my work. 
I did not want my work to be one dimensional in the sense that it just appeals to 
the intellect. I wanted it to be a complete experience that involves your body, your 
senses, your mind, your emotions, everything. I think this has very much to do 
with the culture I grew up in where there is more of an integration between body 
and mind.69  
                                                      
69 Sazzad, “Hatoum, Said and Foucault,” 14. 
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Hatoum problematized the bounded character of the body and the mind, not by representing the 
body but by making the body and the body’s orientation toward objects and spaces perceptible 
for the audience. To be embodied in a way that does not line up with the majoritarian orientation 
is to be disoriented. Ahmed sees a potential in paying attention to the moments of disorientation. 
Disorientation can be uncomfortable but it can also be revealing.  
Hatoum and Antoni make no essentializing claim for what the body is, but they set up a 
situation for the body to be felt. Embodied process directs Antoni’s work and resists a distant 
objective contemplation of the work. The thinking mind is engaged by the work, but it is a mind 
inseparable from the body. The body is no dumb matter or ground on which culture acts. The 
body is the point of interrelationship. The body is not the border’s edge of the mind but the fluid 
and interconnected force. Antoni is exemplary of an artist working in a mode that highlights 
embodiment. She deals with political and feminist issues in her work in a way that does not rely 
on the representation of the body. Yet the body is always implicated. Guided by a queer 
phenomenology this chapter has revealed how Hatoum’s work challenges boundaries and 
confronts us with a queer orientation. Her work dissects the ordinary and brings what too often 
disappears in the background into the foreground of our perception. Both Antoni and Hatoum 
appeal to an embodied subject in a way that fully integrates the body and mind.  
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Chapter Two: Sensational Bodies 
 
Whether through words, colors, sounds, or stone, art is the language of sensations. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy 
 
 Bodies feel. The feeling body has long been a contentious point in philosophy. For those 
who would separate the mind and the body, sensation is connected with all that makes the body 
suspicious. The senses are unreliable, or worse, contaminating, although, often special 
consideration is given to the sense of sight, allowing sight a privileged relationship to mind. In 
the previous chapter, I argued that the feelings of the body could not be disconnected from the 
thinking of the mind. If we reject the mind/body duality, then we must also give up the notion 
that the mind, and its mythical rationality, has an inherently privileged place in the production of 
knowledge. Knowledge, I contend, originates in sensation. In what follows, I will examine 
processes that value the sensual and the nonsensical in the hopes that acknowledging sensation 
might provide a way to think the human subject as interconnected and relational, rather than as 
an individualistic, objective subject that is oriented toward the other as object. Specifically, I 
want to look at artistic processes involving sound but sound integrated with other sensations. In 
thinking through the implications of theories about sensation, I consider the work of three artists: 
Christina Kubisch, Laetitia Sonami, and Pipilotti Rist. Each of these artists employs sound in 
unique ways; Kubisch brings forward sounds that typically disappear into the background; 
Sonami couples sound with proprioceptive sensation; and Rist uses sound in immersive video 
installations. I question if art production can provide a way of working from the situated position 
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of the sensational mind-body. Following Marsha Meskimmon, in Women Making Art: History, 
Subjectivity, Aesthetic, I contend that the move toward embodiment and materiality opens up a 
space to think about art practice beyond images and symbolic representations and “as a fully 
sensory mode of cognition.”1 
 Bodies are sensational. The feeling, moving body is directly implicated in artworks and 
art production.  Artworks come to us through the interconnected sensory perception of the body-
mind. For Deleuze and Gutaurri art is the stuff of sensation. “We paint, sculpt, compose, and 
write with sensations.”2 Art functions “to extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of 
sensations.”3 Art is not about creating things that are recognizable and that confirm opinion but 
about creating something indeterminate that passes into sensation. The point of separation 
between the material artwork and the perceptive body is ambiguous. Sensation is not in the 
material or in the body but dependent on processual relationship between them. Deleuze is 
influenced by Erwin Straus’ conception of sensation as relational, as something that affects the 
perceiver and the perceived; it is a sharing and a connecting. Straus writes: “The Now of sensing 
belongs neither to objectivity nor to subjectivity alone, but necessarily to both together. In 
sensing, both self and world unfold simultaneously for the sensing subject; the sensing being 
experiences himself and the world, himself in the world, himself with the world.”4 There is an 
indeterminacy of the boundaries between what is typically thought of as a subject object 
relationship, as there is also an undecidability regarding the separation of the individual sense 
faculties. The lack of clear distinctions refuses an easy separation or a logic of identity. In 
                                                      
1 Meskimmon, 5. 
2 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 166. 
3 Ibid., 167. 
4 Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth, 8. 
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looking at the relational quality of art and sensory perception, I first consider how senses were 
isolated from one another and from the mind. 
Ocularcentrism and the Dualism of Sound and Vision 
 To experience artwork through the body implies experiencing the artwork as more than 
just visual information. Many philosophers have charged Western art, and Western culture in 
general, of ocularcentrism, of placing vision above the other senses. In, Downcast Eyes: The 
Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought, Martin Jay writes about 
developments in theories about human sight and how these theories informed much Western 
philosophy, pointing out sight’s relationship to empiricism and objectivity. Sight has not always 
been trusted as a direct understanding of reality. Jay references Plato’s skepticism and his notion 
that vision may be as much fabrication as revelation. However, during the rise of scientific 
thought during the Enlightenment, vision became a tool to reveal truth. Vision became the 
“noblest sense”5 and functioned as evidence. Technologies developed to expand human capacity 
like the telescope and the microscope allowing the acquisition of even greater knowledge of the 
visible world. 
Jean Gebser, in The Ever-Present Origin, also writes about changes taking place 
beginning with the Renaissance development of perspective. Perspective gave artists the ability 
to illuminate space, but it also changed the way humans understood their relationship to the 
world. Perspective created a distance between subject and object and a solidification of the 
individual, the “I,” and the Ego. Gebser elaborates on how “perspectival man’s” “over-emphasis 
on the ‘objectively’ external, a consequence of an excessively visual orientation, leads not only 
to rationalization and haptification but to an unavoidable hypertrophy of the ‘I.’ which is in 
                                                      
5 Jay, Downcast Eyes. 85. 
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confrontation with the external world.6 The senses were divided and sight elevated and with the 
elevation and the extension of the human faculty of sight came a focus on the individual. 
Individuals are set apart from the world they observed from a clear distance. The focus on visible 
reality denies the fluidity of change over time as the observable world becomes reduced to fixed 
categories. Coincidently, the will of the individual was elevated above the needs of the 
community.  
Jay points out that the privileging of sight was not universally accepted and scholars, like 
Denis Diderot, Nietzsche, and Bergson among others, questioned if other senses were not just as 
important in comprehending the world. For instance, Diderot suggested that touch might tell us 
about the world while also connecting us to the world instead of distancing us from it, as vision 
was assumed to do. But the link between vision and an objective knowledge of the world 
remained dominant in much of Western thought. While Bergson stressed the importance of 
movement and Diderot contrasted vision with the sense of touch, of all the ‘other’ senses the one 
most often examined seems to be that of audition. Vision and audition are often placed in a 
binary opposition, and the eyes are associated with the mind and the ears are associated with the 
body. Descartes, of course, is well known for his binary positioning of the mind and the body, 
but his binary hierarchies also extended to the senses. First to value the senses at all he distanced 
them from the body: “it is the mind which senses, not the body.”7 Then he singled out vision as 
having a special relationship to the mind, as “Sight is the most comprehensive and the noblest” 
of the senses.8 These theories had a large role in disseminating the notion of the disembodied eye 
                                                      
6 Gebser, The Ever-Present Origin, 22. 
7 Descartes, Discourse on Method, 87. 
8 Ibid., 65. 
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and contributed to the ocularcentrism of much modern and contemporary thinking.9 
 Under ocularcentrism, auditory perception often takes the place of the ‘other’ to visual 
perception.10 Consequently, many wishing to dismantle Western rationalism, including many 
feminist thinkers, often look to elevate the ear in order to dethrone the eye. But too often these 
arguments still maintain the dualism between sight and sound.11 We should not simply accept the 
characteristics attributed to sound that are arbitrary and based on normative convention. Jazz 
producer Joachim Berendt, in The World is Sound, portrays the eyes as “aggressive, dominating, 
rational, surface-oriented, analyzing things,” whereas the ears are “female, receptive, careful, 
intuitive, spiritual, depth oriented, perceiving the whole as one.”12 Meant as a critique to 
ocularcentrism this kind of thinking fits too comfortably with all the other dualisms: mind/body, 
culture/nature, civilized/primitive, and man/woman. It is no accident that vision is described in 
typically masculine attributes and audition with typically feminine attributes. We must take care 
to dismantle the opposition of hearing to sight even as we insist on the value of sound as a 
sensory experience. 
 While a simplistic elevation of the sense of audition or the reversal of the binary in favor of 
hearing is not the aim here, I do wish to consider the sense of audition for what it might reveal 
about the role of sensation in issues of affect and embodiment. Sound may also be useful for the 
way in which it often behaves in an unexpected manner. The affective qualities of sound that go 
unnoticed defy our standard conception of sensory perception. With vision we are too certain of 
the solidity of the world we see, and sound is easier to conceive of as disconnected from an 
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11 Ibid., 295.. 
12 Ibid., 296. 
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object. But ultimately I will argue that the separation of the senses into discrete operations is an 
abstraction that is ultimately misleading. The senses never operate separately.  
Yet this does not deny the potency of sound to complicate categories. Frances Dyson in 
Sounding New Media: Immersion and Embodiment in the Arts and Culture, points to the 
embodied quality of sound without assigning loaded traits like rationality or femininity: 
Hearing is not a discrete sense, to hear is also to be touched, both physically and 
emotionally. We feel low sound vibration in our stomachs and start to panic, sharp 
sudden sound makes us flinch involuntarily, a high pitched scream is emotionally 
wrenching: sound has immediate and obvious physical effects. In listening, one is 
engaged in a synergy with the world and the senses, a hearing/touch that is the essence of 
what we mean by gut reaction—a response that is simultaneously physiological and 
psychological, body and mind. These very characteristics rattle the foundations of 
Western metaphysics and Western culture generally, by questioning the status of the 
object and of the subject, simultaneously.13 
Sound seems to have a more direct impact on the materiality of the body. Sound waves contact 
the inner workings of the ear; the vibrations of sound oscillate the eardrum and the tiny bones of 
middle ear. Sound touches us. Sometimes this touch can be quite painful or even lead to 
permanent damage. While light rays can blind us and sound waves can deafen us, the sonic can 
also act in more subtly affective ways. It can lead to “diminished intellectual capacity, 
accelerated respiration and heartbeat, hypertension, slowed digestion neurosis, altered diction.”14 
Sound touches and art that deals with sound can reveal something of this touch, this connecting. 
Art with sound can impact the subject. It can affect both physiology and psychology, both body 
                                                      
13 Dyson, Sounding New Media, 4. 
14 Goodman, Steve. Sonic Warfare, 10. 
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and mind. 
Sounding the Unseen   
“Music is…the rendering sonorous of forces, ultimately the forces of chaos itself, that are 
themselves nonsonourous. Music sounds what has not and cannot be heard otherwise.”  
 
Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art 
 
 I take inspiration in part from how Elizabeth Grosz, following Deleuze, describes art as 
an intensity that “directly impacts the nervous system” and music as that which is capable of 
“giving voice or sound to what has not been heard before.”15 I will extend this also to sound 
artists who give sound to that which has not been perceived at all. To separate one sensory 
apparatus from another is a symptom of disembodiment. It is not in keeping with the interaction 
and multimodal characteristics of sense perception. Looking to the work of experimental 
electronic music and sound art can easily shake the tidy divisions of the five senses, and the 
common assumption that these are all that provide the input to our information processing brains. 
 Sound art, as a separate category from music, has been around since the 1960, though it 
has become more prominent since the late 1990s. Sound artists frequently do not just deal in 
sound alone, however. They may create installation art or sculpture that uses sound as a 
dominant element. The sounds used are not typically musical per se.  In fact, noise is a prominent 
concept in sound art. Noise can be a useful concept in that we are surrounded by noise even as it 
is often pushed into the background. It is also a concept often articulated in relationship to 
information. Noise is the stuff that does not communicate or even interferes with proper 
communication. In some sense noise is to logical, useful information what the body is to the 
mind. Just as Ahmed endeavored to queer phenomenology by bringing the background forward, 
it is potentially useful to bring noise forward to queer our understanding of our relationship to an 
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instrumentalized sense of sound.  
 Common sense tells us that we must quiet the noise to think properly, but noise is never 
silenced. Edgard Varèse, a composer of experimental music and a prominent influence on many 
sound artists, declared, “Subjectively noise is any sound one doesn’t like.”16 Noise can fade into 
the background as it is ever-present and fails to get our attention. Any sensations that persists 
will tend to become imperceptible. Noise is habitually dismissed because it is considered 
irrelevant to or incompatible with meaning. Another way to conceive of noise is to think of it as 
the ongoing and continuous sound from which all sounds emerge, some of which capture our 
attention. John Cage, another figure that influenced so many sound artists, offers this: “Wherever 
we are, what we hear is mostly noise. When we ignore it, it disturbs us. When we listen to it, we 
find it fascinating.”17  
Christina Kubisch: Sounding the Unseen World 
Art is intensely political not in the sense that it is a collective or community activity 
(which it may be but usually is not) but in the sense that it elaborates the possibilities of 
new, more different sensations than those we know. Art is where the becoming of the 
earth couple with the becomings of life to produce intensities and sensations that in 
themselves summon up a new kind of life.  
 
Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art 
 
 Sound artists draw attention to the noise of the background and in doing so also reveal the 
extent to which we disregard much of the sensations we encounter, as if they have no impact just 
because we do not give them notice. Christina Kubisch is a sound artist who makes the 
imperceptible aspects of our environment manifest. She designed headphones that are capable of 
picking up the electromagnetism of our surrounding environment. Anything that generates 
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electrical current is producing a signal that can be detected and amplified. In her earlier works 
she created installations of wires that were carrying a musical signal. The wires were arranged in 
spaces often in curvilinear or flowing patterns. The audience could approach the wires and hear 
the sounds carried by the current. Initially the audience was aided by small cubes that amplified 
the sounds traveling through the wires; they put the cubes up next to their ears and, if they 
moved close enough to the wires, they could hear the sound compositions. Kubisch later had 
special headphones adapted to perform a similar function as the cubes. She put away the 
headphones for a number of years as she pursued other work.  She came back to them later to 
discover that the sounds, she once treated as interference, were now much more prevalent, and 
were generating rhythms and patterns all their own. In the 1990s there was a tremendous 
proliferation of electrical and digital technologies introduced into the everyday environment. 
Inspired by the quality and quantity of sounds she heard, she had yet another set of headphones 
developed to explore these environmental sounds. Now rather than directly composing the sound 
works herself, she located the sound composition produced by the proliferation of digital 
technology. This led to a series of works collectively known as Electrical Walks.   
 For Electrical Walks, Kubisch provides the audience with a map of an area nearby. The 
participants walk around the city wearing the headphones provided. In this way, Kubisch offers 
suggestions about where to hear interesting sounds. There is no particular path mandated, but 
points of interest are indicated. Sounds emanate from ATM machines, security detection devices, 
and subways systems--everywhere electricity flows. Kubisch’s work reveals the concealed 
attributes of the environment and calls into question, or reminds us of, the embedded nature of 
subjectivity. The work also calls attention to the limits of perception. What we know of the world 
comes from fairly limited sensory apparatuses. We are surrounded by signals that are outside of 
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our conventional sensory awareness. Being surrounded by so many signals of which we are 
unaware begs the question, how much of our world do we know? Do these unseen and unheard 
things have impact regardless of whether we perceive them or not? Much of the electromagnetic 
waves that Kubisch is dealing with may have little direct impact on people, but some aspects of 
environmental noise do impact on bodies even when it is outside of conscious awareness. In 
Sonic Warfare, Steve Goodman describes how some of these elements impact our bodies. Part of 
Goodman’s project is to point out how both sounds we can hear and sounds we cannot have been 
militarized,. Despite the fact that we cannot hear infrasonic (below hearing) or ultrasonic (above 
hearing) frequencies, experiments have indicated that there is still some level on which we 
perceive them. This is exploited in movie theaters with subwoofers that produce frequencies 
below audible levels. Movies often employ this to heighten fear response in the audience. Also, 
as with other perceptual stimuli, sound does not need to reach the conscious mind in order to 
affect response. Josephe Ledoux performed experiments on the auditory cortex. Goodman 
describes Ledoux research showing that “stimuli are routed straight from the thalamus lower 
down in the brain to the amygdale, which he discovered was sufficient to elicit ‘freezing 
behavior, autonomic responses, suppression of pain, stress hormone release, and reflex 
potentiation.’”18 Ledoux concludes that in fact, the higher cognitive functions of the cortex 
merely serve as filters for decisions already made, subtracting some, complying with others.19  
 Kubisch creates works in which the sonic is experienced in a new way. The headphones 
reveal what is ordinarily imperceptible. This alters the relationship of the audience to their 
environment. They do not reveal pure sound or sound in and of itself; they provide an experience 
of the everyday but made into a new encounter. In an interview with Motte-Haber, Kubisch 
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declares, “I try to create spaces in which the way sound and light are arranged prevents the usual 
processes of classification and perception from functioning from the outset.”20 She speaks of 
how we generally want “things around us to be clear, manageable, secure, and reliably ordered. 
To maintain this illusion, many troubling elements of what we actually see have to be mentally 
blocked out.”21 I contend that this work provides an opportunity to understand the world 
differently, and to understand one’s relationship to the world differently. 
The sounds encountered range a great deal from low rumblings to high-pitched peeps and 
clicks. Many of the sounds have repetitive elements that become rhythmic and, as multiple sound 
sources are often heard at once, rhythms can become complex. In listening to these sounds that 
are otherwise inaudible, we also become more attuned to the general background sounds that 
make up our environment. Another sound artist, Pauline Oliveros, promotes something she calls 
“deep listening.” One does not need special headphones to hear the world in a new way. Simply 
in paying attention to what are customarily background noises these sounds can become an 
amazing composition. Oliveros describes some of the sounds she hears when she sits down to 
write:  
In the distance a bulldozer is eating away a hillside while its motor is a seccada of 
harmonics defining the space between it and the Rock ‘n’ Roll radio playing in the next 
room. Sounds of birds, insects, children’s voices and the rustling of trees fleck this space. 
As I penetrate the deep drone of the bulldozer with my ear, the mind opens and reveals 
the high-pitched whine of my nervous system. It reaches out and joins the flight of an 
airplane drone, floats down the curve of Doppler effect.22  
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22 In Cox, Audio Culture, 102. 
  61 
Kubisch’s headphones are perhaps a tool to jumpstart a kind of deep listening, attuning the 
participant to the strange sounds of the ever-growing electronic environments that surround 
them. Hearing this complex web of sound might train the ears to listen for what is ordinarily 
pushed out of perception and pushed out of thought. 
 Electrical Walks take the participants outside of gallery and museum spaces. The space in 
which the art is experienced is not cordoned off for the appreciation of art. It is a kind of public 
art but without a monument. There is no permanency. Even the locations indicated on the map 
are in a state of flux, the sounds differing day-to-day, moment-to-moment, and the participant is 
not required to follow the guide at all. From this, ideally, I imagine the participants become 
better attuned to the relationality of moving, feeling bodies immersed in a world of movement 
and vibration. A possible drawback in this work, the relationality may tend to maintain a primacy 
of the individual in that each participant is wearing headphones that, while connecting them to 
this hidden world of sound, do not serve to connect them with other people. Seth Kim-Cohen 
questions the experience of the participants wearing conspicuous headphones in public spaces.23 
They would also likely be moving in unusual ways, walking up to objects and placing their heads 
in close proximity to screens and fixtures. Do they feel conspicuous? I think Kim-Cohen is 
implying that because they are participating in an art experience they may be willing to tolerate 
their conspicuousness because they are associated with something that has a certain cultural 
capital. One of the main drawbacks to much of how art functions in society is the tendency for it 
to be elitist. Who typically goes to art galleries and museums? These spaces often participate in a 
social stratification. Even if Kubisch’s pieces still attract these same elitist audiences, at least it is 
different in that they are moving about in non art specified locations, locations that are not 
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marked off as art spaces. As they hear the amazing variety of noises, do they become a kind of 
spectacle? Do they become “weirdos” with big headphones listing closely to ATM machines? 
Perhaps this might accentuate the habitual ways people move in spaces as the participants defy 
the proper orientation toward object and the instrumentalized ways of moving through spaces; 
perhaps if they feel conspicuous in moving in public in eccentric ways they may also become 
aware of the normalization of public interactions and bodily movements. Perhaps also those 
bystanders observing the spectacle may also have their sense of normalcy disrupted for a 
moment. 
 Kubisch speaks of an interest in letting the audience have freedom and a role in the 
composition of the sound experience. She establishes guides but does not direct the specifics of 
the experience. Each participant will have a different experience of the sound scape provided by 
the headphones. When sounds shift with just a centimeter’s move of the head, no two people 
could experience the same composition if they tried. So this is not art as musical composition 
unless we think of that composition as self directed. The sound composition is not authorized by 
the artist.  
 What is generating all this noise? In revealing the ubiquity of electric technology these 
works also have the potential to compel the viewer to think about the structures of society that 
bring this technology into being, to the kinds of power relationships embedded in how 
technology is distributed and deployed. The work calls attention to the rapid proliferation of 
technology in urban areas, and it is up to the individual participant to draw connections if they 
are so inclined. How do we understand the environment full of electromagnetic waves from all 
manner of technology? How often do people notice the security systems they walk by on a 
regular basis? These security systems are often there to protect the capitalist from loss due to 
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shoplifting. They are part of an elaborate surveillance system in a growing control society. With 
these headphones these subtle passageways that are so pervasive and familiar as to disappear, 
become loud and impressive soundscapes, sometime becoming too loud to walk through.  
Sensation in Motion 
Orientation was a compelling frame for looking at embodiment in the preceding chapter 
not only for how it stressed the relation of bodies to objects but also for how it revealed how 
bodies do not come magically into position. Orientation is processual. Orientation, as Ahmed 
points out, also implies being directed and moving along paths. Bodies can be oriented in space 
but this never becomes a static fixed location. This never ceasing process complicates notions of 
what it means to be embodied. Brian Massumi offers a related but different frame for thinking 
this proccesual moving body. Massumi begins Parables of the Virtual by declaring that bodies 
move and bodies feel and that there is a link between these two facets of embodiment. Massumi 
asks, “Can we think a body without this: an intrinsic connection between movement and 
sensation whereby each immediately summons the other?”24 The body has a material existence 
but is not reducible to inanimate matter. Bodies are intertwined with the forces of movement, 
sensation and affect. Working against a neo-Cartesian understanding of space in which the body 
is profoundly separate from the spaces they occupy, here bodies cannot be thought outside of 
their movements and sensations in space. The body in immersed in a vibratory sensorial plane. 
 The concept, following after Henri Bergson and also influenced by Deleuze, that 
movement is a “dynamic unity” is one of the key elements of Massumi’s project. Bodies are 
fundamentally things that move. They are not static objects that can be simply positioned in 
space, categorized and measured. Any analysis of the body must factor in the “continuity” of 
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movement. An arrow shot into the air cannot be reconstituted by thinking of the sequence of 
positions that it occupied along its path. The path cannot be known at all till the arrow strikes its 
target. To try to break down and measure the arrow’s movement can only be done in retrospect. 
Zeno’s famous paradox tried to imagine the points along the line that the arrow occupied but ran 
up against the problem that between any two points on a line the space between the points is 
infinitely devisable. If the arrow occupied one point it could never reach the next and thus 
movement is impossible. For Bergson this is trying to understand movement through a perhaps 
equally misguided understanding of space. But movement cannot be decomposed into space. 
“Measurement stops the movement in thought.”25 When we try to understand perception in terms 
of discreet units we are distorting the sensation of that perception. The creation of knowledge of 
the world following this manner of empiricism creates a kind of fiction, a ‘fabulation’ of a world 
made up of pieces with definitive boundaries.  
 Massumi tells us that bodies move. Steve Goodman in Sonic Warfare tells us that 
everything moves. “If we subtract human perception, everything moves. Anything static is so 
only at the level of perceptibility. At the molecular or quantum level, everything is in motion, is 
vibrating. Equally, objecthood, that which gives an entity duration in time, makes it endure, is an 
event irrespective of human perception. All that is required then is an entity be felt as an object 
by another entity.”26 Here again it is only in thinking about our perceptions that we understand 
things to stand still. It is only in perception that the body is thinkable as separate from what 
engages its senses. Goodman, following William James and Aflred North Whitehead, promotes a 
kind of “’radical empiricism,’ in which the relation between things assumes as much significance 
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as the things themselves.”27  
 Still, the body is thinkable as separate from what engages its senses. This is aided, I 
believe, by the common conception that we have but five senses. The five common senses all 
register at the surface, at the boundary between outside and inside; but what about the sensation 
of the body itself? We often fail to consider this as sense perception, but without this perception 
we could not feel the location of an arm in relation to a doorknob or feel the strain on the 
muscles as they lift a bowling ball as any different than lifting a beach ball. The sense of our own 
body and the sense of the smell of a flower are not such distinctly different perceptions. 
 Beyond vision, and even beyond the five customarily named senses, there is 
proprioception. It is probably closest in relation to the sense of touch, but as touch remains on the 
surface of the body, proprioception is felt deeper within the body. Massumi names it a middle 
level sensation describing it as being “at a medium depth where the body is only body, having 
nothing of the putative profundity of the self nor the superficiality of external encounter. This 
asubjective and nonobjective medium depth is one of the strata proper to the corporeal; it is a 
dimension of the flesh.”28 With the skin, and in some ways with the five senses as well, it is 
possible to imagine that sensory perception is at the outer edge, the boundary of the body, and 
that it allows information from the exterior world to pass inside. The skin very easily reads as 
boundary. But not all sensation is about the outside world or exteroceptive. There are also 
interoceptive senses that allow one to perceive things inside the body like pain and hunger, 
which complicate the division of outside and inside.  
 Proprioception is sensation at the level of muscle and tendons. It is the sense that allows 
you to touch your finger to your nose in a sobriety test. It is a sensation of movement and 
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position. Without the sense of proprioception one could not walk without looking at where they 
put their feet, could not dance, could not modulate their voice. This is a sense that does not get a 
lot of attention. But it is particularly interesting in thinking about the relationality of the body, in 
relation to itself and the world. Proprioception is not usually considered perhaps because it does 
not reveal the world around us but within us, perhaps because it does not fit comfortably with 
separations of body and mind and subject and object. Or it could be considered all body and of 
no consequence to mind, or anything else important. If hearing is charged with being of the body 
then what about sensations that are more directly about the body? Proprioception is vital to how 
bodies move through space and interact with objects. Proprioception is critical in playing a 
musical instrument, but when we listen to a recording of music we often forget about the 
musicians movement. Even when watching a performance, the movements of the musician are 
predictable enough that they still may not register. In the next section I will consider the work of 
a composer and musician who brings attention to embodied sensation and proprioception. 
Laetitia Sonami: Performing Proprioception 
Laetitia Sonami is a composer and sound installation artist. She performs her own 
compositions utilizing a device she calls the “Lady’s Glove.” The glove contains numerous 
sensors which respond to the movements of Sonami’s hand in relation to her body and its 
position in space. The glove itself contains micro switches, transducers, accelerometers, 
ultrasonic receivers, resistive strips and more. With it Sonami can control up to sixteen different 
musical parameters. She also has sensors located on her opposing hand and on top of her foot 
that function to locate her gloved hand in relation to the rest of her body.29 Her performances 
utilize the sense of proprioception and draws the audience’s attention to the moving body in an 
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unique way. Her bodily movements seem to generate the sounds of the performance, but the 
sounds themselves, digitally programmed and emanated from loudspeakers, have no natural 
relationship to her movements and bear no relationship to a biological entity. A loud oscillating 
noise may be initiated by the turn of her wrist, for instance. The sounds are more typical of 
machines, as they are recorded from the mechanisms of “discarded tools” or “raw digital data 
from documents and old software.”30 She finds the discarded and hidden in technology and 
performs a manipulation of the failure of the digital world. Sonomi could easily generate these 
same sounds with a different interface. She chooses an interface that engages the body in motion, 
calling attention to the pleasures of the moving body. It creates a different relationship to 
sensation, a relationship that is less dependent on subject/object relationships and more on a 
sense of the body immersed in the world of forces. She potential confuses the boundaries of 
inside and outside. 
 John Cage once wrote, “The most important thing to do with electronic music now is to 
somehow make it theatrical . . . by introducing live performance elements. That is to say, people 
actually doing things . . . [and] the actual, visual manipulation of the machine.”31 Sonami gives 
us the person “actually doing things” and she gives us the “visual manipulation of the machine.” 
She combines many typical dualisms. She uses sound that is immersive and visceral but 
emanates from a body that is capable and in possession of knowledge at home in both mind and 
body. Sonami acknowledges that in some sense what she’s doing is still akin to the performance 
of a traditional instrumentalist, and she prefers this sense of physicality in the relationship of 
body to a material instrument. However, her instrument is not so obviously material. The sounds 
that she uses are still ephemeral, digital information housed in a computer. Her relationship to 
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the instrument is more a matter of a relationship to her own body. She does not feel the pressure 
of fingers against strings or strike them to produce the desired vibration. She must instead focus 
on the bend of a finger or the acceleration of her hand as she rotates her wrist. Julie Wilson-
Bokowiec and Mark Alexander Bokowiec write about their experiences using a similar system, 
the “Bodycoder.” The Bodycoder system utilizes a glove embedded with switches and 
proportional bend sensors located at various points on the body. The interface sends data 
collected about the movement of the body and sends it via radio to a Max/MSP environment.32 
Unlike a traditional instrument, the body does not touch an external object but instead becomes 
hyperaware of the movements of the body itself. They relate how this leads to the sensation that 
the sound is actually emanating from the arm itself even as they know that the arm movements 
are simply acting as a trigger for sounds coming from an external location. They also are 
interested in the role of embodiment in relationship to technology, but they point to the role that 
bodily sensation has had on the development of technology throughout its history: 
Critical theory and science fiction seem to present us with only two possible scenarios: 
either we become slaves and caretakers to technology or the human body will be forced 
to evolve through technological augmentation and genetic manipulation. Both these 
scenarios imply a situation of violent confrontation in which the body either wins or loses 
to technology. Theories that touch on the sensual—the ecstasy of communication—still 
theorize the ‘disappearance’ of the body in the technological haze of an information- 
dominated economy of exchange. What is missing from these projective scenarios is the 
role that bodily experience has historically played in the development of both utilitarian 
and expressive technologies: a desire for physical experiences, for sensation underscores 
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initiation and reception of creative gestures. As such, sensation is the bedrock upon 
which the identifiable products of our culture are built.33  
We are not then the passive receivers of technological innovation. Both Sonami and Bokowiec 
express more complex relationships with the mind and body and the tools we use to extend them.  
 Sonami has spoken about her Lady’s Glove as a response to a common type of computer 
interface of the late 1980s that was overly masculine, robotic, and militaristic. She first created 
the Lady’s Glove for a performance in 1991, which, at the time, was made from rubber kitchen 
gloves, “the perfect housewife’s tool.” She writes on her website about how “this first glove was 
also somewhat of a joke, a response to the heavy masculine apparel used in virtual reality 
systems.”34 Later gloves were made in the style of a long feminine lady’s glove. This too can be 
seen as a response to the heavily masculine-type of controller, but it was also a desire for the 
controller to be more sensual. Her concern for sensuality is connected to her belief in the 
importance of bodily and physical interaction and bypassing the brain. The sensual emphasizes 
the libidinal and the bodily presence. It softens the technology. It models an involvement with 
technology that does not disembody but insists on pleasure in movement and proprioception. 
The vision of Sonami’s hand enveloped in wires and sensors cannot help but call to mind 
associations to the figure of the cyborg championed by Donna Haraway. In “A Cyborg 
Manifesto” Haraway writes, “Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in 
which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves.”35 And like Haraway’s cyborg, 
Sonami presents a figure to reflect on, if not escape, a number of troubling dualisms. Sonami sets 
out to complicate the mind/body duality, and along the way she also complicates the division of 
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sound and vision; human and machine; man and woman; and instrument and body. She is 
concerned with the tendency to use digital technology in a way that promotes a sense of 
disembodiment. It is also not insignificant that she is a woman working with technology that she 
developed herself. She is not simply modeling the latest gadget but is involved in its creation. 
She also programs the sound parameters and processes with which the glove interfaces.36  
 To separate one sensory apparatus from another is also a symptom of disembodiment, and 
we can look at Sonami’s work as a kind of celebration or embracing of the multimodal quality of 
sensation. Her performance engages the senses through the sight of her body in motion, 
physically articulating the sound. Additionally, she frequently uses projections of moving images 
adding representational movement to the enacted movements of her performance. She sometimes 
uses the glove to interact with objects like light bulbs with sound-controlled filaments. Sonami 
has designed and constructed an intricate interrelation of unique components. Her multimodal 
form is an effective approach to combine that which traditional Western rationalism has tried to 
separate, while not reestablishing a new unity, simply a new version of the universal unified 
subject. 
Multisensoral Confusion of Boundaries 
In Sonic Warfar, Goodman writes about the recent rise in interest in the “sonic.” The 
sonic is not dealing with the perceptual sense of sound in isolation but the combined sensory 
experience of the “vibratory.”37 These theories still oppose ocularcentrism but focus on a 
synesthetic experience that does not rely on the assumption of a preformed subject or a 
separation of vision and audition. In contemporary perceptual studies, it is more common to find 
the notion that “every sensation is synesthetic or multimodal.” Pedro Rebelo suggests that 
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isolating the senses is only useful in the analysis of sensation, which is another way in which we 
divide the world into categories and classifications to produce a seemingly objective knowledge. 
(28) Goodman again: 
Interestingly, many ascribe to the sonic a strange intermediary sensory role. Deleuze and 
Gutaurri assert that perhaps sound plays a piloting role in synesthesia. Stephen Connor 
has argued that this derives from sound’s interstitial qualities, that it has the tendency to 
drift in between the other senses. French film theorist of audiovisual perception Michel 
Chion argues that the sonic, within film, possesses a strange power to render a block of 
sensations that includes both the tactile and the visual.…For him ‘the ear’s temporal 
resolving power is incomparably finer than that of the eye’ and this allows cinema to go 
beyond a mere correspondence between the senses toward what he called an ‘intersensory 
reciprocity,’ transposing a ‘sonic velocity into the order of the visible.’38  
There is no separation between the senses, be they senses directed to the outside world like sight 
or audition or the sensations of the body itself.  All collaborate “trans-sensorially” in a confusion 
that implicates the confusion between bodies and the things sensed. Massumi asks: “What does 
the bee see and smell in the flower? Enough to extract pollen from it. A creature’s perception is 
exactly proportioned to its action upon the thing. The properties of the perceived thing are 
properties of the action, more than of the thing itself. This does not mean, on the other hand, that 
the properties are subjective or in the perceiver. On the contrary, they are tokens of the 
perceiver’s and the perceived’s concrete inclusion in each other’s world. The perception lies 
between the perceiver and the perceived.”39 Perception delimits a body’s possible actions and 
movement. What bodies can do is dependent on what they sense. 
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 Body-minds are extended by sensory perception. The feeling, sensing body does not 
move in isolation. What is in between bodies and objects but sensation? Senses are experienced 
in relation and they develop in relation. Massumi draws this conclusion by pointing to an 
experiment in which animals were immobilized.40 The result of this immobilization was the 
inability to see. They did not develop the capacity for sight because sight develops in a body that 
can move in the world. It develops in relation. What are the implications of this for human 
bodies and other bodies? Sight is argued to create an objective distance and make possible the 
subject–object dichotomy. If sight, compounded simultaneously with all the other sensory 
perceptions, is a relation, a being in relation, how does the other become object? If sight extends 
bodies and is an in between, inseparable from the body seeing and from the body seen this 
challenges the notion of objective distance.41  
 In the next section I consider an artist that uses sight and sound and even proprioception 
all at once. Pipilotti Rist creates video and sound installations that manipulate what the audience 
sees and hears and how they move through space. She creates atmospheres. “Like the aural, the 
atmospheric suggest a relationship not only with the body in its immediate space but with a 
permeable body integrated within, and subject to, a global system: one that combines the air we 
breathe, the weather we feel, the pulses and waves of the electromagnetic spectrum the subtends 
and enable technologies, old, and new, and circulates,...in the excitable tissues of the heart.”42 I 
suggest that Rist’s work reveals the interplay of sensations and the sensing body with the world. 
Her practice can ultimately highlight the permeability of the body and the subject/bodies 
emergent in relation.  
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Pipilotti Rist: Immersed in Sensation 
Pipilotti Rist is an artist who works with video and sound installations. The work is 
intermedia and appeals to a multitude of senses. In experiencing her work one cannot easily 
separate the function of the eyes from that of the ears, nor can one ignore the proprioceptive 
experience. My most recent experience with Pipilotti Rist’s work was at the exhibition at the 
Anderson Gallery entitled The Nameless Hour: Places of Reverie, Paths of Reflection, 2010. 
Rist’s piece in the show was entitled Gravity Be My Friend (2007). There was a partition at the 
entrance separating the space of her installation from the rest of the gallery. At the entrance to 
the room there was a gallery attendant who asked all visitors to take off their shoes. Entering the 
space my first sense was that of the smell of new carpet. Rist had piled carpet pieces on top of 
each other. They were cut into curvilinear shapes with each shape getting slightly smaller as they 
move up the pile, creating the effect of a topographical map of sorts. There were rises and 
valleys like a miniature landscape. The carpet mounds seem to invite the viewer to lay back and 
experience the video projected on the ceiling. The sound of music, very characteristic of Rist’s 
work, seems to come from all around. One is enveloped in sights and sounds and smell and 
touch, and one can feel one’s body relaxing on the soft floor. The video itself is framed by 
another biomorphic, curvilinear shape reminiscent of the shapes in the carpet and also repeated 
on the walls with colorful paint. The video felt immersive, probably more so because of the 
space it was in, but the quality of the images had something to do with it as well, the slow 
movement of the imagery combined with an intimate proximity to the objects and the inviting 
and lyrical sounds. The sound was pleasant, but almost sickly sweet. It too had an odd quality to 
it, something of a fairy tale with a slightly dark promise. 
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 Watching the video from this vantage is an odd experience. It takes one out of one’s 
customary relationship to works in a gallery. Videos are commonly projected onto walls and are 
experienced in a very similar vein to a painting or drawing–a very typical experience of a gallery 
space. Even the curvilinear forms estrange us from the equal and opposing forces of the “white 
cube” gallery. Lying on the floor immediately places the viewer in an uncommon relationship to 
the work and to the space. There was something that felt a bit vulnerable about this experience, 
feeling odd in a space that is designated as high culture. Shoes off, laying on the floor, I was also 
keenly aware of the other people experiencing the work with me, trying to negotiate the space 
with the conventional standard of allowing appropriate personal space, conscious of a need, or 
desire, to share the space with others. They were the same people that I was surrounded by in the 
other parts of the gallery, but in this closed off space, in this shared experience of the odd, it felt 
strangely more like a people in relation to one another, not just in relation to the work.  
 I don’t want to make too much of this relationality. As Clair Bishop points out in 
critiquing relational aesthetics, just having an interaction with a group of people is not inherently 
political or democratizing, especially as galleries are generally frequented by people with a lot in 
common and who form identification with one another with relative ease.43 Nevertheless, the 
work does move away from the individualizing contemplation of equally autonomous objects. It 
might create a space to think about our relationships to sensation differently and perhaps our 
relationship with other people differently. Amelia Jones writes of the way that Rist’s work 
produces a feminist subject, “via a multiple and relational feminine subjectivity enacted via a 
deep conceptual and material intertwining body, space, screen, sound, and object–one that 
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necessarily implicates the spectator-cum-participant through synaesthetic means.”44 Elaborating 
on the relational aspect of subject formation implicit in Rist’s work, Jones positions herself as 
like Rist in age and historical relationship to feminism. Jones finds it easy to feel a relation to 
Rist. I also wonder about the identifiers she is not mentioning: middle-class, white, thin bodied, 
and the like. Would the process seem as relational for a differently positioned viewer? Relational 
sometimes seems to assume and/or overlook the degree of sameness of the audience participants. 
So while I admit to feeling a of community in viewing Rist’s work, it may be significant that I 
am already in a community of artists and art consumers. Still, perhaps the viewer leaves this 
space with a different feeling regarding their interrelatedness in general, extending beyond the 
limited group of people in the gallery at the point of the experience. 
 The experience was not typical of most gallery experiences, but it was also different from 
the immersive quality of watching a movie at a theater. There are no clearly designated seats. 
One had to negotiate the space and the other participants. One cannot forget about the body the 
way one ideally does in a movie theater. Certainly I am aware of my body in a theater if there is 
not enough room for my legs, or if the seat is uncomfortable in some way, or when negotiating 
the shared armrest between the seats, but for the most part the environment disappears once the 
movie begins. The seats of the theater are homogenous, strictly ordered, fixed in place, designed 
to maximize occupancy, to maximize profit. Rist’s work is immersive in that it envelops the 
viewer and engages every sense perception in an open relationship with others. 
 It might be productive to think of Rist’s work in relationship to Laura Marks 
understanding of “haptic visuality.” Marks describes haptic perception “as the combination of 
tactile, kinesthetic, and proprioceptive functions, the way we experience touch both on the 
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surface of and inside our bodies.”45  In haptic cinema the viewer is not encouraged to view the 
depth of the scene as much as to view the surface of the moving images. The screen is not a 
window on the world but another object with which one shares space. “It enables an embodied 
perception: the viewer responding to the video as to another body and to the screen as another 
skin.”46 Rist’s work engages this haptic visuality. The images are digitally manipulated such the 
space often flattens as one image is overlaid with another; the spaces become confused and 
ambiguous. The images often have a great deal of detail, sometimes by means of the camera 
coming very close to objects, other times by visual manipulation, like a colored liquid moving 
through water and creating complicated arabesques of movement like a band of smoke swirling 
through the air. Marks claims that haptic video compels the view to be self-reflexive because 
they cannot enter into an identificatory relationship with the images, the window is opaque and 
the viewer remains aware of themselves in relation.    
 Christine Ross has noted that in Rist’s work “femininity is the starting point for 
discordant beings who fall, scream, grimace, smash or float, seeking to redefine–from within–
norms of femininity. These disruptions occur not only at the level of the represented body but 
also in the body of the electronic image.”47 The images are distorted, the narratives are broken if 
existent at all; this appeals to the irrational and the sensational. One cannot look upon these 
videos and feel a sense of mastery, or a sense in which the eyes will lead one to some objective 
truth. This further enforces the sense in which works are haptic: “The ideal relationship between 
viewer and optical image tends to be one of mastery, in which the viewer isolates and 
comprehends the objects of vision. The ideal relationship between viewer and haptic image is 
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one of mutuality, in which the viewer is more likely to lose her/himself in the image, to lose her 
or his sense of proportion.”48  
 To the extent that there are narratives at work in Rist’s videos they are ambiguous. But 
while the imagery is often not naturalistic, there is still much that is recognizable and suggestive 
of meaning. And as Ross alludes to above, some of that meaning seems to involve gender 
normativity. Even as the video is dealing with imagery that is recognizable, the way the camera 
travels over surfaces, moving at odd angles, alters our relationship to the objects and spaces. 
Often the camera is low to the ground, aiming up, or moving very close to objects. Everything 
seems slightly unreal. The situations are not so much confusing as perhaps relating to Deleuze's 
principle of “indiscernibility: we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, 
in the situation, not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and there is 
no longer even a place from which to ask.”49 This is not realism appealing to sensory-motor 
action but “rather a dreamlike connection through the intermediary of the liberated sense 
organs”50 creating a “purely optical and sound situation.”51 
 In Gravity Be My Friend, we see images of women in water bobbing and playing. In 
much of the video the camera is underwater or moves through the surface of the water above and 
below. In one section, the vantage of the camera is from below and through the surface of the 
water. In it we see a line of trees and a bright sky. In the water is an apple moving with the gentle 
waves among lily pads. A close up view of a hand comes into the image and reaches out to the 
apple. Again this can be viewed in relation to Deleuze's notion of the haptic in cinema. The hand 
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touches the apple but not in an instrumental way. The hand is an object of sensation and not a 
character in a narrative. The hand does not just possess a “prehensile function” and the eye 
“doubles its optical function by a specifically ‘grabbing’ [haptique] one, if we follow Riegl’s 
formula for indicating a touching which is specific to the gaze.”52 Marks also references Riegl 
assessment of the relationship between the haptic and more perspectival images in the history of 
art. His account is a story of progress from the more decorative and surface oriented works to the 
more advanced illusionist works. This narrative also serves to reinforce the idea that later 
instances of decorative art were of lesser stature. Not coincidently much of this work was 
associated with the productions of women: weaving, needle point, and embroidery. In a way 
Rist’s work reads as decorative. It is also highly colorful; another characteristic that has often 
been relegated to the lesser arts in the art world, and it too tends to be associated with the 
feminine. But in Deleuze, the tactile is considered in relation to the “pure optical and sound 
situation.”53 The image had to free itself from sensory-motor links; it had to stop being action-
image in order to become a pure optical, sound (and tactile) image”54 in order to put perception 
in contact with thought.55 
I am not interested in synesthetic and haptic visuality for the sensations in and of 
themselves but for what they might do in the world. If Rist’s work is just a pleasant immersive 
experience then it is of little interest. As I will address in the next chapter pleasant experiences 
and happiness are not in themselves inherently good. My interest is in changing the way people 
think, moving away from binary oppositions, away from a drive toward mastery and control, and 
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toward an understanding of the deeply interdependent and dependent qualities of being in the 
world. Sensation is key in any artwork but the artists described in this chapter all deal more 
pointedly with foregrounding a perceptual engagement with the world. At the same time they all 
engage a thinking subject and thus model a way to conceive of feeling and thinking as a 
continuous unity. Incorporating the positioned viewer, they accentuate rationality and move 
away from the assumed distance between viewer and object. Avoiding an instrumentalized and 
objectivist form of seeing, sound art and multisensory work enmesh sensations and bodies and 
contextualized spaces. Kim-Cohen expresses his hope for the role of sound in art: “An expanded 
sonic practice would include the spectator, who always carries, as constituent parts of his or her 
subjectivity, a perspective shaped by social, political, gender, class and racial experience.”56 
Kibsch, Sonami and Rist all pull the audience into the work but not to experience art as an “easy 
chair.” The work still explores ideas as it explores sensation. 
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Chapter Three: Queer Emotion 
 
 
In the previous chapter I looked at sensation and perceptual faculties. Now I will question 
the relationship of sensation to thought and emotion. I explore what emotions do; how do they 
impact bodies and subjects and worlds. Theories regarding affect will inform the next two 
chapters but looking at affect from two different vantage points. Affect at its most molecular can 
be thought of in terms of physiological responses of the body prior to consciousness. Affect at a 
more macroscopic, or perhaps Deleuze’s molar, level constitutes emotions. Emotions are the 
sedimentation of affect into something nominal, recognizable, still affective but closer to the 
realm of consciousness. Emotion is how we represent our feeling to ourselves. They are 
definitely placed on the body side of the body mind binary and on the opposing side to the 
exalted rationality. Emotions may motivate behavior and even ideology. The plastic arts fairly 
clearly deal in the stuff of sensation. What is their relationship to the affective? Art can trigger 
emotion and emotions are powerful forces that can direct our course through life. Art can 
engender emotion, but it can simultaneously stimulate complex thought processes. Here again, 
art refuses the binary. Emotions are opposed to rationalism, but they are also caught up in 
another binary, that of the public and private. Emotions are proper only in the private realm. By 
dealing with emotional content artists can force open our notions of what is proper to the public 
and the political realms. While emotions generally are phenomena to be controlled and kept out 
of public space, happiness is practically a requirement in public and private spaces. In what 
follows I will consider Sara Ahmed’s The Promise of Happiness, and complicate this promise 
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with realities of grief and failure, pulling in Judith Butler’s Precarious Life: The Powers of 
Mourning and Violence and Judith Halberstam’s Queer Art of Failure. Félix González-Torres 
will provide the artwork to guide my consideration of arts relationship to these ideas. His work is 
emotional yet cognitively stimulating, private yet public, successful yet a success that could be 
read as a failure. As affect is a term that is used in a multitude of ways, I first establish the 
specificity of what I intend to address.  
Affect is associated with feeling whether it is feeling as emotion or as sensitivity to 
forces. There would appear to be an increasing interest in affect in the areas of cultural criticism 
and theory. Ann Pellegrini and Jasbir Puar survey the “centrality of theories of affect to 
conceptualizations of subjecthood, being, corporeality, and politics.”1 Although Pellegrini and 
Puar are skeptical about how new or homogeneous these idea are, their assessment of the 
importance of affect is in line with many recent publications. Brian Massumi tells us, “There 
seems to be a growing feeling within media, literary, and art theory that affect is central to an 
understanding of our information-and image-based late capitalist culture.”2 Some scholars such 
as Patricia Clough and Michael Hardt, go so far as to refer to this phenomenon as “the affective 
turn.”3 Others down play the extent to which this turn is really a new direction. Hardt, like 
Pellegrini and Paur, acknowledges the precedence for theorizing the affective. Writing in The 
Affective Turn, Hardt establishes a lineage for this current direction, claiming that it has two 
major antecedents, “the focus on the body, which has been most extensively advanced in 
feminist theory, and the exploration of emotions, conducted predominantly in queer theory.”4 As 
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these antecedents significantly and directly connect to my work here, I now move to consider 
affect.   
 So if affect follows after the concern for the body and the concern for emotions, how is it 
distinguished as something else, if not something new? How affect differs is in the particular and 
pointed way that affect also implicates thought and consciousness. “A focus on affects certainly 
does draw attention to the body and emotions, but it also introduces an important shift. The 
challenge of the perspective of the affect resides primarily in the syntheses it requires. This is, in 
the first place, because affect refers equally to the body and the mind; and, in the second, because 
it involves both reason and the passions.5 It is closely linked with many concepts of embodiment 
in that embodiment also acknowledges the inseparable nature of bodies and thought–the role of 
bodies in experiencing and understanding the world. However, affect looks specifically at a 
unique aspect of perception, but more accurately termed affection. Affect implicates the body-
mind in the interstitial space between perception and action. Through this interstitial space, 
theories of affect provide a potent arena to examine the interconnected nature of processes of 
mind and body, and the way processes that go unseen and unconsidered, never-the-less, play a 
significant role in experience.  
 Theories of affect are complicated by imprecision in language and the lack of a 
“vocabulary specific to affect.” Brain Massumi make this point and claims our existing 
“vocabulary has derived from theories of signification that are still wedded to structure.”6 Affect 
is used to designate slightly differing phenomenon depending on the author addressing the 
concept. Sometimes it refers to the external expression of emotion, sometimes to emotions 
themselves. Other authors, such as Sedgwick, follow Silvan Tomkins’ work on affect. “Tomkins 
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understood affect in terms of specific physiological responses that then give rise to various 
effects, which may or may not translate into emotions. Affect therefore precedes emotions; affect 
is not conscious, but it has a dynamism, a sociality or social productivity.”7 Brian Massumi takes 
pains to distinguish affect from emotion, preferring to link affect to intensity. Emotion is 
problematic for Massumi because of its assumed relationship to subjectivity. “An emotion is a 
subjective content…defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, 
consensual progressions, in to narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. 
It is intensity owned and recognized.”8 Affect then for Massumi following Deleuze, is pre-
personal. This is a distinction that also helps many to avoid renewal of the centrality of the 
human subject.   
Deleuze considers affect in terms of force and intensity, as a receptivity and a capability 
to act. All things have the capacity to affect and to be affected. This highlights the way that 
body-minds are embedded in the world, moved by it and moving it in turn. This is my interest in 
affect. Referring back to Spinoza, Hardt writes, “the mind’s power to think corresponds to its 
receptivity to external ideas; and the body’s power to act corresponds to its sensitivity to other 
bodies.”9 Thinking is not a separate process from feeling and acting. The body, mind, and world 
are continuous. There are no discrete, bounded bodies acting in a world of wholly separate 
objects, but all are moving together.  Affect thus helps problematize the fixed distinction 
between subject and object, self and other. 
Some authors, Massumi for one, promote an affective turn because of what they see as an 
impasse in cultural criticism or a sense of the limitations of a poststructuralist emphasis on 
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linguistics. I do not see affect as against poststructuralism or an alternative to ideological 
criticism but as an addition/coupling with. I am not comfortable with the degree to which 
Massumi and others suggest affect as a turn away from poststructuralism. The language of 
“turning” is not helpful in this sense as it creates easy opposition of bad “old” theory and good 
“new” theory. Perhaps it could be thought as a turning toward, but we do not have to drop the 
tools we are already using to pick up new ones. Despite this one departure, I align my project 
with a good deal of Massumi’s work. I believe that affect has a valuable place within cultural 
criticism, but we must also attend to the ways that affect works to reproduce dominant social 
structures. Affect may not be controllable, but it does not attach to objects randomly. Within Eve 
Sedgwick’s reading of Silvin Tomkins she is excited by the notion that “any affect may have any 
‘object.’ This is the basic source of complexity of human motivation and behavior.”10 While it 
may be true that any affect can couple with any object, it should also be noted that some affects 
cluster around some object, and subjects, to a greater extent. This is not innocent coincidence but 
is tied to dominant social structures and norms, in part perhaps because of the variability of what 
objects are in reach for different individuals. People can only be affected by the objects that 
come near, as Ahmed might say. And certainly some objects are more likely than others to 
produce a given affect. An affect might itself be a kind of object if the affective feeling of one 
individual is thought to influence the affect of another.  
Affect is a direct bodily force or intensity and can often act in surprising ways, but it is 
connected to macro level power structures. Deleuze writes of molecular and molar and while the 
molecular seems to be the level where positive changes can be instigated, Deleuze does not lose 
sight of the ongoing relationship to the molar. Affect may, in some sense, operate at the 
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molecular but this does not mean that it operates autonomously, independent from cultural 
construction.  To consider a more molar perspective, I will look at how seeking positive affect 
can maintain dominant social structure. I am inspired here in part by the work of Sara Ahmed 
and specifically The Promise of Happiness. We chase after the good life because it promises 
positive affect. Culture constructs norms in such a way as to make it seem as common sense that 
certain things will be happy things.  
Affect as Emotion 
In … affective economies, emotions do things, and they align individuals with 
communities—or bodily space with social space—through the very intensity of 
their attachments. Rather than seeing emotions as psychological dispositions, we 
need to consider how they work, in concrete and particular ways, to mediate the 
relationship between the psychic and the social, and between the individual and 
the collective.  
 
Sarah Ahmed, "Affective Economies" 
 
  The present is not enough. It is impoverished and toxic for queers and other  
  people who do not feel the privilege of majoritarian belonging, normative tastes,  
  and “rational” expectations. 
 
José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia 
 
In the Deleuzian conception of affect, it is a pre-personal event that comes before action 
and before emotion proper. This would suggest then that when we address emotion we are 
dealing with the personal.  However, I contend that we conceive of emotions as phenomenon that 
do not reside exclusively in the interior of the subject but circulate between bodies and objects 
and other bodies. Sara Ahmed proposes that emotions travel in what she terms “affective 
economies.” In other words, emotions work as a form of capital. Affect does not reside positively 
in the sign or commodity, but is produced only as an effect of its circulation. I am using “’the 
economic’ to suggest that emotions circulate and are distributed across a social as well as 
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psychic field.’”11 Emotions do things in the way they circulate, in the directions of movement 
and attachment. I want to consider the ramifications of conceding that emotions are personal but 
also consider emotion as something that is not contained solely within the subject that is simply 
expressed outwardly. Emotions might designate a force moving between subjects and objects, 
neither inside nor outside but interconnecting between. “Emotions are not simply ‘within’ or 
‘without’ but…they create the very effect of the surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds.”12  
In what follows, I will consider Sara Ahmed’s The Promise of Happiness in dialog with 
Judith Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure. Happiness promises a good life for those who 
follow the right path, who have the option of following the right path. I will juxtapose this with 
what it might mean to fail to be happy, as well as fail to achieve success. In Chapter 4, I will then 
follow with a consideration of affect at the molecular level, as a more physiologically impactful 
force. Here I will look to Masumi’s and Deleuze’s work on affect. And at every level I will 
consider the relationship between affect and art practice.  
 Affects can be productive. They have the capacity to direct our attention, to move us 
toward some things and away from others. Arguably the most sought after affect would be what 
is frequently termed happiness. This project is not intent on swinging over to the opposite side of 
the binary of rational/emotional, but rather to look for ways to break down the separation. In 
much contemporary US culture emotions are devalued. They are out of control; they degrade the 
illusion of the rational human. Interestingly though, some emotions are exempt; for instance 
happiness. There is still some gendering here. If a man is too joyful, his masculinity might fall 
suspect to question. But overall, happiness seems to be an accepted and even actively sought 
after emotion.  
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Happy Affect 
 Happiness is the ultimate affect, or the affect that is elevated as the ultimate goal. Surely, 
everyone wants to be happy. Even if one does not express happiness as the goal, happiness is 
enmeshed with things believed to bring happiness. In effect, happiness can encompass so many 
other goals: obtaining money and success; marriage; children; all the normative signs of the good 
life. Perhaps a related phenomenon to the affective turn, Sara Ahmed writes of the ‘happiness 
turn,’ pointing to the number of recent publications with happiness as their subject, the rise in 
reference to happiness in the media, and scholars investigating the ‘science of happiness.’ So 
many efforts to promote happiness and most seem to assume that happiness is inherently good 
and that a life well lived is a life in pursuit of happiness. Ahmed expresses skepticism that 
happiness is inherently good and asks, “What does happiness do?”13 How does moving in the 
direction of happiness shape the world? Emotions are never innocent or isolated from other 
forces in the world. What role does the promise of happiness play in the maintenance of 
hegemonic norms? 
 Some things in the world have become associated with happiness or assumed to bring 
about happiness. Ahmed refers to these as “happiness-causes.” In many accounts of what 
promotes happiness, marriage is placed at the top of the list. The science of happiness 
demonstrates a correlation between happiness and marriage and then reads the correlation as 
cause.14  If people believe that marriage is good and it is crucial to living the good life, does this 
influence their self-reporting about their level of happiness? What if we associate happiness not 
just with the good life but with good people? Ahmed makes the point that we come to associate 
happiness as part of the character of certain people; it is a ‘trait” that some people possess and 
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others do not. In that we associate happiness with all that is good, we also tend to favor those 
people who possess this happy trait. Those who feel good are good; conversely, those who feel 
bad are bad. To be unhappy is read as failure, or perhaps worse, a refusal. We cannot lose sight 
of the fact that we live in a world where some people have an easier path to happiness, or they 
have a path that makes happiness more likely.  What is not acknowledged is the privilege of this 
path. Happiness as a social good makes an easy critique of those who are critical of 
contemporary culture: “feminist killjoys,” “unhappy queers,” or “melancholic migrants.”15 
Happiness makes for good workers and good consumers in the ever-receding goal of happiness 
that spurs the momentary high of the newly purchased.  
 Insistence on happiness also obscures the number of people actually living lives of 
drudgery and even misery. At the same time that the science of happiness is compelling people 
to have positive attitudes, pharmaceutical companies are selling record numbers of anti-
depressant drugs. If good people are happy then when people face real unhappy situations they 
are compelled to, at least not speak of it, and ideally not think of it, less they risk being bad 
people: lonely, antisocial, neurotic. Meanwhile so few seem to be asking why so many people 
are failing at being happy. Maybe it is not a character flaw in the individual but something 
systemically wrong with dominant society. Ahmed is struck by how the failure of so many to be 
happy has not led to a challenge of “social ideals.”16 Happiness scholars are surprised when what 
is thought to bring happiness does not deliver its promise. One cited paradox is the fact that 
greater wealth has not produced greater happiness. Despite this failed association, people still 
hold to social ideals and read the failure as resulting from not adhering closely enough to these 
ideals. Even marriage often fails to be a happiness cause, but marriage is still held to be the 
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ultimate goal in our heteronormative society. 
 José Esteban Muñoz, Heather Love, and Judith Halberstam worry that contemporary gay 
and lesbian politics are adopting an emotional “positivism.” Love’s “compulsory happiness,” 
Muñoz’s “banal optimism,” or Halberstam’s “toxic positivity,” all express a concern that some 
may be following too closely to the normative path to happiness. Heather Love cautions against a 
“compulsory happiness” that seems to be emerging in some recent queer theory: “There are, of 
course, many reasons for pursuing a politics of gay happiness, not only because gays and 
lesbians do deserve some happiness for their pains, but also because a great deal of anti-gay 
propaganda still feeds on the assumption that homosexuality is tragic. So, while it is true that we 
need accounts of queer joy, in this historical moment of enforced happiness, attention to queer 
unhappiness remains paramount.”17 The good and happy life has strong associations with 
heterosexual couples and the dominant social structures of marriage and family. Marriage as a 
happiness cause may be caught up in the neoliberal gay and lesbian political focus on marriage 
rights. If one deviates from this path one is threatened with unhappiness or worse.  
If the queer life is imagined at all, it is imagined as unhappy. Some conservative figures 
take the association between homosexuality and unhappiness so far as to believe that 
unhappiness, in the form of “loneliness and sadness, profound feelings of inadequacy, mistrust 
and fear,” actually causes one to become homosexual.18 Perhaps it is more likely that being queer 
in a straight world might lead to a certain degree of unhappiness. While the association of 
unhappiness and queerness is troubling, it should not simply be covered over or erased for the 
sake of seeming happy, or putting up a cheerful front for others so that they can be happy. “We 
can see too the importance of embracing the unhappy queer, rather than simply placing our hopes 
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in an alterative figure of the happy queer. The unhappy queer is unhappy with the world that 
reads queers as unhappy. The risk of promoting the happy queer is that the unhappiness of this 
world could disappear from view. We must stay unhappy with this world.”19 Muñoz is also 
concerned about what he terms a “ banal optimism,” and argues this is something to be avoided, 
but he is also wary of a “political pessimism.” He opposes a “certain romance of negativity” but 
not to the extent that excludes the political potential of any kind of negative affect.20 We must 
avoid a binary opposition here, as in all critical thinking. Negative affects or “sentiments” can 
functions as a kind of “political refusal,” a refusal of the dominant culture that has all too often 
created a state of hopelessness in the minoritarian subject.21 
 Emotion is thought of as a highly personal and interior phenomenon. But this notion 
helps solidify the boundaries between interior and exterior and between private and public. The 
rigid boundary between private and public has long been the object of criticism within feminist 
theory. It is a way of hiding systemic problems under the rouse of personal responsibility. If 
something is a personal matter, then it is of no concern to anyone outside of that unique 
individual. Crossing and confusing the boundaries of the private and the public is a potentially 
potent strategy. It is also a matter of concern within queer theory. Here I align myself with the 
queer project as expressed by Berlant: 
The queer project we imagine is not just to destigmatize those average intimacies, not just 
to give access to the sentimentality of the couple for persons of the same sex, and 
definitely not to certify as properly private the personal lives of gays and lesbians. Rather, 
it is to support forms of affective, erotic, and personal living that are public in the sense 
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of accessible, available to memory, and sustained through collective activity.22  
Dominant notions of what constitutes private and personal determine what is appropriate for 
public discourse and for political action. If queer folks keep their sexuality and intimacies to 
themselves, this makes the public sphere a more comfortable place for the heteronormative. The 
aberrant are hidden away within the normative assumptions of properly private matters. It also 
obscures the way in which the private is structured to perpetuate heteronormativity through the 
presumptive family form. Works that are affective and are not just revealing of the individual, 
personal emotions of the artist; but I will argue this work breaks down the boundary between 
public and private, the binary construction that hides the private in order to create the illusion of 
sameness and normalcy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Félix González-Torres: Art of Affect 
Private loss is restructured and becomes public art.  
 
José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia 
 
 Félix González-Torres was an artist whose work put the private out into public spaces. In 
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the Untitled (1991), the artist created a black-and-white photograph of his unmade bed. This 
image was enlarged and displayed on twenty-four billboards throughout New York City. It is 
tightly framed and presents the upper section of the bed drawing the viewer’s attention to the two 
pillows that clearly show the impressions left behind by two heads. The imprints from two 
bodies create a pronounced sense of absence and the simple composition against the chaotic 
surrounds of the city creates a sense of quiet stillness. Anyone viewing the work can make a 
connection with a recently occupied bed.  The bed is a place of intimacy, as well as a place of 
passion and lust, or rest and recuperation. If one knows more about González-Torres, or even the 
sense of the crisis facing the queer community in the 1980s, the work takes on another layer of 
meaning/feeling. His partner died of an AIDS-related illness in 1991. González-Torres does not 
show us his grief, but he shows a space of intimate connections and profound loss. This is a 
space we can imagine occupying. Writing about González-Torres, bell hooks says that his “work 
disrupts boundaries, challenges us to see and acknowledge in public space all that we have been 
encouraged to reveal only in private. Bringing us face to face with our emotional vulnerability, 
our lack of control over our bodies, our intense longing for nurturance…this art restores the 
primacy of our bond with flesh.”23  
 The work deals with privatizing emotions but does not represent the personal identity of 
the artist. Affect allows González-Torres to deal with political issues in a impactful manner 
without having to narrow and restrict his identity into a typical representation, or be read as a 
predicable identity no matter what is actually present in the representation. Muñoz, along with 
many others, points out how minoritarians are either absent from cultural representation or 
restricted to a very limiting representation. Muñoz’s term minoritarian refers to “citizen-subjects 
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who, due to antagonisms within the social such as race, class, and sex, are debased within the 
majoritarian public sphere.”24 Almost any way minoritarian individuals represents themselves 
will be read against the expected stereotypical or exoticized dominant expectation. González-
Torres gets at private material without having to present himself as specimen. Relaying 
González-Torres’s rejection of simplistic and restricting notions of identify politics, Munoz 
argues that González-Torres manages to achieve “disidentity.”25  “He does not counter negative 
representations with positive ones, but instead absents himself and his work from this dead-end 
street.” When asked in an interview about the “lack of an overt political or Latino content” in his 
work, he responded, “I’m not a good token. I don’t wear the right colors. …Some people want to 
promote multiculturalism as long as they are the promoters, the circus directors.”26 While not 
following the expected path of identity politics, his work is far from apolitical. The act of 
bringing the private into public spaces alone has political significance. Queer artist and activist, 
David Wojnarowicz proclaimed: “To make the private into something public is an action that has 
terrific repercussions in the pre-invented world. The government has the job of maintaining the 
day to day illusion of the ONE TRIBE NATION. Each public disclosure of a private reality 
becomes something of a magnet that can attract others with a similar frame of reference; thus 
each public disclosure of a fragment of private reality serves as a dismantling tool against the 
illusion of ONE-TRIBE NATION; it lifts the curtains for a brief peek and reveals the probable 
existence of literally millions of tribes.”27 González-Torres work is political also in how it 
confronts the viewer with issues of grief and specifically grief over the loss of a minoritarian 
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subject. 
 In “Violence, Mourning, Politics,” Judith Butler asks what “makes for a grievable life?”  
She also states, “Loss has made a tenuous ‘we’ of us all.”28 I posit González-Torres’s work 
addresses these same issues.  He is, in a way, insisting that a queer man who dies from AIDS is 
grievable. Those who have died from AIDS are not unfortunate statistics either held at a distance 
or disappeared from consciousness altogether. Perhaps, as Butler further asserts, “There is less a 
dehumanizing discourse at work here than a refusal of discourse that produces dehumanization 
as a result.”29 Our shared vulnerability to loss is potentially something that might brings us closer 
to a sense of relationality, interconnectivity, a “tenuous we.” The experience of mourning the 
queer life in a public space involves a multitude.  
“Many people think that grief is privatizing, that it returns us to a solitary situation and is, 
in that sense, depoliticizing.” Butler continues, “But I think it furnishes a sense of political 
community of a complex order, and it does this first of all by bringing to the fore the relational 
ties that have implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility.”30 
Emotions are also private because they have no place in the public. Publicity is the realm of 
rational discourse and people are required to be in control of their emotions. Emotions are a sign 
of weakness and lack of self-discipline.  Emotions are an intrusion when they occur in public 
spaces. And emotions are of course gendered in notable ways such that this weakness is only 
tolerable in women, but only because a certain weakness is expected of women. However, this 
tolerance of emotional weakness has its limits. Beyond this limit, the public characterizes women 
as irrational, hysterical, and even dangerous.  
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It is difficult to imagine that we do not all feel grief. Butler writes of human vulnerability 
and how we are “undone by each other.” We are undone in grief, and she claims this reveals that 
we are undone by the desires that lead us to make intimate attachments in the first place. Our 
interconnectedness is revealed by grief. In losing someone, one’s own sense of self is altered and 
so is the “notion of ourselves as autonomous and in control.”31 The bonds of flesh that hooks 
refers to also entail vulnerability, to lose through grief and bodily harm.  This vulnerability can 
be a motive for some to seek even greater control and “fantasy of mastery,” but it does not have 
to. A recognition of our mutual vulnerability might heighten our sense of “collective 
responsibility for the physical lives of one another.”32 It is important to note that we are not all 
equally vulnerable to some kinds of loss. Queer bodies are often targeted for violence and live in 
a world with greater vulnerability. Likewise not all losses are publically acknowledged as loss.  
 Grief is a private matter but obituaries give public notice of the loss of some individuals. 
Some people are publically mourned and memorialized. The US does not memorialize those who 
died in Iraq or Afghanistan beyond the US soldiers. Iraqi artist, Wafaa Bilal, has done a 
performance piece, …And Counting, which memorializes Iraqis who died at the same time as it 
memorialized the deceased US soldiers. Bilal had a map of Iraq laved out on his back and 
tattooed in the names of Iraqi cities. He then had 100,000 of dots tattooed in green UVA ink to 
represent the casualties incurred in the corresponding cities. Yet another layer of dots were 
tattooed to represent dead Iraqis but these dots were created with a special ink that was only 
visible under UV light. In normal lighting conditions, all one would see would be the U.S. 
soldiers and the Iraqi deaths would remain invisible. While he was undergoing the tattoo process, 
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audience members would read from a list of the names of deceased Iraqi citizens.33 Do these 
deaths remain invisible in the U.S. because these lives are ungrievable? What would an 
emotional response to the loss of these lives mean?  Would it be a loss of control, a sign of 
weakness, or an acknowledgement of the shared vulnerability and interconnectedness? What 
would it mean to be interconnected with “the enemy”? Bilal felt the pain of this loss, and had this 
pain marked on his flesh. This was a very personal loss. He lost family members in the war, and 
the war was a kind of grief that was felt for a loss of place as well. Exiled from his home by war, 
having his country forever altered by a foreign power, also brought grief, personally felt, but 
with great political significance. It is also important to recognize “the radically inequitable ways 
that corporeal vulnerability is distributed globally.34  
 González-Torres created another kind of public memorial for his partner in the piece, 
Untitled (Portrait of Ross) 1991. This work consists of 175 pounds of hard candy in colorful 
wrappers piled up in the corner of a gallery. At least it starts out each day as 175 pounds of 
candy. Viewers are invited to take a piece of candy from the pile, thus the amount of candy 
dwindles over the course of the day and is then replenished at the start of a new day. One might 
approach this work with associations of happiness and childlike delight until one realizes the 
significance of the weight of the candy.  Portrait of Ross refers to Ross Laycock, González-
Torres’s partner. When he was diagnosed as HIV positive the doctor set his ideal weight at 175 
pounds. When we consume the happy candy we are metaphorically consuming the body of Ross. 
We are involved; we are implicated. Are we being asked to grieve the loss or celebrate the life, 
or, more likely, both?  Moreover, as hooks points out, we are pulled in “not simply through 
empathy with the artist but by way of our own relationship to loss, to absence, to leave-taking, to 
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remembered grief.”35 But I think it is important to consider this work as not only about loss. It is 
complicated by the relationality of the work and the community emergent in the experience of 
the work. Moreover, it is complicated by sensuality. In the moment we are not asked to eat a 
humble piece of bread that might befit the mourning of a life, but we are instead asked to enjoy a 
sweet treat. González-Torres said of this aspect of the work, “I'm giving you this sugary thing; 
you put it in your mouth and you suck on someone else's body. And in this way, my work 
becomes part of so many other people's bodies ... For just a few seconds, I have put something 
sweet in someone's mouth and that is very sexy.”36 Emotions are never singular and autonomous; 
rather they are a complex of intertwined and resonant multiplicity. They are also not removed 
from processes of thinking. The work is affective by drawing the audience into the work. It 
affects their bodies when they ingest the candy. The pleasure of the sweetness of the candy and 
the disjunction of the grief defies the opposition of thought and emotion in that the emotion is 
dependent on thinking through the significance of the material. Simply recognizing the bed may 
spur memory and feeling but to access the further layers of feeling one has to think on some 
level. I would argue that these are not separate actions but are deeply interconnected.  
 The erotic nature of affect, implicated in the González-Torres quote above, is more 
obvious in Untitled (Go-Go Dancing Platform), in which González-Torres places a small 
platform about two feet high with lights framing the edge in the gallery. Periodically a man 
dressed in jockey shorts dances on this small stage. Perhaps equally challenging to binaries of 
public and private, this work places a queer body of color in public space. “This Latino body, 
recontextualized within the space of the art gallery, disrupts its space.”37 The go-go dancer 
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associated with the “semiprivacy of dark clubs” performing in a high art setting challenges the 
opposition of private/public and high/low culture. The performance of the queer body and the 
eroticized Latino queer body is suddenly high art. Munoz writes about how the desire for the 
queer Latino body is often “compartmentalized” and “privatized” in gay male culture.38 
Presented with a lone figure dancing with headphones and a Walkman, we the viewer cannot 
hear the music. The dancing becomes something else without the music. One becomes conscious 
of silence. A body on display for erotic enjoyment is certainly nothing new for a gallery or 
museum space. But there is nothing coy about a go-go dancer. Blatant and unashamed, the 
dancer performs the ‘semiprivate’ the ‘compartmentalized’ in a space that is about a public 
looking, a publicity.  
Muñoz in his recent book, Cruising Utopia, expounds the importance of hope. Through a 
reading of Ernst Bloch, he offers hope as a “critical affect.”39  “On some level, utopia is about a 
politics of emotion; it is central to what Ernst Bloch called a ‘principle of hope.’ It is my belief 
that minoritarian subjects are cast as hopeless in a world without utopia. This is not to say that 
hope is the only modality of emotional recognition that structures belonging; sometimes shame, 
disgust, hate, and other “negative” emotions bind people together.”40 We cannot erase 
unhappiness in a rush to find the success of happiness, especially when the path to this happiness 
means conforming to the ‘happiness causes’ established by the heteronormative world. The way 
things are, the way that is presented as natural and inevitable, is unacceptable. “It [the present] is 
impoverished and toxic for queers and other people who do not feel the privilege of majoritarian 
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belonging, normative tastes, and “rational” expectations.”41 When it is rational to just accept 
things the way they are, then surely the failure to be rational might be a path to hope. 
Queer Failure 
 While Ahmed hopes to “unravel” happiness in part by making explicit what it means to 
be unhappy, in something of a parallel path, Judith Halberstam, in The Queer Art of Failure, 
champions the reconsideration of failure and the success/failure binary. In a society where 
success equates with economic gain and winning in a competitive, hierarchal world, why not 
take a closer look at failure as a way out of this mind set? Failure may “offer more creative, more 
cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world.”42 Happiness is certainly linked with 
notions of success. To refuse the call to mandatory happiness and stand out as an unhappy queer 
negotiates a different relationship to the success/failure opposition. Queer failure is about queers 
failing to be normal and not having to keep trying. Failing to succeed may sometimes be 
preferable to success, especially if success means perpetuating a society built on inequality; 
means living up to a patriarchal ideal, white supremacy, and violent gender norms. Queers have a 
different relationship to failure, considering that they know that socially/systemically legitimized 
success is simply not an option. Heteronormativity leaves no room for queer existence except in 
assimilation. Queer failure may be a good strategy in a time when so much political focus seem 
directed toward the heteronormative model of success. The feeling within a neoliberal positivist 
gay and lesbian politics may be that success in nearly in reach. For some few white, middle class 
gays and lesbians this may be true. Access to the dominant structures of proper families starts to 
seem feasible to some directed by a desire for the privileges of this life as well as a sense of 
belonging. This may look like political success. Yet is it? So perhaps we should attend to failure. 
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 Who decides what is a measure of success? What does striving for success do in the 
world? Success, like happiness, is also associated with maintaining norms. The paths to success 
are pathways to a normative life. Halberstam claims “failure allows us to escape the punishing 
norms that discipline behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us 
from unruly childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods.”43 And just as the prime happiness 
measure is proclaimed to be marriage, marriage is a sign of a successful relationship and a step 
toward mature adulthood. Queer failure denies the expectation of repeating the typical family 
structure, which is also associated with being a successful adult. “‘Advances’ such as gay 
marriage and the increasing media visibility of well-heeled gays and lesbians threaten to obscure 
the continuing denigration and dismissal of queer existence. One may enter the mainstream on 
the condition that one breaks ties with all those who cannot make it–the nonwhite and the 
nonmonogamous, the poor and the genderdeviant, the fat, the disabled, the unemployed, the 
infected, and a host of unmentionable others.”44  
 Being a responsible adult means having a secure job. The work ethic associated with 
success serves to maintain a consumer capitalist society. Diligent workers competing for a good 
job ensures productivity. It is also aligned with the myth of progress. The promise of working 
your way up in the company serves as a justification for all of the ‘entry-level’ jobs. All you 
have to do is work hard and success will be yours. Low-wage jobs are just a step toward success, 
which belies all the people who are stuck at this level. They are erased in the narrative of 
progress and success. They are invisible, or they just haven’t worked hard enough. What if 
success is not in reach for some people? What if this condition is systemic to capitalism? This 
model of success asks people without the means for success to try, try, try again. Perhaps, “if 
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success requires so much effort, then maybe failure is easier in the long run and offers different 
rewards.”45  
 In Queer Art of Failure, Halberstam gives us numerous examples of reading art with 
queer failure. One example is a photo series from 2001 by Tracy Moffat titled, Fourth. These 
photographs depict Olympic athletes who have come in forth place in their competition.46 
Typically the photographs are taken at just that moment of realization that they have lost. Weeks 
later they can talk about the joy of just being in the Olympics, but in that moment it is difficult to 
hide their devastation. The feeling is evident in the posture of the body, the expression of faces, 
even in images were the expression is one of blankness. Failure here is in a world consumed by 
success. Athletic competition at the international level represents a great deal of commitment to 
success. The commitment is not only to the individual success of the athlete but also to nation 
building. Halberstam make the point that television broadcasts in the US are orchestrated around 
those athletes most likely to win medals for the country. It is no coincidence that the richest 
countries experience the greatest success. At this level of competition even the losers are 
performing amazing feats, yet for someone to win in this context a whole lot of others have to 
lose.  What does it mean for these athletes to feel miserable even though they have really just 
done something quite amazing, something that even puts them in a rarefied category of an elite 
few? 
Queer failure involves “investing in counterintuitive modes of knowing such as failure 
and stupidity; we might read failure, for example, as a refusal of mastery, a critique of the 
assumptive connections within capitalism between success and profit, and as a counter 
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hegemonic discourse of losing.47 Returning to González-Torres’s work I explore some of 
Halberstam’s claims for a queer art of failure. González-Torres’s work can be read in relation to 
a ‘refusal of mastery” and as a complication to the relationship of capitalist accumulation and 
success. His work also relates to Halberstam’s claims for the queer resistance of collectivity.48 
Emphasizing the collective over the heroic individualism so closely wedded to success in the US, 
offers another way to resist dominant cultural logics. To acknowledge the collective is to 
acknowledge the dependence of the individual and question the illusion of self-sufficiency. 
González-Torres’s artworks and artistic process draw on notions of the collective.  
  “Without a public these works are nothing, nothing,” González-Torres insisted. “I need 
the public to complete the work.”49 This involvement of the audience also dislocates the typical 
relationship of viewer to art expected in typical encounters with art. These encounters usually 
take place in spaces designated for the consumption of high culture. González-Torres disrupts the 
usual relationship of viewer and work and the common consumer capitalist function of such 
spaces. The distance separating the work and the viewer is also broken down. The quotidian 
imperative, “don’t touch the art,” is overruled and, in fact, directly countermanded. bell hooks 
speaks to the potential this offers to those of us who experience the work. “Once we embrace his 
vision of the collapse of public and private, the convergence of the individual and the collective, 
we open ourselves to the possibility of communion and community.”50 Through a failure to 
perform the proper role of the author/artist, to take control of the meaning and demonstrate a 
mastery over the medium of expression, González-Torres promotes an interconnected 
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relationship within a multiplicity of participants. Individualism gives up some ground to 
community. 
 González-Torres’s practice not only puts work of a private nature out in the public by 
way of gallery or museum spaces; he also makes a point to ensure that some of his works at least 
will make it outside into the larger public realm. Along the way, he disrupts the way art operates 
as an autonomous commodity; he produces a failure in the capitalist exchange. He produces 
images intended for artistic display on billboards. For instance, spaces usually dedicated to 
commercial advertising instead host a photograph of an unmade bed. In contracting with a buyer, 
he stipulates that anytime the work is to be exhibited in a gallery it must also be displayed on at 
least one public billboard space.51 This confounds the operation of an art object that is owned by 
an individual. The owners cannot simply do with the work as they please. It also ensures that the 
work reaches a wider audience by extending outside the exhibition space proper. It puts the art 
collector in a different position. While the collector typically takes responsibility for upkeep of 
the work, which may produce additional expenses beyond the purchase price, now the collector 
also must purchase space on a billboard and produce a print to size. And this is not the only work 
that complicates the relationship of owner and object; the exhibition space must rejuvenate the 
candy spills every day they are on exhibit. The purchase of the work is a commitment to furnish 
what functions as a type of gift to the gallery patron. Of course most museums charge an entry 
fee so the candy is not always without a price. But the process of exchange is problematized and 
the work is resistant to the idea of the artwork as commodity.  
 González-Torres does not demonstrate mastery over any particular medium. In engaging 
with common objects that are ready made he sidesteps the expectation of the artist as master 
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creator. This is certainly not unique to González-Torres’s work alone, but it is yet another 
element of González-Torres’s embracing of what Halberstam would call queer failure. In 
Untitled (Last Light) created in 1993, González-Torres uses common everyday light bulbs strung 
together in a line of twenty-four bulbs. González-Torres not only refused mastery in the selection 
of common objects but also in the way that he allowed the work to be hung in any configuration 
desired. They could be hung from the ceiling, against a wall, or piled on the floor. He gave up 
control over the configuration and display of the work in favor of collective involvement. 
Two ordinary battery-powered clocks hang side by side in Untitled (Perfect Couple). 
They start out in sync but as the battery’s power drains at different rates, the clock hands fall out 
of sync and no longer match up perfectly. Eventually the batteries fail entirely and are replaced. 
Embedded in the work is the awareness of the inevitability of failure; failure of the batteries but 
also the failure to be perfect, to move in perfect alignment. It also relates to the loss of González-
Torres’s partner, as he and Ross embodied the “perfect couple,” and their lives feel out of sync 
due to Ross’s devastating illness. The bulbs too began with a piece that displayed only two bulbs 
side by side. Produced just after Ross’ death, it was dedicated to his birthday. Is a life cut short a 
failure? Life expectancies keep getting longer and the idea of a successful life is one long lived. 
And yet, life expectancy is not constant across different populations. Those living in poverty 
have a notably shorter live expectancy, and the life expectancy of those in the trans* community 
is shorter still. While it may be problematic to embrace a life cut short, certainly it is not 
acceptable that some die young because of systemic inequality, it is nevertheless important to 
resist a restrictive model of living without risk. Placing value on simply staying alive without 
consideration of the quality of that life is problematic. Staying alive is not the same as truly 
living. 
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Shirin Neshat evidences a different relationship to failure in both her art practice and 
artwork. In a lecture titled, From Photography to Cinema, given at Berkeley in 2013, Neshat 
took the audience through an overview of her career.52 She begins by speaking of how she was 
not a good artist in art school, how she barely got into a graduate program. After grad school she 
moved to New York and there decided that she was not an artist. The next ten years she did not 
engage in art production. Neshat started making work again after returning to her country of 
origin, Iran. There she felt the pain of feeling like an outsider in her own country and in her own 
family. And she felt the pain of seeing what had become of her country. She felt a need to 
express this pain and only then realized that her mode of expression was visual, not spoken or 
written language. She returned to making art, first with a series of photographs of Iranian 
women, Women of Allah. Neshat chose photography, even though she had not studied 
photography in school, and she had never even owned a camera. She gave up any need for 
mastery and through collaboration learned a new mode of working. Collaboration is like a giving 
up on the notion of self-sufficiency. It involves learning laterally and not only from an authorized 
expert. The photographs were inspired by the idea of religious martyrdom. They revolve around 
four objects: the veil, the weapon, poetry, and the female body. All of her work is “deeply 
personal” but also political. Neshat spoke of how working with the political might be a choice 
for certain Western artist, but for an Iranian artist it was a kind of inevitability. She gained a 
reputation and a degree of success in the US and Europe with these photographs. As soon as she 
felt she was being identified by this work she stopped making it and started working with video 
installations. This choice to stop making the work that was successful was risking failure, even 
embracing failure over financial security and professional acclaim. Again, once she achieved 
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success with video work, she stopped working with video and made a feature length film. She 
recently returned to photography after a six-year absence from the art world.  
The video installation titled, Turbulent (1998), features two videos projected on opposite 
walls of the gallery space. On one side an Iranian man, wearing a white shirt, sings in front of an 
audience of men also wearing white shirts. When the man finishes his song and the audience 
applauds, he then turns toward the woman projected on the opposite wall as if waiting for her 
response. The woman is filmed in what appears to be the same auditorium, but she faces only 
empty seats, and her back is turned to the camera and the viewer’s point of view. As she sings 
her voice shifts and become an unnatural sound. She does not turn at the end of her song and she 
is greeted by silence. Interestingly, the camera, which has remained fixed when filming the man, 
now moves around the figure. She is a fixed point. In A Queer Time, Halberstam writes of this 
piece as an example of an “aesthetic of turbulence” or in relation to what she terms as a 
“transgender aesthetic.”53 The space the gallery audience occupies is one of turbulence, being in 
between the two projections. “But the turbulence that Neshat’s video creates is specifically a 
gender turbulence, and the space between the male singer and the female singer could 
provisionally be called a transgender space in the sense that it conjures up a site between two 
distinct genders where social conduct, religious doctrine, performance rituals, and cultural 
histories clash.”54 I wonder if this work does not also relate to Halberstam's aesthetics of failure. 
The male singer performs “successfully.” He reaches his audience and moves them to applause. 
The female singer has no access to the means of success. But still she sings. The piece is in part 
about the difficulties of making art as a woman and the restrictions placed on women regarding 
public performance. Neshat made the choice to alter the voice of the female singer giving it an 
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otherworldly quality but also a harshness, a voice infused with an element of the disruptive 
character of noise. It is not a clean, naturalistic, communicative song but very emotive, almost 
tormented. She sings in relative darkness, “failing” to connect to the world. 
Both González-Torres and Neshat work in ways that challenge conventional notions of 
success: González-Torres through embracing connectivity and giving up mastery, Neshat 
through a practice that does not chase after commercial success and shows us the emotive power 
of a failure to communicate. In majoritarian culture, failure, though quite common, is 
unacceptable. We must all be winners. But most of the ways that people win necessitate that 
someone else, usually a lot of someone elses, must fail. To win a gold medal obviously means 
others must lose. Extreme wealth depends on systemic inequality. We cannot all be winners in a 
society that values hyper competition and capital accumulation. But we are all supposed to strive 
for success nonetheless, and those that are not successful, we are to believe, have simply not 
tried hard enough. Queer failure “is a story of art without markets, drama without a script, 
narrative without progress. The queer art of failure turns on the impossible, the improbable, the 
unlikely, and the unremarkable. It quietly loses, and in losing it imagines other goals for life, for 
love, for art, and for being.”55 Success and happiness are the epitome of the good life, but I have 
shown that they are also tied to the normative life. The pursuit of happiness often follows a 
narrow path. Hegemonic norms mold a world that is precarious for those who stray from the 
path. “We must stay unhappy with this world.”56 
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Chapter Four: Affected Minds 
 
  We don’t lack communication, we have too much, we lack creation. We lack  
  resistance to the present.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy  
 
Everybody knows very well that in fact men think rarely, and more often under 
the impulse of a shock than in the excitement of a taste for thinking.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy  
 
In previous chapters I have critiqued the binary opposition of mind and body, in part by 
insisting on the indivisibility of mind and body, in part by reasserting the body in the equation, 
and in part by insisting on the productivity of emotion and the queering of failure. In this chapter 
I want to again look at affect but this time I examine affect as molecular–affecting without being 
named or recognized and immediately enveloped by common sense opinion. I want to take up 
affect to help instigate the failure of reason, the limits of knowing, and explore the affectivity of 
the non-human. The affect in this chapter will be closer to Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
the term and will only tangentially address conventional emotions.1 Here I will consider affect in 
the sense of a being's sensitivity to being affected, or impacted by, and its capability to affect 
something else. This correlates with the notion that people are interconnected; they are affected 
and affecting. The logical mind cannot separate out emotions and sensation, and the human being 
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cannot separate out the surrounding world. Humans are affected and affecting, signaling the 
untenable nature of the individualistic, autonomous subject. This subject is founded on the 
duality of mind and body but also on the duality of nature and culture. In being affected we must 
acknowledge that both nature and culture have a profound impact on us, and hopefully this will 
also point to the profound impact that we have on our surroundings. For the rational mind to set 
itself apart there must be an irrational body. For culture to be set apart there must be an opposing 
nature. In essence, the domain of the rational mind is culture and the domain of the body is 
nature. Culture is the high achievement of the rational mind, forming the world from the raw 
materials of passive nature. I challenge both the assumptions of the rational, active mind and the 
assumptions about the passive, fixed natural world. I present a conception of nature as dynamic 
and forceful and challenge the idea that there is any meaningful distinction between nature and 
culture, while also complicating the distinction between subject and object. 
I have stressed in preceding chapters the necessity of subverting the mind/body duality. I 
am troubled by the idea that the mind is something separate, something that if we are dedicated 
enough, work at it hard enough, can be shielded from the contamination of emotion, 
contaminations of the body and all its automatic responses and desires. What if thought itself is 
just another emotion or desire, not a thing that is different in kind? What if the desire to 
understand is the same stuff as the desire to eat? I argue that we would do well to acknowledge 
or even embrace emotion, affect, as a part of thought. To the extent that we operate with the idea 
that we can access a purely logical mind, we are deluding ourselves. But are we are doing more 
harm that just this self-delusion? Certainly we can connect the operation of expelling the 
emotional aspects of thought with the expulsion of the unwanted “other” in so many dualistic 
pairs. Emotion is feminized and racialized. Emotion is the “natural” that must be suppressed, 
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controlled. Our concept of the rational mind is a construction but a thoroughly naturalized 
construction. It is how we represent the mind; it is how we recognize the mind, and it makes 
other possibilities unrecognizable, incomprehensible, unthinkable.  
Turning toward the mind then, I now look more closely at strategies to take down the 
constructs of rationalism. Not only does the body profoundly influence thinking, but I argue that 
the thinking mind does not work the way common assumptions would suggest. I argue, in short, 
that not only is the rational mind not superior to the body, even if we could manage to tease apart 
the mind from the body, but that the mind is incapable of the kind of rational thought it is touted 
to proffer. An objective position is unattainable, and thought processes, emotions, motivations 
are not transparent to the subject that experiences them. Minds are vulnerable to all kinds of 
internal and external foreign bodies, and minds are often wrong. When we believe in the innate 
capacity for objective logical thought these minds often continue being wrong with great 
confidence. This wrongheadedness is making some people’s lives less livable.  If one thinks that 
their conceptions of the world are based in rational thought, it is difficult to dislodge these 
conceptions. Thinking that people, or at least some people, are logical beings serves to conceal 
bias and ignore the ways that we are permeable to the world and radically dependent on the 
world and each other. 
 Thought and affect may be linked in all operations of the mind, but perhaps they are 
easier to recognize in art. I am suggesting art as a boundary crossing, art as an in-between, 
interstitial space. Art is a site where we might find the intermingling body-mind-world to be 
intelligible. If we can see the interconnected nature of thought, if we can see the illegitimacy of 
old conceptions of the rational mind, if we can see that a reliance on this kind of mind sets us up 
for a dangerous fiction of how thought works, then perhaps we can think a new world. Perhaps 
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we can revalue affect and with it empathy, give up the illusion and desire for control over, and 
reconceive ourselves as part of nature and as part of each other. 
I will begin this foray into the dismantling of rationalism, by means of the forces of 
affect, with a consideration of the theories of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Deleuze and 
Guattari set forth a concept of affect as a pre-personal force. Their theory allows for art as a form 
of thinking and a way of contributing to the future of a people not yet here. Sensation has a role 
in thinking in this model, and their concept of affect deemphasizes the ego in art and 
acknowledges the invisible forces at play everywhere. I am hopeful about an art that can be 
political, that can move away from instrumentality of markets and cultural capital, and that can 
go beyond common sense understandings or myopic engagements with self-referential art world 
preoccupations. Deleuze and Guattari about write art being made for a people to come, art 
created for the not yet here and calling futurity into existence, and art as a resistance to the 
present. “Books of philosophy and works of art contain their sum of unimaginable sufferings that 
forewarn of the advent of a people. They have resistance in common–their resistance to death, to 
servitude, to the intolerable, to shame, and to the present.2  
Deleuzian Affect 
Art thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects and percepts. 
 
       Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy  
 
 
Artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects. They not only create 
them in their work, they give them to us and make us become with them, they draw us 
into the compound.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy  
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Deleuze and Guattari call on us to resist the present and propose that both art and 
philosophy share this potentiality. The present is full of unimaginable suffering. The present and 
the history of capitalism prevent the becoming subject and insist on the inevitability of the way 
things are now, but creation, of concepts and affects, can lead us to a new future. “The creation 
of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist”3 
Artistic creation too is directed toward calling a people into existence. Deleuze and Guattari 
envision a people, a becoming, which resist the majority, a becoming minoritarian. The 
difference, for Deleuze and Guattari, between majority and minority is not one of size or 
percentages of the population. The majority is the dominant, normative model to which all are 
compelled to conform. The creative minority, creative in part because they do not or cannot 
conform to the existing model, this hoped for people “is not one that claims to be pure but rather 
an oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediably minor race.”4  
One might also think of the people to come as a queer people. In fact, in Cruising Utopia, 
Muñoz writes in a similar vein about a future not yet here, a queer future. Utilizing the ideas of 
philosophers from Bloch, Agamben, and Badiou to the phenomenology of Husserl, he writes of 
the “not-quite-conscious” as the “realm of potentiality that must be called on, and insisted on, if 
we are to look beyond the pragmatic sphere of the here and now, the hollow nature of the 
present. Thus I wish to argue that queerness is not quite here; it is, in the language of philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben, a potentiality. Alan Badiou refers to that which follows the event as the thing-
that-is-not-yet-imaged, and in my estimation queerness too should be understood to have a 
similar valence.”5 Potentiality differs from the possibility in that the possible is linked to the 
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present and the real while potentiality points toward a future not yet realized. Artistic affects and 
philosophical concepts can help us to image the future that is not yet thought, is not yet 
conscious. One of the ways that art can approach this, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is 
through the creation of affect and the struggle with chaos and against opinion. 
Deleuze and Guattari propose that art is a struggle “against the ‘clichés’ of opinion.”6 
Opinion functions as a barrier against chaos. Elizabeth Grosz tells us that chaos is “also known 
or invoked through the concepts of: the outside, the real, the virtual, the world, materiality, 
nature, totality, the cosmos, each of which is a narrowing and specification of chaos from a 
particular point of view.”7 Opinion covers over chaos and makes regular and predicable forces 
that are anything but.  I take from their concept of opinion a critique of dominant, normative 
ideas. ”The essence of opinion is will to majority and already speaks in the name of a majority.”8 
Those in dominant positions determine what counts as true opinion, and opinion becomes like 
the recognizable sign of the dominant group and determinant of its membership. Conventions 
and opinions act as a shield to keep out destabilizing forces, a shielding that the artist perpetually 
breaks open again. Artists struggle also against chaos but “in order to bring forth a vision that 
illuminates it for an instant, a Sensation.”9  From brief glimpses of chaos the artist finds tools to 
combat opinion. Art at its best does not rest on opinion but explores what might be hidden 
behind it, and this can have a queering effect by bringing forward what is hidden behind. Out of 
chaos, art isolates affects and precepts and opens up the ordered world of opinion, and as 
Elizabeth Grosz tells us, “affects and intensities attest to the body’s immersion and participation 
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in nature, chaos, [and] materiality.”10 While opinion allows the subject to ignore difference or 
singularities of perception in favor of a stable image of itself, affect can jar the subject out of 
automatic responses of recognition and into a state of thinking the new.  
Affect for Deleuze and Guattari is not the equivalent of emotion or feeling per se. Affect 
is what happens in between perception and action. Typically, the mind-body encounters 
sensation and acts accordingly, but this causal ordering is not always so simple and direct. For 
instance, hearing a car horn, the mind-body experiences the sensation of the horn before the 
mind/consciousness register an awareness of it, even before the body jumps in fright if we are 
startled by the sound, and long before we decide to step a little further away from the road. 
Affect is closer to the impulses in the nervous system than to the emotion of fear that we come to 
label the experience after the fact. Even if the car horn is a distant vibration that does not rise to 
the attention of the conscious mind the vibration if still felt. Affect avoids the production of a 
subject/object relation but instead engenders a relation of one vibratory body acting on another. 
‘I’ as a conscious subject does not register the sound but the body-mind, nevertheless, feels it. 
Once we recognize the sensation we can file it comfortably away without giving it any thought. 
However, what is compelling about affect for Deleuze is the fact that it does not necessarily 
result in action or recognition but does compel us to think. 
There are physiological stimuli that act so fast as to be over before they reach the 
conscious mind, but there are also affects that slow automatic, unthinking responses. A 
Deleuzian affect happens when one encounters a force that, instead of leading directly to action, 
stops or slows the reaction. Similar perhaps to the way that Deleuze writes in Cinema 2 about 
going beyond the sensory-motor response and experiencing “pure optical and sound situations.” 
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When perceptions and sensations do not immediately extend into action or habitual response, 
Deleuze tells us, they are allowed to directly contact thought. But Deleuze stresses that we 
develop a new image of thought. The mind is not the origin of thought but a point of turbulence 
within a multiplicity. The mind is not the ultimate attribute of the subject. “Deleuze refuses any 
‘intellectual’ account of being, any account that in any way subordinates being to thought, that 
poses thinking as the supreme form of being.”11 Deleuze want to avoid putting the mind above 
the body and the material. He challenges us to produce a new “image of thought” that refuses 
comfortable habits of thought and common sense opinion. In the next section I will address this 
affective queering of thought. 
Queering Cognition 
It is not enough to disturb the sensory-motor connections. It is necessary to combine the 
optical-sound image with the enormous forces that are not those of a simply intellectual 
consciousness, nor of the social one, but of a profound, vital intuition.  
 
Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2  
 
Thought rather than a common occurrence is only engaged in on occasion of a kind of 
shock. Deleuze opposes a notion of thought as re-presentation of the real or the recognition of a 
pre-given reality. The conventional image of thought is really a force of habit that simply repeats 
a common sense understanding that itself is built on assumptions of a common sense ordering of 
the world. Affect is that event that can bring about the shock to thought. Thought is not an easy 
and comfortable affair but is difficult and results from a disruption of ordinary processes of 
moving through the world. Thought occurs outside the boundaries of the existing order and 
challenges its bounded nature.  
We are affected by all manner of things in our surroundings and in our corporeality. We 
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are not, and cannot be, consciously aware of all these things at once, if at all. We are not self-
transparent. We do not fully know what we are affected by or how we are affect by it. 
Nevertheless, things outside our awareness most assuredly affect our thought processes. Many 
scholars have looked to psychoanalytic theory for this reason. I follow Deleuze and Guattari in 
rejecting psychoanalytic theory that is based on the Oedipus complex and the “daddy-mommy-
me triangle.”12 However, I do still hold to the general concept of drives and forces of which we 
remain unconscious. These forces do not have to be elaborate constructs of the psyche, however. 
They can sometimes entail being affected by simple stimuli or even the microorganisms living 
inside the body. In what follows I will describe a number of scenarios in which the thinking mind 
is queered through a little known understanding of perception, by the implication that certain 
bodily movements can affect judgment, and by the queer notion that bacteria in the intestines 
speak directly to the brain. 
 Perception of a stimulus may remain outside of awareness, and it would seem that 
perception can actually occur retroactively. Brian Massumi describes the research of Benjamin 
Libet to give an example of the enormous complexity of sensation and perception. Libet’s 
experiments found that a stimulus had to persist for approximately 500 milliseconds (or half a 
second) in order for the subject to be consciously aware of it. He was able to apply an electrical 
pulse to the brains of conscious patients, and he found that individuals very often respond to 
stimuli in time frames of less than half a second. This leads to the possibility that we are 
responding to stimuli of which we are not fully conscious. Our effective response is far more 
rapid than our conscious response. This would seem to require that we experience an odd lag 
between our actions and our consciousness of the “cause” of our actions. I might begin to swat at 
                                                      
12 Deleuze and Guattari. Anti-Oedipus, 51. 
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a fly prior to registering the fly’s presence. So why do we feel a synchronicity between stimulus 
and response? Libet theorized that our subjective experience is backdated. He also suggested that 
we make decisions before we are actually aware of them. He did further experiments to confirm 
his hypothesis. The subject’s decision to act registers as an electrical change in the brain, and it 
would appear that decisions can be made before one becomes aware that one has made them. 
According to Libet our awareness of our decision-making is also backdated. It is difficult to 
overlook the implication that our experience of actions and decisions are actually fabrications or 
in Massumi’s terms “hallucination.” In another section of the Parables of the Virtual, Massumi 
goes so far as to say “It is not possible to sustain a strict distinction between perception and 
hallucination.”13 Perhaps even more interestingly we are likely effectively influenced by 
numerous stimuli that never reach our conscious awareness, even as backdated fabrication. This 
includes influence on what we commonly think of as higher reasoning. As Massumi put it, “It 
should be noted in particular that during the mysterious half second, what we think of as “free, 
‘higher’ functions, such as volition, are apparently being performed by autonomic, bodily 
reactions occurring in the brain but outside consciousness.”14 The bodily is part of our thought 
processes, even our decision making processes, whether we like it or not, whether we know it or 
not.  
 To queer the mind further, other scientific studies suggest still more ways that stimuli 
have unexpected influences on what we commonly think of as the mind. There have been a 
number of scientific studies regarding the association between smiling and judgment. Tempered 
with the understanding that science does not possess an unproblematic relationship to knowledge 
production, these studies show some intriguing correlations. One such study looked at the 
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correlation between certain body movements and music preference. Some subjects were asked to 
engage the muscles associated with smiling (by holding a pen in their teeth) while others were 
compelled to suppress those same muscles (by holding the pen in their lips). In brief, those 
smiling were statistically more likely to report a preference for the music played.15 None of this 
necessarily means that this is biological destiny. Why this correlation exists is not explained by 
the study. Those executing the study may believe they have demonstrated something immutable 
and natural about the human animal, but there could of course be other explanation.  
This same study also had the participants move their head (up and down or side to side). 
It is not too difficult to guess which one was associated with positive response versus negative, 
but the experiments involving the movements of the arm were a bit more unexpected. 
Contracting the muscles that would bend the arm toward the body versus pushing the arm away 
from the body produced a similar statistical correlation. Moving the arm toward the body 
produced greater positive responses. Although neither the head movement nor the arm 
movement was as impactful as smiling, they still produced a statistically significant result.16 
What I find interesting about this, and other studies like it, is that it implies that the relationship 
of body and mind is perhaps more reciprocal that we usually think it is. A mind can make a 
decision about musical preference that is informed in part by an arbitrary movement of the arm. 
Perhaps decisions about musical preference are not the stuff of rational thought but it is 
nevertheless a conscious choice made by the ‘mind.’ But even at the level of emotional response, 
these studies are telling. Typically we think that if we feel happiness or pleasure or enjoyment 
then we smile in response. What is the implication if, on occasion, the emotions we feel are a 
response to our bodily movements? Many self help books tell us that having a positive outlook 
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will make us happier. This is one small item that serves to call into question the role of the body 
in judgment, in feeling, in thought. It points to a complex integration of body and mind, and 
embodied cognition. 
Another queer influence on the mind comes from the gut. It has long been established 
within the medical sciences that the bacteria living in the intestines of humans play a major role 
in the digestion of food, not just in breaking down the food but in proper absorption of nutrients. 
More recently, studies are looking at the role of these bacteria on the function of the mind. One 
such study found that bacteria possess both “mammalian neurohormones and their receptors” 
which “suggests the possibility of interkingdom signaling which could represent a heretofore 
unrecognized avenue by which both disease and homeostasis are influenced.”17 Signals are being 
sent from one species to another, but not only between different species, but different kingdoms. 
Mark Lyte, a researcher in microbial endocrinology, theorizes that the bacteria are signaling to 
the brain through the vargus nerve. “The ultimate result is that changes in microbial 
diversity…influences the function of components of the CNS (i.e. brain) as reflected in altered 
cognition, such as induction of anxiety-like behavior or changes in memory and learning”18 Lyte 
even speculates as to whether the microbes might be signaling the brain as to their preferred diet. 
How does this fit with common conceptions about the nature of the human mind? The 
autonomous, rational mind is actually interconnected with billions of microorganisms and 
disruptions in the balance of bacteria species correlate with a “spectrum of psychiatric symptoms 
including depression, panic disorder and generalized anxiety.” 19 I believe we must change our 
image of thought when we come to understand that microscopic organisms living within our 
                                                      
17 Lyte, "The Microbial Organ in the Gut,” 635. 
18 Lyte, "The Microbial Organ in the Gut,” 635-636. 
19 Ibid., 636. 
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bodies influences our brain chemistry, our emotions, and our thoughts. It is part of our common 
understanding that certainly things that we ingest can affect brain chemistry, but typically this is 
conceived of as the ingestion of medications–the product of advance medical science. Still the 
idea that living things, living within us, can have just as significant impact on brain processes 
might surprise many.  
Where do we draw the boundary between human and microbe? I think the relationship 
described above challenges the binary between human and nonhuman, a boundary line that has 
been drawn with great ferocity, due to the human hubris that we are totally unique on the planet. 
Related to this binary is the opposition between culture and nature. The human is above the 
nonhuman animal just as human created culture is above nature with the implication that culture 
holds the promise of controlling nature. Even early feminist theory tended to keep this binary 
functioning as it argued for the social construction of gender. Of course that was soon 
complicated. In Epistemology of the Closet, Eve Sedgwick muses about the “buoyant enthusiasm 
with which feminist scholars used to greet the finding that one or other brutal form of oppression 
was not biological but ‘only’ cultural!”20 While culture proved to be more intractable than 
assumed, so too did nature prove to be more dynamic. Nature was, and is, often assumed to be 
the stable ground on which culture acts. This leaves nature as fixed and unchanging but also as 
passive relative to the active forces of culture. Again I struggle with where we even draw the line 
of separation between the two conceptions. Generally, culture is that which is built or 
manipulated by human society. Are cows a part of nature or culture? Is a tree natural until it is 
milled into lumber? What about trees planted in regimented spacing along the side of road, 
absorbing the exhaust from passing cars, and trimmed to fit around the power lines? What about 
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“natural” disasters that occur when people build cities in flood plains? Is this the force of nature 
alone? What seems clear to me is that what we generally think of as nature is anything but fixed, 
immutable, or passive. As Massumi tells us, there is no decisive boundary between the categories 
of culture and nature, but both are becoming. “Becoming implies an emergent process which 
cannot be reduced to a binarism. Just as movement is a dynamic unity with location in space, as 
an emergent quality of movement, culture emerges from nature but does not separate from it. 
With this we can reject the separation of culture and nature and instead look to emergent 
properties of relationality or to a “nature-culture continuum.”21 
Nature Is Not Immutable 
Art is of the animal.  It comes, not from reason, recognition, intelligence, not from a 
uniquely human sensibility, or from any of man’s higher accomplishments, but from 
something excessive, unpredictable, lowly. 
 
Elizabeth Grosz, Shaos, Territory, Art   
 
In1978, the documentary the Secret Life of Plants was released. One section of the 
documentary is dedicated to the scientific exploration into the capacity of plants to respond to 
their environment, to in some sense feel. Researchers conducted an experiment with cabbage 
plants. They attached sensitive electrodes to the leaves of the plant to measure changes in 
electrical activity, using what appears to be an oscilloscope they observed the changes in wave 
formation to measure the plants reaction to stimuli. At one point in the documentary a voiceover 
tells us, “Research conducted in the Soviet Union lead scientists to believe that plants may 
think.”22 If so this would certainly queer the image of thought. Much of the research presented is 
a bit suspect, the study referenced by the narrator claims that a cabbage plant not only responds 
                                                      
21 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 11. 
22 Green, The Secret Life of Plants. 
  122 
when a technician destroys a nearby plant, but that the plant can pick that specific technician out 
of a line up. However, there is agreement in the scientific community that plants are plastic and 
responsive and communicate with one another through various forms of signaling. “The 
literature is replete with…studies demonstrating how plants use chemicals, contact, or various 
light wavelengths to transmit, receive, and evaluate information about their neighbors both above 
and below ground.” They communicate things like imminent drought or they communicate to 
prevent competition with other individuals of their species “favoring them over strangers, and 
hence facilitating kin selection processes such as cooperation and altruism, similar to what is 
seen in animal social systems.”23 Plant life communication exposes just one element of the vast 
interconnected natural world. And human life is a part of this world. 
As a part of the culture/nature binary, complicated of course with the need for shelter 
from inhospitable environment, most people live the vast majority of their lives in built 
environments that do not attempt to integrate elements of the ‘natural’ world. The habit of people 
to separate themselves from nature is detrimental. Nature affects humans just as humans affect 
nature. Plants are responding to their human cohabitants; there is a great deal of research as to 
the effects of different kind of sound on plants.24 Likewise, people respond to plants. There is a 
level of influence on human feeling and thinking that goes unnoticed and unacknowledged. 
Some recent research investigates the effects of green space on human health. For instance, 
studies show that children with ADHD who are exposed to green space for a period each day 
experience a statistically significant reduction in symptoms. “In a survey, parents of children 
with ADHD reported greater symptom improvement after children participated in activities in 
“natural” settings versus indoor or artificially built outdoor settings such as cement 
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playgrounds.” And “a recent study found that children with ADHD performed better on a verbal 
task sensitive to concentration after taking a walk in a park versus a residential or downtown 
setting.”25 The human refusal to acknowledge their own dependence and interdependence 
encourages the strict separation of built environment from natural environments. In the next 
section I will examine the work of an artist who complicates this separation. 
Natalie Jeremijenko: Queer Nature 
Natalie Jeremijenko is an artist and engineer with a background that includes studies in 
biochemistry, physics, and neuroscience. She works in a manner that shares commonalities with 
science, and some might argue that her work only shares a few commonalities with art. Her work 
is experimental in nature though not as rigorous in methodology as a typical scientist might 
prefer. Jeremijenko is concerned with revealing processes of nature and the environment that are 
not commonly considered. Her work questions our understanding of what is considered natural.  
Natalie Jeremijenko installed a piece at MASS MoCA in 1999 titled Tree Logic. This work 
incorporates six living trees. They are suspended from trusses and oriented upside-down. The 
roots are planted in large metal containers sealed and suspended from what resemble telephone 
poles. The suspension itself is startlingly. Trees are strongly connected to the earth in ubiquitous 
experience but also in ideas. Trees are firmly planted on the earth, in the earth. They seem solid 
and ancient. Seeing a tree knocked down by a storm gives one a sense of the awesome power 
that storm let loose. The suspended trees lose their weightiness, but more disconcerting still, the 
trees are hanging upside down. Jeremijenko was interested in the dynamic processes of trees, 
specifically their gravitropic and phototropic responses.26 Over time the trees have begun to grow 
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toward the sun, bending back towards their roots and taking on an unnatural shape. The work 
makes evident that nature is dynamic and moved by interconnectedness.  It also makes evident 
the instrumental relationship that we have with all aspects of the world. The trees are lined up in 
two rows, spaced as one might find them in a park or lining a street, functioning to decorate and 
beautify our orderly world. It also seems reminiscent of the kind of ordering inherent in our 
systems of knowledge, like cataloged specimens. And of course one cannot escape the sense of 
scientific experiment. In some strange way it is indeed an experiment based in scientific 
knowledge, a demonstration of phenomenon. The spacing separates the trees and makes each an 
individual example of ‘treeness.’ Their isolation in this arrangement still cannot separate them 
from their environment. The piece is following the habit of instrumental use and control over 
nature but is so far outside the ordinary, it creates that shock to thought. 
The concept of the piece is not just about the display of the inverted trees but also about 
revealing a generally unconsidered natural process in order to reconsider what in fact is natural 
about it. Plant life grows toward the sun and away from the earth, sensing the light (phototropic 
response) and gravity (gravitropic responses).  These responses follow set patterns. Jeremijenko 
is studying what happens to the patterns of growth in these displaced trees. Turning the trees 
upside down does a number of things. First, it creates a confrontation with a sense of illogical. It 
speaks to the sciences as systemization that pay little attention to practical logic. It speaks to 
control of nature. It displaces what is natural about the shape of a tree. But more importantly 
Jeremijenko makes evident the dynamic processes of nature. Nature is not passive or fixed.  
Currently, Jeremijenko is the director of the xDesign Environmental Health Clinic at 
NYU. This is a collaboration of artists and designers and it is modeled after a medical clinic. A 
visitor to the clinic meets with an artist like Jeremijenko and describes their illness or rather an 
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environmental health concern. The artist works with the individual to devise a prescription. An 
example of a prescription might be the directive to acquire a GreenLight, which is a plant in a 
self-contained maintenance device designed to bring air purification into the living space.  A 
more complicated prescription, NoPark, involved creating a miniature park in the unutilized 
spaces in front of fire hydrants. The plants do not impede the fire truck on the occasion when 
they require access, but they do provide a little bit more green space within an urban 
environment. “Micro engineered” green spaces, these parks actual filter the polluted run off from 
the roads before it makes its way into the sewage system. Jeremijenko presents us with a new 
way to think about the culture nature binary and perhaps a way to get closer to a new image of 
thought itself. 
Art has the potential, though often not attained, to make new thought possible. New ways 
of thinking are required for new ways of being in the world. Thinking is productive, not a 
passive observation. Thinking beyond recognition and opinion is an active engagement. And 
thinking is not the isolated work of the mind, but is the coupling of the mind and body, the body 
and world. Perhaps one of the greatest potentials for art in this project is the necessity that it 
engages sensation, activating the embodied and embedded subject. It can move us away from a 
conception of thought as the sole purview of the rational mind. The shock that makes us think 
might just be a visceral response to the unintelligible, that which does not make sense but is 
highly sensorial. Breaking with the ordinary is meaningful, or better, it is thought provoking. The 
world is stuck as we go through the routines of living. So, in line with Deleuze and Guattari, I 
have argued against opinion and for the desire to touch a bit of chaos and pull away with the 
new. The new is desirable, perhaps essential, for positive change. Change requires breaking the 
routine, stepping outside the ordinary, crossing boundaries, and rearranging stander couplings. 
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The world is in need of change and one possible direction forward–queer thinking for a new 
future. 
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Chapter Five: Art in Practice: Suitable for Wet Locations 
 
The preceding chapters have established that art is a productive approach to the challenge 
of breaking down the oppositional divisions of Western dualism. This chapter will address the art 
installation, entitled Suitable for Wet Locations, created in conjunction with this dissertation. In 
what follows, I think through my own work as an experimentation in what art can do, 
approaching art practice as another form of inquiry. I claim that my art is affecting and that art 
with the force of affect calls for both thinking and feeling and complicates an either/or 
construction of mind/body. In this material exploration, the primary dualism I address is that of 
culture/nature. I examine the both/and relationship of nature and culture. I explore how placing 
nature in opposition to culture also places it under the control of the human, culture-producing, 
subject. In this chapter, I also describe the processual nature of art and how this becoming rather 
than being resists fixity and standard subject/object relationships. The work is an event; it takes 
place through time and movement, as well as space. 
I begin with a straightforward description of the artwork to establish some basic sense of 
the subject under consideration. The installation is comprised largely of prefabricated industrial 
materials and living plants. Electrical metallic tubing (EMT) is formed into a framework that 
supports long trays of grass. There are six of these framework stations arranged in two rows of 
three on either side of a central channel-like space. The six are repetitions of the same basic 
design. The stations are seventy-eight inches tall and four feet wide. A horizontal plane, or plant 
tray, runs across the four-foot wide main frame approximately four feet off the ground. The 
plane itself is forty-two by twelve inches. This tray is covered by tautly stretched black plastic 
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with evenly spaced circular holes cut into the plastic. From each of these holes grows a dense 
bunch of grass. Water drips from above, coming out of four small spigots embedded into clear 
plastic tubing running across the top of the EMT frame.  The tubing runs up from a bucket 
housing an electric submersible pump. The water drips down onto the plant tray platform and the 
blades of grass. Some of the water seeps into the holes and some collects and eventually runs 
over the edge of the surface. Beneath this platform is a second planar surface. This plane also has 
a tightly stretched plastic surface. This plane is tilted at a slant so that the water runs down to one 
corner and off into the bucket with the water and submersible pump. The water is then pumped 
back up to the top continually circulating water through the system. The six plant sustaining 
stations are connected together with metal tubing running from the tops of framework. At the far 
end of the central channel between the two rows there is a screen with a video projection. 
Processual Emergence 
The work for this dissertation project is particularly focused on process and event rather 
than object and essence. In what follows, I address process in relation to how my work comes 
into being and is received by the viewer. And I also consider how a focus on process relates to a 
theoretical stance. Processes move through space and time; they are occurrences, events. Process, 
event, becoming, all stress a dynamic ongoing conception of the subject and the world. This 
moves us away from the images of fixed subjectivity operating on/against a static object. It offers 
a new image of the subject/object dynamic. In Semblance and Event, Brian Massumi tells us, 
“The world is not an aggregate of objects. To see it that way is to have participated in an 
abstraction reductive of the complexity of nature as passage.”1 The world is not a complex of 
objects but a multiplicity of occurrences. Objects are the result of processes but the process does 
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not stop with the completion of the object. Nor are subjects ever completed. Process implies 
something ongoing and changing, creating space for a more malleable vision of the world and 
becoming with the world. Suitable for Wet Locations is not merely an art object; it is an event in 
process.  
When I approach a body of work, I do not have a resolute form in mind. The process of 
making is a play of ideas and experimentation with materials. I am not concerned with 
representing something in the world; I want to create work that is felt as the world. Engendering 
the final form is a process of reciprocal thinking and feeling. I have a thinking-feeling that 
propels the process. As I consider materials and orchestrations of space, I imagine what they 
might mean to a viewer and at the same time how they might feel to the viewer. While I have a 
great deal of appreciate for works that are conceptually driven to the point of dematerialization, 
in my own work, I am compelled by the notion that the work can impact at the level of sensation. 
It can generate a visceral response–not a visceral response that shouts at the viewer but a quiet 
emergent thinking-feeling. In this dissertation, I posit that art is a kind of thinking: an embodied 
thinking, an affective thinking. As I work on this project, I feel my way through it; it is a feeling 
similar to Massumi’s “thinking-feeling,” distinct from recognition-action.  
But that thinking-feeling slips behind the flow of potential action that the objectness 
suggests. We let the vitality affect, the “uncanny” apprehension of the qualitative 
dimension, pass unnoticed. Instead, we orient toward the instrumental aspect of the 
actions and reactions that the perception affords. The self-reflexivity of the experience is 
backgrounded. The sense of relational aliveness disappears into the living.”2  
My work foregrounds the “vitality affect” and brings the relational forward.  
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When the viewer is presented with the work, it continues to function as process. It is an 
encounter between the viewer and the work. The installation is not an object that the viewer 
stands apart from and contemplates from a distance. It does not address a unified fixed subject 
placed in the perspectival position in relation to the work as an autonomous fixed object. The 
work is an event to be immersed within. The audience/viewer/participant3 experiences the work 
through space, time, and movement. In a sense, the process of reception is another stage of 
development or a continuation of the becoming of the work. Process takes place over time; it 
takes place through space; it is not singular or individual but rather relational. This shifts the 
focus from object to process, from individual to collective. The viewer experiences the work 
relationally and processually. The process makes the experience of sensation explicitly felt-
thought. “Art foregrounds the dynamic, ongoing relational pole. Everyday experience 
foregrounds the object-oriented, action-reaction, instrumental pole.”4  
Interconnecting Assemblage 
In the opening chapter of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari articulate their 
concept of rhizomatic multiplicities, which has resonance with the concept of relationality and 
process. Comparing the rhizome with radicular structures, they hail the rhizome as lacking the 
hierarchal structure of the root. A typical root structure has a dominant center or trunk with a 
unidirectional flow of water and nutrients from the small capillary roots back through the 
branching structure to the central root. The term rhizome literally refers to a plant that propagates 
by sending out horizontal subterranean shoots to generate a new node or plant. Compared to a 
radicular structure, the rhizome moves in all directs across a field where no one rhizome is 
anymore significant than any other, and new rhizomes are continually shooting out in new 
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directions creating plant nodes along the way. As a theoretical figure or model the rhizome can 
express the interconnected nature of the human subject. “Here in the West, the tree has implanted 
itself in our bodies, rigidifying and stratifying even the sexes.”5 In a rhizomatic mode the subject 
is not settled or complete but entangled with other subjects and other forces in a process of 
becoming. The rhizome queers subjectivity, and in this model Deleuze and Guattari assert that 
everything is interconnected: 
Multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent pseudomultiplicities for what they 
are. There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject.…A 
multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and 
dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature 
(the laws of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows). Puppet 
strings, as a rhizome or multiplicity, are tied not to the supposed will of an artist or 
puppeteer but to a multiplicity of nerve fibers, which form another puppet in other 
dimensions connected to the first.6  
Rhizomes are also related to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the assemblage. 
Assemblages too are mutliplicities–dynamic multiplicities linking together to form a transient or 
tenuous configuration. “Assemblages have elements (or multiplicities) of several kinds: human, 
social, and technical machines, organized molar machines; molecular machines with their 
particles of becoming-inhuman.”7 The elements of an assemblage are transitory. They begin to 
solidify to a degree as they become territorialized but always promise to become deterritorialized 
by new lines of flight. Assemblages represent an ongoing process in which multiplicities connect 
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and then branching off or disconnect entirely to combine with other elements forming new 
couplings. Lines of flight are ever-present resistances to dominant structures. Change and 
resistance are built into the system. Affect and rhizomes are related in that they both propel a 
way of thinking that moves away from a regular, taxonomical understanding of the world. 
In Suitable for Wet Locations, a multiplicity of elements come together to form a 
contingent unity, always maintaining the potentiality to take on new elements and new 
configurations. The materials used are well suited to working in a modular fashion. Modularity 
has the advantage of functioning much like organic growth. New cells are added on or sloughed 
off to direct the form and function of the organism. This installation is quite literally made up of 
an assemblage of elements. I have chosen to work with industrial materials with visible 
couplings. The electrical metallic tubing (EMT) is used in electrical wiring in all manner of 
structures in the US. The tubing can be formed to fit any location or circumstance, and the 
connectors are universal. The pieces can be formed into numinous configurations and dismantled 
and put together in a completely different way. Electrical conduit is visible in many buildings 
that have been retrofitted with new or additional electrical wiring. It is seen running along walls 
and across ceilings. I chose this material for its practical function, to carry electricity to the 
lighting for the plants, but also because what it makes is never a completed form. In a building, a 
new outlet can be added at any time by running another line of tubing, branching off an existing 
line or straight from the circuit box. The pieces are interchangeable and in a sense are in 
themselves modular. 
The potential disadvantage to modularity is that typically each unit must be nearly 
identical to fit in its place next to the others implying a rigid sameness. However, in organic 
modularity the cells can actually manifest a tremendous variety. The repetition in this installation 
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relates both to restrictive mechanical regimentation but also to cellular building which produces 
a vast array of different forms. There is repetition in the tubing and connectors, but also in the six 
repeating plant-sustaining stations, and in the repetition of the holes from which the repeating 
blades of grass emerge. Each repeating element connects to another element. Even the blades of 
grass have intertwined roots and connect in a very functional way to the dirt. Even the 
components that are not physically touching are connected. The light from the bulbs touches the 
plants. The pieces are interconnected and interdependent. Each of the six modules that physically 
support the plant trays also houses a process that forms a life support for the plants. Water 
circulates through the framework and lights provide a specific wavelength of light conducive to 
plant growth. 
The title of this installation, Suitable for Wet Locations, comes from a label imprinted on 
many of the components used to construct the framework. Namely, it is stamped on the light 
fixtures and the junction boxes. These elements meet building code requirements for electrical 
components located outside and exposed to the elements. Basically it is safe if they are rained on. 
I chose this phrase because it speaks to the divisions of inside and outside. It also calls into 
question just what might be suitable for a wet location and what kind of locations are wet. Bodies 
are wet. The term wetware is often used to distinguish living beings or the human brain from 
hardware and software, distinguishing biology from technology. These divisions are brought 
forward in this piece but as an assemblage that merges them all together. The boundaries are 
challenged and the affective quality of the work makes the interconnections palpable.  
Affect and the Event of Perception 
What is called "perception" is no longer a state of affairs but a state of the body as 
induced by another body, and "affection" is the passage of this state to another state as 
increase or decrease of potential-power through the action of other bodies.  
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Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? 
The creative project that accompanies this dissertation is an exploration of the idea that 
art can be affective. Art with the force of affect calls for both thinking and feeling. My process 
has always been entangled with theory, but the relationship of my own artwork to this 
dissertation is not one of mere illustration. Art practice is another form of inquiry. In this section, 
I address my own artwork in connection with the theories of affect articulated in chapters three 
and four. In this dissertation, art is a kind of thinking, an embodied thinking, an affective 
thinking.  
The work in this installation is meant to be affecting on many levels. Upon entering the 
space the viewer encounters the moisture in the air, and if they move close enough to the 
individual stations they can feel the light spray of water on their skin as the water drops bounce 
off the tautly stretched plastic. Viewing the grass pushing its way up through the holes in the 
plastic, one might even feel an empathy with the plants in their restricted boundaries or with their 
persistent movement toward the light. Every manner of movement surrounds the viewer: the 
slow movement of plant growth; the movement of water dripping from above the grass and from 
below, the movement of the images in the video projection, and the time lapse movement of the 
dandelion which grows among the grass. And the viewer’s body moves through the space to 
perceive the work. The objects are familiar but strange. It is not enough to imagine what the 
work looks like from the other side; the viewer must move their body to fully experience the 
work. Finally they experience the vibratory movement of all of the sounds. And as they move 
through the space the sounds change as they move closer to one element of sound generation and 
further from another. 
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Sound and Vibratory Affect 
“Vibrations, waves, oscillations, resonances affect living bodies, not for any higher 
purpose but for pleasure alone. Living beings are vibratory beings: vibration is their mode 
of differentiation, the way they enhance and enjoy the forces of the earth itself.”  
 
Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art 
 
Sound is part of the strategy of making Suitable for Wet Locations affective. To perceive 
we must be open to the world; we must be vulnerable to its impact, its affect. To perceive we 
must be open to the affect of forces of becoming. To hear a noise I am touched by the very 
vibrations moving at the origin of the auditory stimulus. The sonic vibrations touch the ears just 
as the water vapor touches the skin. But these things do not stop at the surface. Skin is a 
permeable membrane and water penetrates into the body. Sound too penetrates past the surface 
and resonates throughout the body. Sound can affect our internal organs as well as our mood. 
Sensation defies the boundary of the body; it extends the body beyond the skin 
The water drips slowing from four spigots running across the top of the EMT framework. 
It makes a kind of drumming noise as it hits the tightly stretched plastic surface. The rate of 
dripping varies slightly from one spigot to the other, and they do not drip in sync. The sound is 
rhythmic but irregular and changing. Some of the water collects on the surface and runs off the 
side of the platform. This movement is more like a pour than a drip, adding a different kind of 
rhythm. The second tier platform is larger and makes a different audible frequency when struck. 
The sounds of the water striking the surfaces are varied and changing. Yet if one stands still, or 
does not focus on an individual element, the sound of all six plant stations dripping and pouring 
combine into a din not unlike a steady rain. All the dripping starts to merge into one percept. 
Nevertheless, as one walks closer to any one of the six stations, the volumes shift and the closer 
sounds start to stand out and individuate. In this way sound locates the viewer in relation to the 
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objects and articulates their movements through space.   
 To add an additional component to the multiplicity of the installation, I made audio 
recordings of the dripping water and created a digital sound composition that plays through 
loudspeakers. The recorded audio serves to individuate elements of the sound, accentuating 
attention directed at selections of sounds. This cuts through the din of noise but also has a 
decentering effect on the viewer. These sonic stimuli do not have an object, a recognizable 
source. The live sound and the artificial or contrived sound of the recording coincide and 
entangle. The boundaries between them are unclear.  
The boundaries between subject and object are unclear as well. The auditory element 
intensifies the immersive experience of the work. In Suitable for Wet Locations, I chose to work 
with multisensorial installation. The viewer cannot stand outside the object of contemplation. 
There is no fixed object to be perceived by a fixed subject. The forms surround the viewer in 
front and back but also above and below. They are enveloped with tubing running above the their 
heads and plastic sheeting, covering the floor, crinkles under foot as they traverse the space. The 
immersive experience plays with the illusion that the individual can control their reaction to 
sensations, control affect. The moisture from the spray will be absorbed into the membranes of 
the skin no matter what one thinks about the water. The plants will clean the air they breathe no 
matter whether anyone gives a thought to this process. Maneuvering through the space will make 
an impression on the body and will engage proprioception. The synaesthetic experience will 
make any simple reading of the work, like a one to one language, impossible. The body will 
insist on its presence during the event of perception. The work as event queers the subject object 
relationship with affective reverberations of the interconnections, couplings, and assemblages 
calling into question the distinctions of the built and natural world, of culture and nature, and of 
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human and nonhuman life. 
Controlling Boundaries 
Emotion is another facet of affect. Affect can blur the boundaries between subject and 
object, and emotion can blur those between self and other. Emotion and affect can also queer the 
rational, sovereign subject. In previous chapters, I addressed this subject, engendered by Western 
dualism, and its illusions of control and self-mastery. Dichotomous thinking leads us to imagine 
we can and should control our emotions and, by extension, we can and should control nature. 
Emotions, sensations, and bodies threaten because they are out of the control of the rational 
mind. The non-normative threatens the control of the hegemonic normative order. I posit we 
must give up control and reconceive the subject as vulnerable and interdependent. Chapter three 
covered issues of emotion and focused in part on happiness, critiquing research in happiness 
studies with a queering of phenomenology. I now investigate happiness in the context of a 
subjectivity that fails to control: emotions, sensations, nature, and even the suburban lawn of the 
American dream. Suitable for Wet Locations is, in part, an inquiry into the regimentation, 
instrumentalization, and control that are functions of this promise of happiness.  
Daniel Gilbert, a professor of psychology at Harvard University and author of Stumbling 
on Happiness, claims that humans have an innate desire for control, not just for what practical 
effects this control can bring them but because “people find it gratifying to exercise control.” 
This control is a large part of happiness. His work fits within the trend toward happiness studies 
addressed in chapter three. Gilbert declares with great confidence that control “is one of the 
fundamental needs with which human brains seem to be naturally endowed.”8 But he has a rather 
loose and shifting definition of “control.” In many instances it would seem like a better word for 
                                                      
8 Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness. 22. 
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what he is addressing might be agency or even affect. I find it disconcerting to conflate the 
meaning of the words ‘control’ and ‘affect.’ Control implies control over with implications of 
dominance. Gilbert reads the joy of a toddler knocking over a stack of blocks as the child’s 
desire for control. Clearly the child does not have control over the blocks. The blocks fall in a 
seemingly random manner. The child affects the blocks, and the child is affected by their 
movement in return. Rather than understanding this as evidence of the innate need for control we 
might instead image the child’s joy coming from a being in the world and a coming into being 
with the world.   
“Our desire to control is so powerful, and the feeling of being in control so rewarding, 
that people often act as though they can control the uncontrollable.”9 Apparently people do not 
enjoy watching a recording of a football game, with the winner already decided, as much as 
watching the game live because there is no possibility to influence the outcome. Gilbert suggests 
that much of our sense of control is illusory. However, he claims that one group “immune to this 
illusion are the clinically depressed, who tend to estimate accurately the degree to which they can 
control events in most situations.”10 Thus leading some psychologists to believe that the “feeling 
of control–whether real or illusory–is one of the wellsprings of mental health.”11 It is interesting 
that the conclusion is that those who are prone to illusions are the mentally healthy. Believe that 
you have control and you’ll feel better. Have a positive attitude and you’ll be happy. Perhaps 
rather than encouraging delusions of control we might work to alter the world so that there are 
not so many people who lack agency in their lives. Perhaps these researchers might consider that 
this illusion is easier to maintain for some people who happen to be privileged by living in a 
                                                      
9 Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness. 23. 
10 Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness. 24. 
11 Ibid. 
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world that essentially tells them they are, or at least should be, in control.  
 Sara Ahmed offers compelling insights in The Promise of Happiness. Some people have 
greater access to the means of control or, at least, to greater choice and agency. She also points to 
the danger of claiming that happiness is a character trait. Ruut Veenhoven is another scholar 
associated with happiness studies, and he is director of the World Database of Happiness and 
founding editor of the Journal of Happiness Studies. In “Questions on Happiness,” he describes 
the “distinctive personality profiles” of the happy person.12   
Happy persons are more likely to be found in the economically prosperous countries, 
whose freedom and democracy are held in respect and the political scene is stable. The 
happy are more likely to be found in majority groups than among minorities and more 
often at the top of the ladder than at the bottom. They are typically married and get on 
well with families and friends. In respect of their personal characteristics, the happy 
appear relatively healthy, both physically and mentally. They are active and openminded. 
They feel they are in control of their lives. Their aspirations concern social and moral 
matters rather than money making. In matters of politics, the happy tend to the 
conservative side of middle.13 
While this seems to be describing people who might have a greater sense of control, this control 
comes from privilege not from good character. In an individualistic society, a happy life is 
assumed to be about making the right choices and having a positive attitude; unhappy people 
have just made bad choices; their happiness is completely within their control and has nothing to 
do with systemic conditions. They are failures in a world of positive thinking.  
                                                      
12 Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness. 10. 
13 Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness. 10-11. 
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Immaculate Lawns and the Failure of Weeds  
In the chapter, “Queer Emotion,” I wrote about how happiness directs us toward happy 
objects. In turn, the promises of, and threats against, happiness direct us toward “happiness 
causes” which often turn out to be societal norms. Marriage and family are among the chief 
happiness causes. Ideally this family is middle-class, majoritarian, and on the “conservative side 
of middle.” The image of the ideal family also entails the happy suburban home. This home is 
surrounded by an immaculate lawn, even if the white picket fence is less common than it once 
was. The lawn must be uniform in plant type, color, and height. The weed is a sign of failure; it 
is out of control. Here again I draw inspiration from The Queer Art of Failure. The ideal lawn 
has its nemesis, the weed. The lawn is only a lawn by keeping anything not proper grass out. A 
weed is defined in context. The weed is the plant that grows where it does not belong. The 
belonging is decided by the ideal and by the drive to master nature. The suburban yard is ideally 
homogeneous, much like the ideal suburban human population.  
In Suitable for Wet Locations, I created mechanisms that sustain living plants, 
specifically grass. The grass might make one think of a grassy lawn, or a row of decorative 
plants, or even rows of crops in a field. These all have in common the evidence of human 
domestication or a functionalist approach to living forms. The shaping and spacing of the plants 
in this installation imply associations with control and regimentation. I think of this controlling 
environment as related to the control necessary to create the immaculate ideal lawn. The grass 
grows from sixteen evenly spaced holes cut in the plastic. It creates a very restrictive 
environment for the grass, but at the same time it speaks to the resiliency of plant life and to the 
futility of efforts to control. Plants will grow up from the cracks in a sidewalk as these blades of 
grass find their way through these small holes. We do not have control over plants because we 
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plant them in rows; the life processes continue without our instigation. We affect; we do not 
control. But this illusion of control and the boundary created between culture and nature also 
serves to obscure the affect that our surroundings have on us.  
Letting plants mingle is a “failure” of lawn maintenance. When a plant grows in the 
wrong place it is a weed. Even the coveted grass is a weed if it grows in the wrong place. 
Keeping everything separate is a never-ending endeavor, and it is an illusion. Lawns require a 
great deal of maintenance: watering, weeding, mowing, trimming, raking (or leaf blowing), and 
fertilizing. In the installation, one of the holes does not have grass growing up through it. If one 
moves closer to observe why, one will see a small video display screen with a time lapse image 
of a dandelion flower blooming. This is a failure in the other wise uniform growth, but it is 
virtual failure. The weed is not growing in the space but is merely a moving image. The time-
lapse video speeds up the movement of the plant and makes the movement of the growing grass 
more present. Plant life is not static but has a different durationality. The time-lapse image 
reveals the becoming of the plant life.  
 The grass blades grow toward the light placed to the side of each plant tray. This too 
speaks to the dynamism of the plants. These trays are the same ones used by nurseries in 
cultivating plants to sell to consumers. A single species growing like specimens in trays remind 
one of the classificatory approach to nature and the cultivation of different categories of plants 
for different purposes. We have a classificatory division among plants but also between plants 
and beings in other kingdoms. Placing plants and animals in separate kingdoms implies a 
fundamental and grand difference, a boundary that is profound and cannot be trespassed. We 
place an even stronger boundary line between humans and animals despite that fact that we are in 
the same kingdom. Many seem to have difficulty conceiving the human as animal and plants 
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barely even register as alive. 
In this installation the grass does not grow in the ground but is held aloft defying 
expectations of grass growing up from solid earth. This serves to take the grass another step 
outside of ordinary perception as a simple recognition. Combining the movement of the video 
with the implied movement of living plants, and recorded sound with live sound, as well as 
defying expectations of easy recognition all serve to queer perception and generate affect with 
the ultimate goal of queering thinking to bring about a different future. 
Shock to Thought and Thinking the New 
The boundaries between culture/nature and human/animal remain in place in a great deal 
of common thought. The body is lesser than the mind in part because it threatens to reveal that 
humans are animals. Humans are thought to be far too clever to be animals, but there are many 
clever non-human animals. An octopus can open a glass jar containing some tasty treat in under 
a minute if it has encountered such an object before. Presented with a jar for the first time it 
might take five minutes. Apparently, it would take a monkey closer to a month to figure out how 
to open a jar. Presented with a childproof bottle it might take the octopus an hour to complete the 
task. Yet the octopus brain is nothing like that of the monkey or other primates-like humans. 
Octopi do not have a cerebral cortex and about two-thirds of their neurons are located in their 
arms.14 This does not limit the octopus’s capacity for thinking, acting, affecting and being 
affected. Perhaps if humans had such an arrangement we might find it easier to avoid imagining 
the brain as a separate entity from the body. The human brain is contained in a centralized 
location but it does not do its work in isolation. While we may not have neurons throughout our 
bodies the body has a profound affect on thinking and other processes of the brain. This queer 
                                                      
14 Courage, “Octopus Help us Understand.” 
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image of thinking might be enough to shock one out of conventional assumptions. 
Normative and dualistic thinking continue to create and oppose categories that, in 
themselves, have no clear boundary. The mind and body continue to be divided in two. Art 
practice can be one of those queer things that fall outside the boundaries and pushes against the 
skin of bounded social forms and concepts permeating the subject and the object, the mind and 
the body, the cultural and the natural. Suitable for Wet Locations is an experimental approach to 
the potential of art practice to create positive difference. The theorem is that art can queer the 
image of thought, promote new ways of thinking, and generate new practices of knowledge 
production. It can provide that shock that compels thought that breaks free of recognition and 
opinion and steps away from the ease of common sense. Certainty of opinion is the enemy of 
those that do not fit into the well-worn concepts of the individualistic self and humanist 
rationalism. Subjectivity is not rational and self-transparent but is in process and never complete. 
This situation allows greater potential for an encounter to result in change. It allows for the event 
to impact the decentered and proccessual subject and generate transformation. We are not closed 
off entities but are instead open to the world and open to the potentiality of change.  
Art has long had a reputation for producing shocking material, whether on moral or 
aesthetic grounds. Many have charged artists with being deliberately shocking for the purpose of 
gaining attention. This is not the kind of shock promoted here. The shock I am writing about is 
not to produce outrage; outrage is just as likely to solidify opinion as to produce new thought. 
The kind of shock sought in this installation necessitates the difficult work of thinking. The 
affective nature of the work interrupts recognition and response and creates that pause after the 
first impression of a sensation. Affect compels a consideration of the work on a different level. 
There is something very familiar about seeing plants growing in rows, about seeing grass 
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growing in contained areas, about hearing water dripping, yet something decidedly strange about 
how they appear in this context. Plants in rows have become normalized to the extent that we no 
longer notice. Lawns are ubiquitous and we fail to consider how they function or how they came 
to be. Queering this arrangement brings this backgrounded nature into full view. It immerses the 
viewer in a thinking-feeling event in the simultaneity of the process of “natural” growth and 
technological sustenance. Suitable for Wet Locations generates the opportunity to think anew. 
This is not an attempt to put nature on a pedestal as all good. Placing something on a pedestal is 
still a process of othering. This is not a scenario in which nature is simply good and 
human/technology is all bad, but speaks to the resiliency and dynamism of nature and the 
interconnectedness of human, nature, and world.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
A queer aesthetic can potentially function like a great refusal because art manifests itself 
in such a way that the political imagination can spark new ways of perceiving and acting 
on a reality that is itself potentially changeable.  
 
José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia 
 
This dissertation established the central role of affect and embodiment in the ongoing 
struggle to create a new image of thinking that disrupts Western dualism. Embodiment counters 
the separation and elevation of the mind and the assumed universal subject implicit in 
conceptions of the mind. This is a matter of great significance as the binary conception of the 
mind versus body consistently reinforces subordination of anyone designated as connected to the 
body. Sensation and affect permeate the embodied subject, which defies the rationalist 
conception of the autonomous subject and the accompanying will to control and assumptions of 
self-transparency. I have shown how art is of sensation and affect and continually implicates the 
mind. The body-mind is affected and affecting, proving the interconnectedness of the subject, 
including a connectedness to the subjects’ environment. I challenged the opposition of 
culture/nature, and determined that the control of nature is implicated in the will to dominate the 
“other” and in constituting the illusion of the control of self. Through this inquiry, I established 
that art can affect the viewer and amplify the idea that nature is not an immutable ground to be 
controlled but is instead an active force constantly in motion and shaping the subject. It is vital to 
recognize the reciprocity and relationality in the subjects encounter with the world.  
The Force of Embodiment  
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Embodiment insists on a located, thinking-feeling subject. This dissertation has shown 
the vitality of embodiment for challenging dichotomous thinking. This is not a preferencing of 
the body or an attempt to bring the body up to equal standing with the mind, but a move to queer 
the distinction. It is not enough to look at the body as a countermeasure; we must consider the 
entanglements of phenomenal experience, social condition, physiological capacity, sensoriality, and 
cognition.  Art proves to be a strategic approach to evidencing this entanglement. Art’s materiality and 
processuality foreground linkages to phenomenal experiences of body-mind-world. Through an analysis of 
artworks by Janine Antoni and Mona Hatoum, I demonstrated that art can reveal bodily 
processes and produce a bodily awareness at the point of contemplation. Antoni showed us the 
weight of a bodily engagement with materiality and spatiality. Hatoum showed us a queer 
orientation toward domestic objects, inspiring wonder rather than recognition. Phenomenal 
experience orients mind-bodies in the world in ways that often go unnoticed and this dissertation 
offered the queer notion that we should pay particular attention to what is backgrounded. 
Interconnected and Interconnecting Sensations 
A located embodiment reveals the interconnectedness of human subjects, as does affect 
and sensation. External as well as internal forces affect us; consequently, we must acknowledge 
that we are not completely autonomous individuals. Thinking Bodies and Sensational Minds, 
established how emotion, affect, and sensation interpenetrate utilizing a selection of artists to 
think through the implications for art practice. Artists Christina Kubisch, Laetitia Sonami, and 
Pipilotti Rist exposed the vulnerability of the human subject to exterior and interior sensations. 
Subjects are not bounded by an impervious membrane separating them from the world, rather 
they are beings of sensation that are touched and permeated by the world. 
Sensory perception is often thought to reinforce the boundaries of inside and outside and 
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of subject and object. But this dissertation has offered a way to think of sensations as relational. 
We do not sense unless we are exposed to stimuli. The stimulus is just as much a part of the 
process of perception as the apparatus of sense perception. Sensation does not draw a line 
between subject and object, but instead sensation proves the relationality of subjectivity. The 
artists in this chapter revealed the subject as immersed in sensation, and gave us a way to look at 
perception as the dynamic experience of an event rather than an object. 
Sensation is omnipresent yet generally neglected in many post-enlightenment Western 
conceptions of subjectivity. However, these conceptions grant the sense of sight a special status 
because of its relationship to empirical knowledge and they extend this sensory perception 
through scientific instrumentation. We can see the microscopic, the astrological, and we can see 
inside the workings of the brains itself. Researchers often study other sensory phenomena but 
rarely consider their influence as factors in the formation of knowledge. We cannot fully separate 
sight from the other senses any more than we can separate the mind from the body. Sensations 
intermingle and precede conscious thought and awareness and often remain in the background 
even as they influence processes of thinking and decision-making. Emotions similarly influence 
thinking but are relegated to the other of the rational mind. 
Queering Happiness and Failure 
Emotions are things to be controlled, held in check by the rational mind. I have 
problematized this notion and shown emotion to be indispensable to the thought processes of an 
embodied subject. A full range of emotions inform a thriving body-mind. Emotions keep one 
connected to others. Some emotions have been more valued than others, and happiness has a 
growing popularity and a field of study named after it. Looking at happiness in isolation from 
other emotions is the first sign that there may be problems with happiness studies. Emotions, like 
  148 
nearly everything else, are interconnected. Not surprisingly, considering the value we place on 
happiness, many are looking for happiness causes. These scholars gathering data on happy 
people and then make the leap that things associated with these people are causal. When 
happiness causes start to look like normative majoritarian values then hegemonic norms become 
the prescription for a happy life. When the oppressed are not happy with their lot in life, it is 
looked on as a character flaw rather than a critique.  
In this project, I examined what we might learn from emotions like grief and failure 
rather than accepting this prescription for happiness. Grief proved to be revealing regarding the 
intensity of intersubjectivity. Grief is an extreme form of affect and exposes the degree to which 
our relations to others affect us. When we feel the devastation of loss, we can also see our 
interdependence with other beings. Grief can also make the body feel sick, and it can make 
concentrated thought seem impossible. It is not contained within the boundaries of emotion 
alone. It seeps through all aspects of experience permeating the human subject. Boundaries do 
not restrict what grief can access; it is only restricted in our images and thoughts. The artist Felix 
Gonzales-Torres made grief palpable but also complicated this emotion with sensuality and 
reciprocity. He defied the boundaries of public and private by sharing his grief it public spaces. 
He also shared material items such as candy and posters, defying boundaries of individualistic 
consumer capitalism.  
It is customary to see emotion as a failure of reason and to see any kind of dependence as 
a failure of character. I identified a framework in which failure is mobilized to resist a 
majoritarian standard of success. Sometimes things are more ambiguous and complicated than an 
either/or scenario. Furthermore, when success means assimilating into an unequal social 
structure, then we should challenge this as a goal. This dissertation showed how queer failure can 
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be a model for a more livable future. We should consider the failure to control bodies, emotion, 
nature and the other as productive of positive change. 
 Nature, like emotion, fails to stay within its proper boundaries. Nevertheless, a persistent 
attitude has it that the natural world must be controlled just as the animal within the human must 
be subordinated to the cultural intellect. This attitude diminishes nature at the same time that 
researchers look for ways to establish difference as natural and immutable. A quick Google 
search of neuroimaging tells us that, “Brain Imaging Studies Show Different Cultures Have 
Different Brains” and “Male and female brains wired differently, scans reveal.” This is a curious 
desire to make cultural norms innate, natural, and inevitable, and it leads people to speak of 
brains as “hard-wired.” However, this is in direct contrast to the understanding of neural 
plasticity.1 The brain changes over time and how it changes depends on factors as diverse as 
what activities we engage in to what microorganisms live in our gut. How we think about 
thinking matters in how we act in the world.  
 Ascribing some things as human nature implies that they are unchanging and 
unchangeable. If some tendency of behavior is “in our nature” then we should give up hope of 
altering this behavior. But the brain is not hard-wired and there is nothing inevitably fixed about 
nature. Culture, thought of as what we build ourselves and seemingly under our complete 
control, is compared to nature, thought of as the ground upon which we build. This project 
revealed how the line between culture and nature is untenable, and it demonstrated the dynamism 
and force of nature. Through an analysis of the artwork of Natalie Jeremijenko, I was able to 
problematize common conceptions of the natural world and established that art can reveal the 
uncommon and generate new ways of thinking beyond comfortable assumptions about how 
                                                      
1 See Huttenlocher, Peter R. Neural Plasticity: The Effects of Environment on the Development of the Cerebral 
Cortex. Cambridge: Harvard University press, 2002. 
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nature works. 
This dissertation has exposed the dangers in fixed opinion and how dualist thinking 
works in tandem with hegemonic norms. Norms do not need to be explicitly declared.  We come 
to understand dichotomies, such as how the mind is separate and superior to the body, without 
necessarily even giving the issue any thought. Thinking is hard work and opinions and norms are 
ready at hand. We cannot go through life thinking through every encounter. Each time I 
approach a chair I do not evaluate its shape, imagine its function, and calculate how much it can 
support. I simply sit down if I need a rest from standing. Recognition without thought is practical 
and necessary, but if we reduce too many experiences to recognition, informed by pre-
established opinion, it makes the world inflexible and intolerant of those items that do not fit. 
Thinking of everything as fixed creates a resistance to change. The force of affect breaks up the 
fixity of opinion and art can cultivate affective encounters.  
The Processual Becoming of Art 
 This dissertation stressed the importance of a new image of thinking, and it demonstrated 
that art has a role in creating this new image. So much art fights against boundaries, even the 
boundaries of what constitutes art, and art wields the tools of thinking, but also sensation and 
affect. These are effective tools against boundary lines drawn between mind and body. Art is 
experiential, even art that presents itself as a fixed object is experienced through sensation, 
within space and over time. Artists can choose to accentuate the experiential nature of art and 
make this process present for the viewer. 
This dissertation has travelled through the interstitial spaces of a dualistic conception of 
subjectivity and sociality. These spaces have been located by examining the binary divisions of 
Western dualism but must not stay tied to this thinking. The work of this dissertation was to 
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imagine a new way of thinking, one not restricted to either side of the binary. Ideally, this new 
image of thought does not remain tied to the two poles established by dualism, rather it 
dislocates the oppositional poles and puts all into a relation of multiplicity. It has been 
challenging to write this critical study without using the very words so anchored to dualistic 
thinking. Our vocabulary is inadequate in addressing interstitial thinking or in thinking of affect, 
sensation, or nature. We do not think merely with the brain or feel with the heart and one without 
the other would be useless.  
This dissertation asserted the problematic of Western dualistic thinking. Dualistic 
thinking is a part of the maintenance of a stratified society. Dividing all difference into 
oppositional pairs also hides from view the vast multiplicity of difference. This thinking reduces 
everything to fit on one side or the other. Nevertheless, excess always frustrates this system. 
Nature will not stay in its place; femininity will not stay within its bounds; and emotions bubble 
up over the edges. Opinion fixes experience to a restrictive model that makes so much of the 
world disappear into mundane recognition. Layers of sedimentation make things seem solid, but 
everything is in motion. Lines of flight continually change the shape of tenuous assemblages. I 
mobilized examples of art that move against sedimentation. My own art production performed as 
a mode of inquiry into a queer aesthetic. The installation accompanying this dissertation 
materially explored some of the same issues expressed in the written text. It challenged the 
dichotomy of nature and culture with an assemblage of parts entangled together in a process of 
becoming. This entire project with text and art together challenges divisions of discipline and the 
separation of knowledge production in to discreet field. Through material experimentation and 
text-based inquiry, this project enacted a process to change our image of thought and opened up 
as space to think the new. 
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